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141018/018 
IN THE DISTRICT COLJRT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRJCT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AATI FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
JANET BELL NIGHTENGALE, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
JASON QUINN, M.D.; IDAHO 
EMERGENCY PHYSICIANS; P.A.; KEVIN 
MA TIHEW TIMMEL, M.D.; AND 
EMERGENCY MEDICINE OF IDAHO, 
P.A., 
Defendants. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
: S8. 
County of Canyon ) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
CASE NO. CV-OC-0722814 
AFFIDAVIT OF KEVIN E. DINIUS 
IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S 
REPONSE TO DEFENDANT 
KEVIN TIMMEL'S MOTIONS IN 
LIMINE 
KEVIN E. DINIUS, being first duly swom, deposes and says as follows: 
1. I am one of the attorneys of record for the Plaintiff in the above-entitled action, 
AFFIDAVIT OF KEVIN E. DINIUS IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT KEVIt) 0 0401 
TIMMEL'S MOTIONS IN LIMINE·) 
08/21/2008 18:38 FAX 20847 raJ°17/018 
and make this Affidavit on the basi:; of my own personal knowledge and/or belief. 
2. Attached hereto as Exhibit "An is a true and correct copy of relevant portions of 
the transcript of the Audio-Visual Deposition of Dr. Dominic 1. Gross taken October 10,2008. 
S',..-
DATED this ~ day of September, 2009. 
Kev~. Dinius 
SUBSCRlBED AND SWORN to before me thisLday of September, 2009. 
~ No' y Public for Idaho 
My Commission Expires: ~ 7 / PC;..? 
• I 
correct copy of the above and forc~',oing document was served upon the following by: 
Steven K. Tolman 
TOLMAN BRIZEE, PC 
P.O. Box 1276 
Twin Falls, ID 83303 
Attorneys for Kevin Timmel, MD 
Kevin 1. Scanlan 
HALL FARLEY OBERRECHT &; 
BLANTON 
P.O. Box 1271 
Boise, ID 83701 
Altorneys for Jason Quinn, MD 
D 
D 
o [8J 
B 
D 
t8J 
US Mail 
Overnight Mail 
Hand Delivery 
Facsimile -: No. 733-5444 
US Mail 
Overnight Mail 
Hand Delivery 
Facsimile ~ No. 395-8585 
... 
for7IUSLAW 
cml1':\ClieJlts\N\Nightengalc. Janet Bell 240S\l\Non-Di.coverylAffidavil in Support of R.c:sponse to TlmmeJ's Motions in Liminc,docx 
AFFlDA VIT OF KEVIN E. DINIUS IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT KEVlij 0 0 4 0 2 
TIMMEL'S MOTTONS IN LIMINE. 2 
08/21/2008 18:37 FAX 20847 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF T~E FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
JANET BELt NIGHTENGALE, ) 
) 
Plaintiff, ) Case No. CV-OC-0722814 
v. l 
) 
) 
JASON QUINN, M.D., IDAHO ) 
EMERGENCY PHYSICIANS, P.A.; ) 
KEVIN MATTHEW TIMMEt, M. D.; AND) 
EMERGENC~ MEDICINE OF IDAHO, ) 
P.A., ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
--~---------------------) 
VIDEO'l'Al?ED DEPOSITION (:F DOMINIC L. GROSS, M.D. 
October 10, 2008 
Boise, Idaho 
Amy E. Menlove, CSR No. 685, gPR, eRR' 
~018/0'8 
08/21/2008 18:37 FAX 20847 1410181018 
Dominic Gross October 10, 2008 Nightengale v. Quinn, et al. 
(Page 16) 
1 Niqhtanga~e's case? 
A. I am not a'\rlare. 
3 Q. Okay. I guess it's safe to say, but I've qot 
4 to ask anyway, you were not involved at any level of any 
5 peer review of Janet Nightengale's case; is that fair? 
6 A. Correct. 
7 Q. Were you ever paid for the surgery you 
8 performed on Janet Nightenga~e on July 20th, 2007? 
9 
lO 
11 
12 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Yes. 
When did you receive payment? 
I was awarB of payment two days ago from 
indigent fund from my Dr. Margaret Jones, who is in my 
13 office. And that was the first I ever heard of it. 
14 Until that point, I "\.,ras under the impression we have not 
15 received payment with regards to her injury. 
16 
17 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Q. Okay. So any payaent you received came from 
the county? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Correct. 
Okay. Do you know when that ooourred? 
No, sir. 
Is that what you and Dr. Foss were disagreeing 
about in the correspondenoe, which is Exhibit 2 and 4? 
A. Correct. 
Q. When you say -- when I mean disagreement, the 
disagreement involved payment for your services in 
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DEFENDANT KEVIN TIMMEL, M.Do'S 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION IN LIMINE 
COMES NOW, Defendant Kevin Timmel, M.D. (hereinafter referred to as "Dr. 
Timmel") and files this Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion in Limine. This 
Memorandum is made and based upon the record herein, and the following law and 
argument. 
INTRODUCTION 
Plaintiff Janet Bell Nightengale (hereinafter referred to as "Plaintiff") has filed 
Plaintiffs Motion In Limine requesting the Court to limit the following items relating to Dr. 
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Timmel: (1) requesting the court to limit the number of expert witnesses Dr. Timmel may 
call in his case-in-chief and for rebuttal purposes; (2) the cause of plaintiffs arterial 
occlusion; (3) evidence of subsequent drug and/or alcohol use by plaintiff; (4) relevance 
of prior medical records of plaintiff, including prison records; (5) plaintiffs prior criminal 
background; (6) whether non-emergency room experts may testify Dr. Timmel satisfied 
the standard of care; (7) improper comments regarding the scope or effect of the 
present case on the healthcare system and the medical practice of Dr. Timmel; (8) the 
use of Dr. Draper as an expert by Dr. Quinn; (9) the limitation of Dr. Draper's testimony 
to that elicited on direct examination; (10) the limitation of testimony that is speculative 
and/or unsubstantiated; and (11) the scope of the expert testimony by Dr. Gregory 
Henry. 
Dr. Timmel objects to each basis for which plaintiff relies upon in support of her 
motion in limine. 
I. 
ARGUMENT 
1. Dr. TimmeJ's Right to Answer Plaintiff's Allegations Under Idaho 
Code § 6-1012 and 6-1013 Would Be Infringed By limitation of His 
Proposed Expert Witnesses. 
Plaintiff suggests that allowing Dr. Timmel to call multiple expert witnesses in his 
defense "are duplicative and cumUlative" and "[s]uch would be a waste of time, cause 
undue delay, and a needless presentation of cumulative evidence, under [Idaho Rule of 
Evidence] 403." Memorandum In Support Of Plaintiff's Motion In Limine, p. 18. Plaintiff 
also asserts "exclusion of one or both of [Dr. Timmel's] experts is clearly warranted" and 
"[c]learly the nature of this request would not prejudice the Defendant in the same 
manner that exclusion of a plaintiffs expert in a medical negligence case would 
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because the defense is not required by statute to come forward with expert testimony in 
the same manner s (sic) a plaintiff." Memorandum In Support Of Plaintiffs Motion In 
Limine, p. 20, n. 3. 
Plaintiffs assertion misstates the law. Dr. Timmel is required, by Idaho statute, to 
establish his defense by expert testimony. If the Court excludes one or both of Dr. 
Timmel's expert witnesses, he could not establish an adequate defense in the present 
case. The testimony of Dr. Timmel's expert witnesses, Po Huang, M.D. F.A.C.E.P. 
(hereinafter referred to as "Dr. Huang"), and John C. Moorhead, M.D., M.S., F.A.C.E.P. 
(hereinafter referred to as "Dr. Moorhead"), is not duplicative or cumulative. Rather, the 
testimony of both experts is vital and necessary to Dr. Timmel in providing and 
establishing his defense. 
a. Idaho Code Sections 6-1012 and 6-1013 Govern Expert 
Testimony. 
The requirements of Idaho Code §§ 6-1012 and 6-1013 regarding the proof 
required in any malpractice case govern this matter. Idaho Code § 6-1012 specifies, in 
relevant part: 
In any case, claim or action for damages due to injury or death of any 
person, brought against any physician ... such claimant or plaintiff must, as 
an essential part of his or her case in chief, affirmatively prove by direct 
expert testimony and by a preponderance of all the competent evidence, 
that such defendant then and there negligently failed to meet the 
applicable standard of health care practice of the community in which 
such care allegedly was or should have been provided, as such standard 
existed at the time and place of the alleged negligence of such 
physician .. .in comparison with Similarly trained and qualified providers of 
the same class in the same community, taking into account his or her 
training, experience, and fields of medical specialization, if any. 
I.C. § 6-1012 (emphasis added). 
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This requirement under Idaho law -- the showing of a failure to meet the 
applicable community standard of health care practice -- is a critical component which 
must be proven in this case in order for plaintiff to prevail. Conversely, it is imperative 
that Dr. Timmel be allowed to defend himself against plaintiffs allegations. In order to 
do so, Dr. Timmel must be allowed to present evidence by qualified experts that Dr. 
Timmel did not breach the community standard of health care practice. Dr. Timmel has 
retained experts in order to testify to specific aspects of plaintiffs expert, Edward A. 
Draper, M.D.'s (hereinafter "Dr. Draper"), expected testimony. Each expert is expected 
to refute Dr. Draper's claim of breach of standard of care with regard to the specific area 
of his expertise. 
Idaho Code § 6-1013 governs how testimony from experts regarding this burden 
of proof must be presented: 
The applicable standard of practice and such a defendant's failure to 
meet said standard must be established in such cases by such a plaintiff 
by testimony of one (1) or more knowledgeable, competent expert 
witnesses, and such expert testimony may only be admitted in evidence if 
the foundation therefore is first laid, establishing (a) that such an opinion 
is actually held by the expert witness, (b) that the said opinion can be 
testified to with reasonable medical certainty, and (c) that such expert 
witness possesses professional knowledge and expertise coupled with 
actual knowledge of the applicable said community standard to which his 
or her expert opinion testimony is addressed ... 
I.C. § 6-1013 (emphasis added). 
As it is expected that plaintiffs expert will testify Dr. Timmel failed to meet the 
community standard of health care practice, Dr. Timmel must be allowed to match this 
testimony with testimony of his own qualified expert witnesses. 
In his deposition of August 25, 2009, Dr. Draper testified, among other things, 
regarding the following: diagnosing a patient who presents with arterial occlusion and 
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the diagnosis and treatment of an arterial occlusion. See Deposition of Edward A. 
Draper., M.D. (hereinafter Deposition of Dr. Draper) pp., 39-40 attached hereto as 
ExhibitA. 
The variety of subjects upon which Dr. Draper is expected to offer an expert 
opinion necessitates experts to testify appropriately regarding the subject matter. 
Plaintiffs Motion in Limine presupposes what testimony Dr. Timmel expects to illicit from 
each expert. In essence, plaintiffs Motion asks this Court to prejudge said testimony 
before it is offered. Plaintiff cannot assert that she knows exactly how Dr. Timmel will 
question each witness and what that witness's testimony will be. The expected 
testimony of Dr. Timmel's expert witnesses contradicts this assertion. Therefore, clearly, 
there is a need for Defendant Timmel to present his expert witnesses and their 
testimony. Dr. Timmel respectfully submits the determination of whether or not expert 
testimony is cumulative is best left to the Court at the time the testimony is offered. 
Moreover, Dr. Timmel has only retained two outside expert witnesses. This is a 
minima! number in any medical malpractice case. Dr. Timme! strongly opposes 
Plaintiffs Motion on the basis it would severely inhibit his ability to present an 
appropriate and necessary defense at trial, as required by Idaho Code §§ 6-1012 and 6-
1013, and violate his right to due process. Further, Dr. Timmel disagrees that the 
testimony of the proposed expert witnesses is cumulative. Rather, Dr. Timmel 
respectfully submits each proposed expert witness is necessary to rebut individual 
aspects of Plaintiff's expert's anticipated testimony. 
Each retained defense expert provides insight from his individual area of 
emergency medicine into the community standard of health care practice for the 
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diagnosis and treatment of patients who present to an emergency care physician with 
the symptoms posed by plaintiff in July 2007. Therefore, Dr. Timmers witnesses are not 
cumulative in nature, and should not be limited by this Court. 
As such, Defendant respectfully submits this Court should deny Plaintiffs Motion. 
b. Dr. Timmel's Right to Due Process Would Be Hampered By 
Extreme Limitation of Witnesses. 
Dr. Timmel submits his due process right to a fair trial would be infringed by 
granting plaintiffs motion in limine requesting the Court to preclude Dr. Timmel from 
calling both expert witnesses. Idaho Rule of Evidence 702 governs when the testimony 
of expert witnesses is admissible. State v. Eytchison, 136 Idaho 210, 212. 30 P. 3d 988. 
990 (Ct. App. 2001). The Eytchison court stated: 
If scientific. technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier 
of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a 
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge. skill. experience, training, or 
education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." The 
five sources of expert qualifications identified in the rule, knowledge,skill, 
experience, training, or education, are disjunctive. 
Id. at 212-213, citing Konechny, 134 Idaho at 414,3 P.3d at 539; State v. Hopkins, 113 
Idaho 679, 681, 747 P.2d 88, 90 (Ct.App.1987). 
Once standing as an expert is established, the court must determine if the expert 
has knowledge which will assist the trier of fact because of its specialized nature. State 
v. Dragoman, 130 Idaho 537,542, 944 P.2d 134 (Ct. App. 1997). 
The Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution guarantees a trial of 
fundamental fairness. Lassiter v. Department of Social Services of Durham County, N. 
C., 452 U.S. 18, 24; 379 U.S. 466, 471, 101 S.Ct. 2153, 2158, L.Ed 2.d 640, 647 
(1981). "For all its consequence, "due process" has never been, and perhaps never can 
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be, precisely defined .... Rather, the phrase expresses the requirement of ''fundamental 
fairness," a requirement whose meaning can be as opaque as its importance is lofty." 
Id. at 24-25. As such, states are accorded leeway in crafting rules regulating the 
admission of evidence. 
The Idaho Supreme Court in State v. Perry, acknowledged the idea that "(a) 
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to present evidence is fundamental; however. this 
right is subject to reasonable limitations." State v. Perry. 139 Idaho 520, 523, 81 P.3d 
1230, 1233 (2003). citing U.S. v. Scheffer. 523 U.S. 303, 308. 118 S.Ct. 1261. 140 L. 
Ed. 2d 413. 418 (1998). The conflict between the rights of the Fourteenth and Sixth 
Amendments and the rights of states to limit evidence to prevent, among other things, 
cumulative evidence and the waste of limited and valuable resources is at the heart of 
plaintiffs motion in limine. Dr. Timmel submits his number and type of experts are not 
unreasonable. 
The court in Perry goes on to address the question of balance between due 
pro~ess rights and reasonableness when it notes U(t)he exclusion is "unconstitutionally 
arbitrary or disproportionate only where it has infringed upon a weighty interest of the 
accused." Id. at 1264. quoting Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 55. 107 S.Ct. 22704, 
2711, 97 L. Ed.2d 37, 48 (1987). Although the court in Perry was addressing the 
question in the context of a criminal case, a similar question is before this Court. Dr. 
Timmel submits a central issue of this case -- the community standard of health care 
practice for the time in question and whether there was a breach -- is a weighty interest 
and unduly restricting Dr. Timmel's ability to present evidence on that core question by 
limiting presentation of evidence to one expert, as requested by plaintiff, would render 
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such a ruling "unconstitutionally arbitrary or disproportionate." As such, Dr. Timmel 
respectfully requests this Court deny plaintiffs motion in limine requesting Dr. Timme/'s 
preclusion of calling both of his disclosed expert witnesses. 
c. Dr. Timmel's Proposed Expert Witnesses Each Provide 
Testimony Which Would Aid The Trier of Fact and Which Is Not 
Cumulative. 
Each of Dr. Timmel's proposed expert witnesses bring a unique perspective and 
insight into the community standard of health care practice in existence during the time 
and place relevant to these proceedings, July 2007, in Boise, Idaho. It is well 
established within Idaho case law that the "admissibility of expert testimony is a matter 
committed to the discretion of the trial court, and the court's ruling will not be overturned 
absent an abuse of that discretion." Athay v. Stacey, 142 Idaho 360, 366, 128 P.3d 897, 
903 (2005), citing Swallow v. Emergency Med. Of Idaho, P.A., 138 Idaho 589, 67 P.3d 
68 (2003). In order to "be admissible, the expert's testimony must assist the trier of fact 
to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue." Id. at 366. 
In cases such as this where medical malpractice is alleged, the issue of 
community standard of health care practice and whether it was breached is of central 
importance. As noted above, Idaho Code §§ 6-1012 and 6-1013 outline the proof 
required to show that the community standard of health care practice was breached and 
how the foundation for such testimony must be laid. This requirement is reiterated 
throughout Idaho case law. In order to survive even summary judgment, there must be 
a showing that there was a failure to meet the applicable community standard of health 
care practice, as defined by Idaho Code § 6-1012. Dulaney v. St. Alphonsus Regional 
Medical Center, 137 Idaho 160, 164, 45 P.3d 816, 820 (2002). This definition of "the 
DEFENDANT KEVIN TIMMEL. M.D:S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTIO~ I~ 0 4 I') 
LIMINE. PAGE 8 , U U 1 t:. 
standard of care (is) for the class of health care provider to which the defendant 
belonged and was functioning, taking into account the defendant's training, experience, 
and fields of medical specialization, if any." Id. at 166, citing Kolin v. Saint Luke's Reg'l 
Med. Ctr., 130 Idaho 323, 940 P.2d 1142 (1997); Evans v. Griswold, 129 Idaho 902, 
935 P.2d 165 (1997). Idaho Code § 6-1013 goes on to establish how the foundation for 
such expert testimony must be laid. Id., citing Morris ex rei. Morris v. Thomson,130 
Idaho 138, 937 P.2d 1212 (1997); Rhodehouse v. Stutts, 125 Idaho 208,868 P.2d 1224 
(1994); Dunlap ex reI. Dunlap v. Gamer, 127 Idaho 599, 903 P.2d 1296 (1994). 
In the above-entitled matter, plaintiff's proposed expert witness, Dr. Draper, is 
expected to testify that he is familiar with the community standard of health care 
practice for emergency room physicians in Boise, Idaho, in July 2007. See Deposition of 
Dr. Draper, p. 85, attached hereto as Exhibit A. Dr. Draper is also expected to testify 
that Defendant Timmel breached this standard of care. Id., pp. 76-78 attached hereto as 
Exhibit A. In order to effectively present a defense in this matter, Dr. Timmel must be 
allowed to present expert witnesses to assist the trier of fact. To this end, Dr. Tim mel 
has retained expert witnesses who will dispute plaintiffs expert's claim of the community 
standard of health care practice for the time in question and his opinion that Dr. Timmel 
breached that standard. 
In her supporting Memorandum, plaintiff claims Dr. Timmel's antiCipated experts 
offer "identical" opinions to one another. Dr. Timmel respectfully suggests that a closer 
reading of Dr. Timmers Expert Witness Disclosure shows otherwise. Simply because 
Dr. Timmers proposed experts reach the same conclusions regarding the community 
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standard of health care practice and whether it was breached does not mean that their 
analysis of the question is cumulative and therefore not helpful to assist the trier of fact. 
i. Dr. Huang, M.D., F.A.C.E.P. - General Standard of Care 
for Emergency Medicine Physicians in Boise, Idaho and 
Patients Presenting With Arterial Occlusion. 
Dr. Huang will provide the trier of fact with insight as a board certified emergency 
medicine physician who is currently an emergency room physician who practiced 
medicine and treated patients in Boise, Idaho in July 2007. Dr. Huang is expected to 
testify regarding the general standard of health care practice for 2007. He is expected to 
testify regarding the applicable standard of health care for treating and diagnosing a 
patient presenting with the symptoms which plaintiff had at the time she was seen by 
Dr. Timme/. 
Dr. Huang will testify that an emergency medicine physician's medical decision 
making process requires a collection of information until sufficient information has been 
obtained from which he can reach a threshold for decision making, such as a medical 
impression or working diagnosis. Dr. Huang will testify that Dr. TimmeJ did not breach 
the local community standard of health care practice in stopping his physical neurologic 
examination of plaintiff once plaintiff told him to stop treatment. Dr. Huang is expected to 
testify that Dr. Timmel did not breach the local community standard of health care 
practice by not ordering further diagnostic tests for plaintiff once she informed Dr. 
Timmel to stop the examination and to stop providing care to her. 
Dr. Huang has familiarized himself with the local community standard of health 
care practice relevant in this case, i.e. Boise, Idaho, in July, 2007, by virtue of his 
practicing as an emergency medicine physician in Boise, Idaho in July 2007. Dr. 
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Huang's expected testimony also differs from the testimony of Dr. Moorhead because 
Dr. Huang will testify from the perspective of a local emergency medicine physician 
practicing medicine in the same, local community as Dr. Timme/. 
ii. Dr. Moorhead, M.D., M.S., F.A.C.E.P. - Standard of Care 
as A Emergency Medicine Physician Nationally v. Boise, 
Idaho, Patients Presenting with Arterial Occlusion. 
Dr. Moorhead is board certified in emergency medicine. He is a practicing 
physician who is also a Professor of Emergency Medicine at Oregon Health and 
Science University's School of Public Health and Preventive Medicine in Portland, 
Oregon. Dr. Moorhead currently practices emergency medicine in Portland, Oregon. 
Dr. Moorhead's testimony differs from the proposed testimony of Dr. Huang 
because Dr. Moorhead is expected to testify from the perspective of an emergency 
medicine physician working in a more urban community (Le. Portland, Oregon) and who 
ostensibly sees more homeless patients. Dr. Moorhead is also expected to testify from 
the perspective of a professor of emergency medicine concerning the atypical 
presentation of plaintiff relating to her stopping Dr. Timmel's examination of her left arm. 
Dr. Moorhead is expected to testify that, from his perspective as both a practicing 
emergency medicine physician and as a professor of emergency medicine, Dr. Timmel 
did not breach the local community standard of health care practice in stopping his 
physical neurologic examination of plaintiff once plaintiff told him to stop treatment. Dr. 
Moorhead is expected to testify that Dr. Timmel did not breach the local community 
standard of health care practice by not ordering further diagnostic tests for plaintiff once 
she informed Dr. Timmel to stop the examination and to stop providing care to her. Dr. 
Moorhead will testify that the national standard of care and the local standard of care in 
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Boise, Idaho in July 2007 does not materially differ and Dr. Timmel's handling of 
plaintiffs treatment did not violate the local standard of health care practice. 
Additionally, Dr. Moorhead is expected to testify regarding the patient's responsibility for 
his or her own health, and how that applied to the instant case. 
Dr. Moorhead has actual knowledge of the community standard of health care 
practice for the Boise, Idaho, area during the relevant time and he has verified that 
knowledge by speaking with a local emergency medicine physician. Dr. Moorhead is 
expected to testify regarding the general standard of health care practice for 2007. He is 
expected to testify regarding the applicable standard of health care for treating and 
diagnosing a patient presenting the symptoms which plaintiff had at the time she was 
seen by Dr. Timme/. 
d. Dr. Timmel Would Suffer Extreme Prejudice if One or Both of 
His Expert Witnesses is Excluded. 
Dr. Timmel acknowledges it is the discretion of the court to allow expert 
testimony to assist the trier of fact. Expert witnesses provide testimony on issues which 
would not be readily known to the general public. Dr. Timmel submits his proposed 
expert witnesses offer valuable, unique insight into the underlying question of the local 
community standard of health care practice and the alleged breach of said standard in 
this case. Each of Dr. Timmel's proposed experts address the issue of the relevant 
community standard of health care practice from the perspective of their specialties and 
based upon their different experiences both in education and careers, in order to 
present a cohesive, comprehensive view of the local community standard of health care 
practice for treatment relevant for the trier of fact. These witnesses are critical to Dr. 
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Timmel's ability to present a complete case in his defense. To limit his ability to do so 
would greatly impact his right to due process. 
Moreover, Dr. Timmel would suffer substantial prejudice if one or both of his 
expert witnesses were precluded from testifying. The fact plaintiff is limited to one expert 
witness testifying about Dr. Timmers alleged breach of the applicable standard of health 
care practice, should not limit Dr. Timmel to one or no expert witnesses testifying in his 
defense that he did not violate the standard of health care practice. Dr. Timmel should 
be allowed to call as many expert witnesses as he needs to defend himself. Also, if 
judgment is entered against Dr. Timmel, then Dr. Timmel must report to the National 
Practioner's Databank. This is a serious potential consequence to Dr. Timmel of the 
current litigation, and therefore, he should be able to defend himself the way he sees fit 
and deserves including calling two expert witnesses to testify on his behalf. 
Allowing Dr. Timmel to present a comprehensive defense does not unfairly 
prejudice Plaintiffs ability to prepare for trial, as asserted. Plaintiff was provided with 
Dr. Timmel's Expert Witness Disclosure in compliance with this Court's Scheduling 
Order, which included detai/ed information regarding their expected testimony and their 
qualifications for providing such testimony. Thus, Dr. Timmel should be allowed to call 
both of his disclosed expert witnesses, Dr. Huang and Dr. Moorhead, in his case-in-
chief and potentially in rebuttal. 
There is no evidence that allowing such testimony would result in excessive time 
or expense to either plaintiff or to the Court in hearing the case. As such, Dr. Timmel 
respectfully submits plaintiff's Motion should be denied. 
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2. Dr. Timmel Should Be Allowed to Opine that the Cause of Plaintiff's 
Arterial Occlusion Was Plaintiff's Prior IVIIA Drug Use. 
Plaintiff argues Dr. Timmel should be prohibited from presenting evidence 
regarding plaintiffs prior IVIIA drug use and claims such evidence is not relevant, or in 
the alternative, its probative value is outweighed by the prejudicial effect to the plaintiff. 
Dr. Timmel objects to any limitation in testimony or opinion regarding the cause(s) of 
plaintiffs arterial occlusion including evidence regarding plaintiffs prior IV/IA drug use. 
Plaintiff has the burden of proving the elements of negligence against Dr. 
Timmel, which include (1) duty, (2) breach, (3) actual and proximate causation, and (4) 
damages. In attempting to prove Dr. Timmel's liability. plaintiff argues Dr. Timmel 
breached the applicable standard of health care practice by allegedly failing to diagnose 
an arterial occlusion causing alleged damages to plaintiff due to the subsequent 
amputation of her left arm. 
Dr. Timmel should be allowed to present evidence regarding plaintiffs prior IVIIA 
drug use because such evidence is relevant to the issue of liability for the alleged 
negligence. The causation of the arterial occlusion is relevant because on July 16, 
2007, when plaintiff presented to Dr. Timmel at the St. Luke's Regional Medical Center 
in Boise, Idaho, plaintiff only provided a medical history to Dr. Timmel describing trauma 
to her left arm. See Deposition of Dr. Timmel, pp. 27-30, attached hereto as Exhibit B. 
As described by the plaintiff, the trauma she suffered to her left arm would not lead to 
an ischemitic injury such as an arterial occlusion, but rather, would suggest 
muscoskeletal problems with the arm. 
Therefore, Dr. Timmel must be allowed to present evidence regarding the 
causation of plaintiffs arterial occlusion because the medical history provided by plaintiff 
DEFENDANT KEVIN TIMMEL, M.D.'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION IN 
LIMINE, PAGE 14 000418 
to Dr. Timme/ dictates the probability of various causative events. The evidence of 
plaintiff's prior IVIIA drug use is relevant because plaintiff did not provide Dr. Timmel 
with this information at the time of the July 16, 2007 examination. Evidence regarding 
plaintiffs drug use is relevant to show Dr. Timmel did not breach the applicable 
standard of health care practice in his treatment of the plaintiff, and therefore, is not 
liable for medical negligence. Since plaintiff failed to provide a complete medical history, 
Dr. Timmel did not violate the standard of health care practice in his treatment of plaintiff 
because her description of her injury only considers muscoskeletal injury rather then 
ischemitic injury. 
Furthermore, Dr. Timmel has asserted the affirmative defense that plaintiff was 
comparatively at fault for withholding from Dr. Timmel information about plaintiff's 
medical history. Plaintiff has the burden of proving any alleged damages as an element 
of her negligence claim against Dr. Timmel. Plaintiffs comparative negligence regarding 
her failure to provide a complete and accurate medical history to Dr. Timmel is a valid 
defense for both the issue of liability and the issue of damages. See Englert v. 
Carondelet Health Network, 199 Ariz. 21, 13 P.3d 763 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000). Thus, 
evidence regarding plaintiff's prior IVIIA drug use is also relevant to show the 
comparative negligence of plaintiff in failing to provide all necessary information in her 
medical history to Dr. Timmel in order for him to conduct a complete examination of 
plaintiffs arm. 
Evidence regarding plaintiff's prior IVIIA drug use is relevant because plaintiff's 
medical history, as provided to Dr. Timmel. dictates the probable causes of her arterial 
occlusion and her description to Dr. Timmel of the trauma to her arm indicates 
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muscoskeletal injury rather than ischemitic injury. Plaintiffs failure to provide a complete 
medical history, including her previous IVIIA drug use, proves elements of comparative 
negligence which the jury must consider in determining any liability and/or damages 
attributable to all parties and non-parties to the present litigation. 
Thus, pursuant to Idaho Rule of Evidence 403, the probative value of the 
evidence regarding plaintiffs prior IVIIA drug use outweighs any danger of unfair 
prejudice because such evidence determines the liability for negligence, if any, 
attributable to Dr. Timme/. Also, the probative value of such evidence outweighs the 
prejudicial effect because such evidence is determinative regarding the comparative 
negligence and fault of the plaintiff pertaining to her alleged damages. Dr. Timmel has 
disclosed comparative negligence as a defense to the plaintiff based upon plaintiffs 
failure to provide a complete medical history, including her failure to provide information 
regarding her past IVIIA drug use, to Dr. Timme/. Plaintiff will not suffer prejudice by the 
presentation of evidence regarding her prior IVIIA drug use. Therefore, the Court should 
allow the presentation of evidence pertaining to plaintiffs prior IVIIA drug use. 
3. Dr. Timmel Should Be Permitted to Elicit and Offer Evidence 
Regarding Plaintiff's Drug AndlOr Alcohol Use After July 20,2007. 
Plaintiff requests the Court to prohibit any eliciting or offering . of evidence 
pertaining to plaintiff's drug and/or alcohol use after July 20,2007. Dr. Timmel objects to 
any limitation in testimony or opinion regarding plaintiffs drug and/or alcohol use after 
July 20,2007. 
Plaintiff has the burden of proving damages allegedly and proximately caused by 
Dr. Timme/. Plaintiff submits her actions after July 20, 2007 are not relevant under Idaho 
Rule of Evidence 401. However, Dr. Timmel argues plaintiffs conduct, including 
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evidence regarding her drug and/or alcohol use after July 20, 2007 is extremely relevant 
in relation to the element of damages. Moreover, such evidence is also highly probative 
and outweighs any prejudicial effect plaintiff may suffer pursuant to Idaho Rule of 
Evidence 403. 
Evidence of plaintiff's drug and/or alcohol use after July 20, 2007 pertains to the 
issue of plaintiff's life expectancy, and therefore, is relevant and probative to any 
damages alleged by plaintiff against Dr. Timme/. Plaintiff's lifestyle choices, including 
any drug and/or alcohol use after July 20, 2007, are relevant to show a shorter life 
expectancy for the plaintiff. Plaintiff's continued use of cigarettes, alcohol, and 
recreational drugs after July 20, 2007, are factors that lay a foundation of a shorter life 
expectancy for the plaintiff. A shorter life expectancy for the plaintiff, in turn, is directly 
relevant and applicable to any calculation of damages, if any, by the jury. 
Therefore, such information and evidence is highly and extremely relevant. 
Plaintiff will not suffer prejudice by the Court's admission of such testimony because 
plaintiff has the burden of proving the element of damages. Life expectancy, and the 
factors affecting life expectancy (Le. plaintiff's post-July 20, 2007 drug and alcohol use), 
is a critical and essential component of the calculation of such damages. Thus, Dr. 
Timmel should be permitted to introduce and present evidence regarding plaintiff's drug 
and/or alcohol use after July 20,2007. 
4. Dr. Timmel Should Be Allowed to Present Evidence Pertaining To 
Plaintiff's Prior Medical Records, Including Prison Records. 
Plaintiff requests the Court to prohibit any eliciting or offering of evidence 
regarding plaintiff's medical records prior to 2007, including prison records. Dr. Timmel 
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objects to any limitation in presenting evidence pertaining to plaintiffs prior medical 
records, including prison records. 
Plaintiff has the burden of proving damages allegedly and proximately caused by 
Dr. Timmel. Plaintiff argues her medical records, including prison records, prior to 2007 
are not relevant under Idaho Rule of Evidence 401. However, Dr. Timmel submits 
plaintiff's pre-2007 medical records, including prison records, is extremely relevant in 
relation to the element of damages. Moreover, such evidence is also highly probative 
and outweighs any prejudicial effect plaintiff may suffer pursuant to Idaho Rule of 
Evidence 403. 
Evidence of plaintiffs medical records prior to 2007, including her prison records, 
pertains to the issue of plaintiff's life expectancy, and therefore, is relevant and 
probative to any damages alleged by plaintiff against Dr. Timmel. Plaintiff's pre-2007 
medical records, including prison records, are relevant to show a shorter life expectancy 
for the plaintiff. Plaintiff's medical records, including prison records, provide information 
which lay a foundation of a shorter life expectancy for the plaintiff. Plaintiff's medical 
records show the health problems which plaintiff suffers from, including Hepatitis Band 
Hepatitis C. See Deposition of Janet Bell Nightengale, p. 82, attached hereto as Exhibit 
C. For example, the fact plaintiff suffers from both Hepatitis Band C are relevant in 
showing a shorter life expectancy for the plaintiff, and therefore, is directly relevant and 
applicable to any calculation of damages, if any, by the jury. 
Thus, such information and evidence is highly and extremely relevant. Plaintiff 
will not suffer prejudice by the Court's admission of such testimony because plaintiff has 
the burden of proving the element of damages. Life expectancy, and the factors 
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affecting life expectancy (Le. plaintiff's pre-2007 medical records, including prison 
records), is a critical and essential component of the calculation of such damages. 
Thus, Dr. Timmel should be permitted to introduce and present evidence regarding 
plaintiff's medical records prior to 2007. 
5. Dr. Timmel Should Be Permitted to Present Evidence Regarding 
Plaintiff's Prior Criminal Background. 
Plaintiff requests the Court to prohibit any presentation of evidence regarding 
plaintiff's prior criminal background. Dr. Timmel objects to any limitation in presenting 
evidence pertaining to plaintiff's prior criminal background. 
Idaho Rule of Evidence 609 states: 
Rule 609. Impeachment by evidence of conviction of crime. 
(a) General rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, 
evidence of the fact that the witness has been convicted of a felony and 
the nature of the felony sha/l be admitted if elicited from the witness or 
established by public record, but only if the court determines in a hearing 
outside the presence of the jury that the fact of the prior conviction or the 
nature of the prior conviction, or both, are relevant to the credibility of the 
witness and that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs 
its prejudicial effect to the party offering the witness. If the evidence of the 
fact of a prior felony conviction, but not the nature of the conviction, is 
admitted for the purpose of impeachment of a party to the action or 
proceeding, the party shall have the option to present evidence of the 
nature of the conviction, but evidence of the circumstances of the 
conviction shall not be admissible. 
I.R.E. 609(a). 
Plaintiff has been convicted of at least one felony, which plaintiff described as an 
"Assault 3." See Deposition of Janet Bell Nightengale, pp. 14,46-47, attached hereto as 
Exhibit C. She also testified in her deposition that she has had other felony convictions. 
See Deposition of Janet Bell Nightengale, pp. 14,46-47, attached hereto as Exhibit C. 
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Dr. Timmel submits evidence of plaintiff's prior felony convictions are relevant for 
impeachment, pursuant to Idaho Rule of Evidence 609, of plaintiff's credibility. 
Moreover, a material fact at issue in the present case is the incomplete and 
deficient medical history which plaintiff failed to provide to Dr. Timmel at the time of his 
examination of her arm on July 16, 2007. Dr. Timmel should be permitted to impeach 
plaintiff's credibility regarding truthfulness, pursuant to Idaho Rules of Evidence 608 and 
609. Dr. Timmel asserts plaintiff's prior felony convictions are extremely relevant and 
highly probative to plaintiff's credibility as a fact witness pursuant to Idaho Rule of 
Evidence 403. Furthermore, plaintiff's prejudice would not outweigh the probative value 
of the introduction of such evidence because the jury should be able to weigh the truth 
and veracity of plaintiff's testimony and her credibility after Dr. TimmeJ's impeachment of 
her by evidence of her prior felony convictions. 
Impeachment of the plaintiff by introduction of her prior felony convictions does 
not add confusion to the issues at trial nor result in a waste of time. Thus, Dr. Timmel 
should be permitted to present evidence regarding plaintiff's prior criminal background. 
6. Dr. Kevin G. Shea, M.D. Should Be Permitted to Testify Regarding His 
Experience with Emergency Room Physicians. 
Plaintiff requests the Court to prohibit Dr. TimmeJ's expert witness, Kevin G. 
Shea, M.D. from testifying as to the standard of care for emergency room physicians. 
Although Kevin G. Shea, M.D. (hereinafter referred to as "Dr. Shea") is not an 
emergency room physician, Dr. Shea should be permitted to testify regarding his 
experiences as an orthopedic surgeon working with, and alongside, emergency room 
physicians. 
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In addition, Dr. Shea is expected to address, explain and render opinions 
concerning medical subjects within his expertise which are related to the present case, 
including, but not limited to: 
arterial duplex, arterial ultrasound, thrombus, emolus, arterial injection 
injury, timing of arterial injury, arterial dissection, arterial spasm, arterial 
blockage, acute blockage, chronic blockage, IV drug use, subclavian 
artery, arterial blood flow, ischemia, venous blood flow, bipolar disorder, 
PTSD, Hepatitis B, Hepatitis C. necrotizing arteritis, neurologic 
examination, sensory testing, subacute process, morphine sulfate, x-ray 
or imaging studies, osseous structures, pallor, platelet aggregation. 
pulses, radial pulse. ulnar pulse, arthritis, capillary refill, vascular 
profusion, and vascular emergency. 
See Defendant Kevin Timmel, M.D.'s Disclosure of Expert Witnesses, p.31 (emphasis 
added). 
Therefore, Dr. Shea has expert knowledge and opinions regarding many of the 
issues presented in the above-entitled case, including the taking of pulses. Dr. Shea is 
qualified to testify whether it was "reasonable for Dr. Timmel, given Mrs. Bell 
Nightengale's refusal to allow further examination, to rely upon the nurse's recording of 
pulses being present" and Dr. Shea should not be precluded from testifying regarding 
such actions and items, either in Dr. Timmel's case-in-chief or rebuttal. 
7. Dr. Timmel Should Be Permitted to Reference the Present Case As 
An Alleged "Medical Malpractice" Case. 
Plaintiff requests the Court to prohibit characterizing the present case as one of 
"medical malpractice." Plaintiff moves the Court to enter an order stating the parties 
must refer to the case as one of "medical negligence" rather than one of "medical 
malpractice" claiming such term ("medical malpractice") may bias or prejudice members 
of the jury against the plaintiff's case. 
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Dr. Timmel objects to any such order or limitation in characterizing the present 
case. Idaho Code, Title 6, Chapter 10 is titled "Medical Malpractice." Plaintiff has 
initiated an action pursuant to Idaho Code, Title 6, Chapter 10 alleging Dr. Timmel 
violated the "Medical Malpractice" Act. Moreover, Idaho Code § 6-1012, which plaintiff 
must prove, is titled "Proof of community standard of health care practice in 
malpractice case." I.C. § 6-1012 (emphasis added). 
Plaintiff cannot dispute the present case is an action alleging "medical 
malpractice" pursuant to Idaho Code. Therefore, the Court should deny plaintiffs 
request to limit characterization of the above-entitled case as one only for "medical 
negligence" thereby prohibiting the use of the term "medical malpractice." Plaintiffs 
request is inappropriate and the Court should deny plaintiffs motion and permit the 
parties to refer to the case as either a "medical malpractice" or "medical negligence" 
action. 
Furthermore, Dr. Timmel objects to any request by plaintiff limiting his ability to 
discuss the consequences that he would suffer if a judgment is entered against him at 
the conclusion of the tria/. As stated previously, if a judgment is entered against Dr. 
Timmel, he must report to the National Practitioner's Databank. Dr. Timme' should be 
permitted to produce evidence and argue the consequences he would incur personally 
and professionally if a judgment is entered against him. Thus, Dr. Timmel requests the 
Court deny plaintiff's motion in limine which moves for any such restriction. 
8. Dr. Timmel's Objections Regarding The Limitation of Dr. Draper's 
Testimony to that Elicited on Direct Examination; the Use of Dr. 
Draper As An Expert By Dr. Quinn; the Limitation of Testimony that 
is Speculative and/or Unsubstantiated; and the Scope of the Expert 
Testimony by Dr. Gregory Henry. 
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Plaintiff requests the Court to limit Dr. Timmel's cross-examination of Dr. Draper 
to the testimony elicited on direct examination. Dr. Timmel intends to abide by the Idaho 
Rules of Evidence regarding cross-examination of witnesses. However, to the extent co-
defendant, Dr. Quinn, objects to this specific motion in limine by plaintiff, Dr. Timmel 
joins in said objection. 
Plaintiff requests the Court to limit the use of Dr. Draper as an expert by Dr. 
Quinn. Dr. Timmel joins Dr. Quinn's objection to this specific motion in limine by plaintiff 
in its entirety. 
Plaintiff requests the Court to limit testimony of Dr. Marx regarding the results of 
an ultrasound study as speculative and/or unsubstantiated. Dr. Quinn intends to call and 
utilize Dr. Marx as an expert witness. Dr. Timmel joins Dr. Quinn's objection to this 
specific motion in limine by plaintiff in its entirety. 
Plaintiff requests the Court to limit the scope of the expert testimony of Dr. 
Gregory Henry. Dr. Quinn intends to call and utilize Dr. Henry as an expert witness. Dr. 
Timmel joins Dr. Quinn's objection to this specific motion in limine by plaintiff in its 
entirety. 
II. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the preceding arguments, Dr. Timmel requests the Court to deny 
plaintiffs Motion in Limine in its entirety. 
~ DATED this 2d. day of September, 2009. 
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1 evidence that contributed to that occluded artery was 1 really an exact science, correct? 
2 some damage to the artery preexisting, and some prolonged 2 A. I don't know whether I alluded to that or said 
3 pressure on the artery, either from sleeping or lying 3 it, but I don't disagree with that statement. It's not 
4 down on the artery or being injured and unconscious lying 4 an exact science. 
S on the arm. Those seem to be the most likely out of all 5 Q. And as an emergency room physician, you are 
6 the possibilities in light of the record. 6 charged with having to use the various knowledge and 
7 
8 
Do r know that's what happened? No. 7 skill sets that you have been given through your training 
Q. Well, and there is no way for US to know for 8 and experience to evaluate and make judgments and do the 
9 certain what happened in this case, right? 9 best that you can to treat what you're presented with in 
10 A. Right. 1 a terms of the patient's complaints and the infonnation 
11 Q. But in terms of, you know, based upon your 11 you're given? 
12 knowledge and experience, you have concluded that the two 12 A. That's a fair characterization. 
13 most likely causes are the impact to the artery from past 13 Q. You talk a little bit about the diagnosis of a 
14 drug abuse and/or the prolonged pressure on the arm? 14 problem like this. And you indicate that the diagnosis 
15 A. They make the most reasonable sense to me. 15 of a complete arterial occlusion is typically rather 
16 Q. And am I correct in understanding that those 16 straightforward. 
17 two in conjunction could be the cause? Or either one of 1 7 Do you agree with that? 
18 those independently could have resulted in this problem? 18 A. No, I wouldn't. The diagnosis of an arterial 
19 A. Either one could have independently, but both 19 occlusion, if it presents with the classic signs and 
20 show up in the record, so I would imagine that it would 2 0 symptoms, is pretty straightfolWdfd. The classic signs 
21 be more likely in conj unction with each other. 21 and symptoms are numerous and varied, and they're not all 
22 And I need to qualify it, all of this, by 22 present with every arterial occlusion, nor are they all 
23 saying that even when all was said and done and pathology 23 diagnostic of it. 
24 tissue reports were done on the amputated arm, there is a 2 4 So although it can be easier under one set of 
2 S great deal of inconsistency in the fmal diagnosis of 25 circumstances than another, perhaps, to make that 
Page 37 Page 39 
1 where the obstruction was in the artery, what kind of 
2 obstruction it was, was it a tear in the artery, was it a 
3 clot. And I don't believe it was even ever decided with 
4 absolute certainty where the -- how far up the occlusion 
5 extended. So there are a lot of unknowns in this case. 
6 I would say we don't really know what was going 
7 on in that artery even after the arm was taken off and it 
8 was examined by a pathologist to come out of the 
9 diagnosis or when it was examined with the ultrasound 
10 before surgery. So it's tough to put an absolute reason 
11 for the blocked arterial circulation since the caricature 
12 of that blockage was never identified completely, the 
13 location was never specified exactly. All we know is 
14 what the result was in terms of the tissue in her arm. 
15 Q. And isn't that the case that you as an 
16 emergency physician run into quite frequently, that you 
1 7 may not know either what the source is or what the cause 
18 of something is? 
19 A. Right. And fortunately, that's not 
2 a specifically the thing that we're looking for. The only 
21 reason we look for that is to figure out what's going on 
22 right now, make a diagnosis, and provide the appropriate 
2 3 treatment. 
24 Q. And I think you were alluding to it a little 
25 bit earlier. The practice of medicine in general is not 
Page 38 
1 diagnosis, it is rarely straightforward. There are some 
2 cases of classical acute arterial obstruction that are 
3 pretty easy, and I've had them in my experience. There 
4 are others that are very, very difficult, and I've had 
5 those in my experience. 
6 So it really requires a look at all of the 
7 factors going into the diagnosis to decide what the 
8 diagnosis is. 
9 Q. And would you agree that at least typically, a 
10 partial arterial occlusion can be even more difficult to 
11 identify because oftentimes it doesn't present with many 
12 or all of the classic signs? 
13 A. Exactly. A partial occlusion is much less 
14 likely to ever be diagnosed while it was partial than a 
15 complete occlusion is likely to be diagnosed when it is 
16 complete. 
1 7 Q. In this particular case, you've indicated that 
18 the time of complete blockage can't be precisely fixed; 
1 9 is that correct? 
20 A. That's correct. 
21 Q. But it's your opinion that total arterial 
22 occlusion did not occur any earlier than 48 to 72 hours 
23 before she was emergently evaluated on July 20th, 2007? 
24 A. Yes. And that's a judgment. It's not 
2 5 something that can be proved, but that's my belief, that 
Page 40 
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1 months ago, I'm not sure. 1 Q. Have you ever had a conversation with 
2 But the 18th of June, she might have been 2 Dr. Timmel? 
3 suffering from some ischemic symptoms because at that 3 A. You know, I don't know. I know I wouldn't 
4 time I think it was clear she was having some arm pain. 4 recognize him if I saw him. I'm sure I've talked to him 
5 She mentioned that. Was that Dr. Yeakley? 5 on the phone on a couple of occasions. Probably in tenus 
6 Q. No. 6 of patients he was seeing in the emergency department at . 
7 A. Too many doctors. Who was the doctor on the 7 St. Luke's and sending over to the VA or patients that I 
8 18th? Anyway, my opinion was her arm pain, when it was 8 had at the V A and I wanted to talk to an emergency 
9 mentioned on several occasions, probably was coming from 9 department doctor there. But I honestly couldn't tell 
10 partial variable ischemia, blood supply problems to her 10 you I've talked to him personally face-to-face. 
11 arm. Again, that's an opinion that I can't give you more 11 Q. Have you talked or consulted with anyone other 
12 than maybe 50 percent confidence in. 12 than Mr. Dinius with respect to Dr. Timmel's care, which 
13 But, yes, I believe that it was representing 13 is at issue in this case? 
14 some probable partial blockage of blood flow to the arm. 14 A. Only Dr. Schlender. 
15 It's the only way I can make sense of the total picture. 15 Q. Who? 
16 Q. Right. And the other side of that is that the 16 A. I mean only Mr. Schlender. 
17 ann was still being profused to some effect? 17 Q. Other than legal counsel, though, you haven't 
18 A. Yes. 18 consulted with any other medical healthcare providers? 
19 Q. Okay. Would you agree with me from reading 19 A. No. 
20 Mrs. Nightengale's records that she is a poor historian? 20 Q. And when you drafted Exhibit 1, which was your 
21 A. No question about that. 21 first draft, did you have all the medical records? 
22 Q. And that her history was not only atypical, it 22 A. I had all of the medical records -- all the 
23 was incomplete and many times inconsistent? 23 emergency medical records from the 1st of June, from the 
24 A. Absolutely, yes. 24 20th of July, the two records from the Ada County 
25 Q. Which makes it difficult for any emergency 25 Paramedics on two of those occasions. And I'm not sure, 
Page 73 Page 75 
1 medicine physician to diagnose a problem? 1 but I believe I also had at least something regarding her 
2 A. Very difficult. 2 subsequent surgical care. I do know that I had a copy of 
3 Q. You practiced with IEP I think you said 24 3 the ultrasound report, copy of the consultation with 
4 years? 4 Dr. Gilbertson. I think I must have had the operative 
5 A. Yes. 5 report and the history and physical from Dr. Gross. 
6 Q. Do you know Dr. Po Huang? 6 I think anything I've had since then was an 
7 A. Yes, I hired him. 7 addition. But I had all of those things for No.1. I 
8 Q. When you hired him, did you believe he was a 8 did not have Dr. Gross's two letters afterwards. 
9 competent, capable emergency medicine doctor? 9 Q. And we'll come back to those. 
10 A. He's a smart guy. He's capable. 10 A. Okay. 
11 Q. Any reason to believe that he is not capable or 11 Q. But given the status of knowledge that you had 
12 medically trained sufficiently to review the same records 12 prior to and on September 18th of '07 when you drafted 
13 that you've reviewed and formulate opinions in this case? 13 this, did you believe that you had sufficient information 
14 A. He's certainly trained to review records and 14 and knowledge from which to render the opinions that 
15 form opinions, no question about it. 15 you've stated in that letter report? 
16 Q. Do you have any criticisms of his ability to 16 A. Yes. 
17 ptactice medicine as an emergency medicine physician? 17 Q. Okay. Was there anything that you were looking 
18 A. Not at all. 18 for in the future to supplement or change the opinions 
19 Q. Do you know Dr. John Moorhead from Portland? 19 that you expressed in that letter? 
20 A. I know him well. I've known him for 20 years 20 A. The only thing that I was looking for that I 
21 through ACEP. I have never practiced with him, so I 21 didn't have and never got were those extra bits of 
22 can't tell you what kind of a doctor he is. I know he's 22 information from the pathologist who made the report on 
23 a great guy. And from an organizational, political 23 the tissue. And that was not necessarily to change my 
24 association standpoint, he's a good guy. And he's got a 24 opinion, but to give me a little more insight as to 
25 huge CV. 25 what - actually what turned out to be the problem in 
Page 74 Page 76 
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1 that artery so it would be possible in looking back to 1 Q. Any other information that you have been 
2 figure out whether the suspicion about an intimal tear, 2 provided that you're relying upon in fonnulating your 
3 which would suggest previous trauma, abrupt trauma, as 3 opinions that would have supplemented or altered your 
4 opposed to simply pressure on the ann or scarring in the 4 opinions expressed in Exhibit 1, the September 18th 
5 artery that might suggest repeated intravenous drug use 5 letter and report? 
6 and the mist that went into the artery. 6 A. Well, let me just ask you something so I'm sure 
7 1bat's the only thing I was looking for, to 7 I know what you're - when you say supplemented or 
8 maybe flesh out my understanding of the case. I was not 8 altered, I would say yeah, it all supplemented. Did it 
9 looking for anything else for any purpose. But I think I 9 alter? No. 
10 put the statement in there if there was other infonnation 10 So nothing that I reviewed after those things I 
11 that was pertinent, then I might have to go back and 11 reviewed before the September 18th report has caused me 
12 rethink my opinions. 12 to alter my opinion. But, I mean, supplemented, sure. 
13 Q. And I think you talked about more further input 13 Q. Okay. And it may be a matter of semantics 
14 and examination. 14 between you and me. 
15 
16 
A. Sure. 15 There is a difference in my mind between 
Q. SO what I'd like to do is explore with you for 16 supplementing and supporting your opinions. You may have 
1 7 a second what infonnation you actually gathered after 17 gathered infonnation that you believe supports the 
1 8 September 18th. You mentioned the two Dr. Gross letters. 18 opinions you've previously rendered. But supplement, I 
1 9 A. Right. 19 mean, added additional opinions -
20 Q. The court has excluded those. 20 A. Additional facts that would relate to my 
21 
22 
A. Right. 21 opinion? 
Q. But do those letters fonn the basis of any of 22 Q. Yes. 
23 your opinions or can you express those opinions without 23 A. Gosh, not that I can think of. The -- I should 
24 
25 
those -- 24 say that the deposition of Dr. Timmel added statements 
A. Oh, I can expresses them without The only 25 about what he did and said and what he reported Janet 
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1 thing they did was allow me to form an opinion about Dr. 
2 Gross. 
3 Q. Right. 
4 A. But not about the care that I reviewed. 
5 Q. SO you can render the opinions you're going to 
6 render in this case absent those two letters and the 
7 input and information from those two letters from Dr. 
B Gross? 
9 A. Yes. 
10 Q. Now, you have the Gross letters. The there are 
11 four depositions that were taken - well, depositions 
12 taken after your September 18th? 
13 A. Right. 
14 Q. Did information contained in those depositions 
15 alter or supplement your opinions in any way? 
16 A. They give me some more information after the 
1 7 fact of what was claimed might have happened during these 
18 four or five emergency department visits. They did not 
1 9 change my basic opinion about the diagnosis and care upon 
20 any of those emergency visits. 
21 Q. SO the opinions you would have been expressed 
22 on September 18th did not fundamentally change based upon 
23 any of those depositions? 
24 A. They did not. They did not. They were 
2 5 interesting to read, but they did not change my opinions. 
Page 78 
1 Nightengale did and said, which are not covered in any of 
2 the other material, either confmned or refuted. 
3 So there were things in that deposition that 
4 referred back to that emergency visit that are in 
5 addition to what you can find when you read the emergency 
6 record. 
7 And so that was infonnation that was added 
8 to -- has been added to my judgment since. I can't say 
9 that it has changed my overall opinions of the case. 
10 Q. SO there was nothing in any of the information 
11 which has been supplied to you after September 18th that 
12 has changed any of your opinions? 
13 A. Not to my knowledge. There may be something 
14 hidden there that I don't know which I'd be happy to 
15 consider, but not to my knowledge. 
16 Q. If you look at Exhibit 4 -- and I'm looking at 
17 page 9. 
18 A. Page 9 has indicated at the top "9 of IS"? 
19 Q. Yeah. 
20 A. Yeah, okay. 
21 Q. And on that page, it has a subcategory of 
22 "Rebuttal Issues." 
23 A. Yes. 
24 Q. Are those issues that you have addressed or 
25 attempted to address in response to defendants', both 
Page 80 
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Edward A. Draper, MD August25,2009 Nightengale v. Quinn 
1 Q. Have you ever practiced at S1. Luke's? 
2 A. Yes. I was chairman of the St. Luke's 
3 emergency department for two years. I practiced there 
4 from 1981 through 1996. 
5 Q. That was before EMI came into being? 
6 A. EMl is a budding off from IEP. 
7 Q. SO when was the last time you would have 
8 practiced in an emergency department at St. Luke's? 
9 A. 1996. 
10 Q. '96, okay. 
11 And have you talked to anyone specifically 
12 about the practice of emergency medicine at St. Luke's in 
13 20071 
14 A. Yes. 
Q. Who? 
1 specialists, call, that sort of thing. But the 
2 principles that involve diagnosis and treatment are the 
3 same at all the hospitals in town. 
4 Q. SO is it your testimony that the demographics 
5 of the emergency patients are the same at St. Luke's and 
6 Saint Ai's and the VA? 
7 A. No. The demographics are not the same. TIle 
8 practice of emergency medicine is the same. Patient 
9 demographics are different between all hospitals. 
10 MR. TOLMAN: Thank you. That's all the questions I 
11 have. 
12 MR. SCANLAN: Just a couple of followups. 
13 
14 FURTHER~ATION 
15 BYMR. SCANLAN: 15 
16 A. Whoever was in the emergency department when I 16 Q. You mentioned that Exhibit 4 is a redraft of 
17 talked to them on the phone, sending patients back and 1 7 some materials that you'd gone over at Mr. Dinius's 
18 forth. 18 office? 
19 Have I ever gone to somebody in the emergency 
20 department and sat down and said how do you practice 
21 emergency medicine here? I haven't even done that in my 
22 own institutions. 
23 Q. Would you agree with me the practice of 
24 emergency medicine at the VA is different than the 
25 practice of emergency medicine at S1. Luke's or Saint 
Page 85 
1 AI's? 
2 A. I would say the practice of emergency medicine 
3 is different at every single hospital rve ever worked 
4 at. 
5 Q. But in terms of distinguishing between the two, 
6 if you have patients -- generally emergency patients are 
7 not transferred from Saint AI's and st. Luke's to the VA 
8 on an emergent basis, correct? 
9 A. Sure, they are. 
10 Q. For what purpose? 
11 A. They're transported back and forth between 
12 hospitals. For what purpose, usually back to the VA 
13 because they have VA insurance and no other insurance. 
14 But, no, we transport them both ways. 
15 Q. SO do ambulances deliver to -
16 A. Yes, they do. And they bring patients from 
1 7 other hospitals into the VA. 
18 Q. Do they bring trauma patients into the --
19 A. They bring some trauma. Major trauma we don't 
20 even accept them. We divert the ambulance. 
21 There is no essential difference in emergency 
22 practice at the VA, St. Luke's, Saint AI's, Twin Falls. 
23 The training of the emergency physicians is the same. 
24 The facilities differ, so sometimes we use other 
25 institutions for the sake of their facilities or their 
Page 86 
19 A. Yes. 
20 Q. Do there exist drafts of any of these reports 
21 someplace? 
22 A. I don't know. This is the only -- this one is 
2 3 the only one that I have. Intermediate drafts preceding 
24 this, I don't know if they exist anywhere. This is the 
2 5 only one that I signed. It was built from other 
Page 87 
1 material. I mean, when you do something like this, the 
2 drafts are really meaningless. 
3 Q. But you didn't keep copies of any of the 
4 working drafts? 
5 A. No. 
6 Q. Did you send them back and forth? 
7 A. No. I sat in the office to work out what this 
8 contained. So as far as I know, this is the only -- this 
9 and copies of this is the only draft in existence. 
10 Q. Do you have any correspondence other than what 
11 you've brougl1t with you here today that you've exchanged 
12 with Mr. Dinius or Mr. Schlender or anybody about this 
13 case? 
14 A. I don't. 
15 Q. Do you have any other notes other than the 
16 notes that you brougl1t about your past cases relating to 
17 this case? 
18 A. Nary a one. 
19 Q. Did you take any notes? 
20 A. I migl1t have while I was drafting these 
21 reports, but I don't keep those. They're gone. I throw 
22 them away. 
23 Q. Okay. So to the extent that you had some 
24 notes, they're no longer around? 
25 A. No. I mean, they're notes like which day they 
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1 you know -- I mean, had you reviewed any other medical 1 A. Correct. 
2 records before you walked into the room with Ms. Bell? 2 Q. Okay. Did you, when you entered the room, 
3 A. Yeah. So the way it works at St. Luke's is 3 speak with Ms. Bell? 
4 when a patient checks in at the front desk, their name 4 A. Yes. 
5 will come up on a computer tracking board through all the 5 Q. What did she say to you? 
6 computers in the department. 6 A. Well, she said a lot of things during the 
7 The next thing that happens is I signed up for 7 course of the normal history. 
8 her as her physician. That then allows me to review the 8 Q. Well, tell me what you recall her telling you. 
9 chart. The chart at that time had the initial set of 9 A. Okay. I can start from the beginning if you'd 
10 vital signs, the triage notes, including her complaints. 10 like. I recall going into the room and introducing 
11 And it's a great system. 11 myself to her and the gentleman that was with her. 
12 At that time I'm also able to click on a button 12 And then started into the normal history, which 
13 that lists all of her prior visits to the st. Luke's 13 I said, "So, what's been going on?" 
14 emergency department -- to any of the st. Luke's, 14 She proceeded to tell me that she was concerned 
15 actually. And then from that I can click on those visits 15 about left arm pain that she estimated she had been 
16 to review the chart. 16 dealing with for about two months. She said that arOlllld 
17 And in her particular case, I clicked on the 17 two months ago, she was injured. She said something 
18 summary to look at the prior visits that she'd been in. 18 about she feels that she was thrown into a canal and felt 
19 And from that it seemed clear that she had been in for 19 that she injured her arm at that time. She said that her 
20 similar complaints in the past. 20 other symptoms, such as neck and shoulder pain seemed to 
21 And then I reviewed - I clicked on the most 21 be getting better, but that her arm pain persisted. 
22 recent visit to S1. Luke's to review that in more detail 22 She said that she was - or indicated that she 
23 before I went in and saw her. 23 was frustrated that the prior evaluations that she had 
24 Q. When you say "most recent," tell me which visit 24 had for that condition seemed to focus on her neck and 
25 you're talking about. Are you talking about that day? 25 her shoulder. And said something to express that she was 
Page 25 Page 27 
1 A. No. No. Her-- I frustrated that nobody had looked at her arm to this 
2 Q. The previous visit? 2 point in particular. 
3 A. Yeah, the previous visit to S1. Luke's, before 3 Her -- I can't remember if it was her that 
4 I saw her. 4 mentioned a lump on her arm fIrst or whether it was the 
5 (Deposition Exhibit No.3 was marked.) 5 male that was with her. But during the.course of the 
6 Q. (BY MR. DINIUS) I'm going to hand you what's 6 history, someone had mentioned that they were concerned 
7 been marked Exhibit 3 and ask you if you recognize those 7 that they had noticed a lump on her forearm. I don't 
8 documents. 8 remember exactly how long they said it had been there. 
9 A. Yes, I do recognize them. Those look like the 9 And the gentleman that was with her actually 
10 records of the visit prior to my visit that I reviewed. 10 leaned over the bed. He was on the other side of the 
11 Q. And you had access to all of those records on 11 bed. And leaned over and pointed to this spot that they 
12 the computer system at St. Luke's when Janet Bell came in 12 were concerned about, described as a lump on her arm. 
13 on July 16th? 13 She complained that she couldn't move her left 
14 A. Yes. 14 hand, that the pain was severe. She was asking for pain 
15 Q. SO you knew that on the 18th of June, roughly a 15 medicine to treat the pain. 
16 month earlier, she'd been in complaining of pain in her 16 Q. Did you think she was seeking pain pills, I 
17 left arm? 17 mean, just out trying to get pain pills? 
18 A. Correct. 18 A. No. 
19 Q. When you walked in or prior to walking into the 19 Q. Okay. You've indicated that her friend that 
20 room with Ms. Bell, did you know that she was homeless? 20 was with her - and ru tell you that I believe that was 
21 A. No. 21 Dennis Nightengale. 
22 Q. Did you learn during your interaction with her 22 A. Okay. 
23 that she was, in fact, homeless? 23 Q. I mean, did you see him at her deposition when 
24 A. No. 24 you attended? 
25 Q. Nobody ever told you that? 25 A Yes. 
Page 26 Page 28 
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Kevin Matthew Timmel, MD March 11, 2009 Nightengale v. Quinn, et al. 
1 Q. Was that the same guy that was with her in the 1 you he was concerned that the ann had gangrene in it? 
2 emergency room? 2 A. No. 
3 A. You know, I didn't recognize him for sure, but 3 Q. Did he point out any discolored areas to you? 
4 he very well could have been. 4 A. No. 
5 Q. Okay. Did you -- outside ofhim potentially 5 Q. Did you actUally observe Janet's left ann? 
6 drawing your attention to the lump on her ann, did you 6 A. Yes. 
7 get any medical history relating to Janet from him? 7 Q. What color was it? 
8 A. I may have. Because I remember him being 8 A. It appeared nonna! color, other than somewhat 
9 particularly helpful during the visit. As she was 9 soiled or dirty. 
10 crying, he would sometimes provide information. 10 Q. And rve seen that in the records. Tell me 
11 And actually I engaged him in helping me to 11 what you mean when you say "soiled." 
12 convince her to let me examine her and such. He was very 12 A. Just dirty. 
13 helpful in that regard. So J think I probably did get 13 Q. Did anyone during this visit on July 16th. 
14 some of the history from him. 14 anyone in the emergency room clean Janet's left arm? 
15 Q. During the time that you are getting the 15 A. I don't believe so. 
16 history, had Janet told you she'd been to the Saint AI's 16 Q. Did you ask anybody to do that? 
17 emergency room and she'd been to St. Luke's prior to the 17 A. No. 
18 day that she's seeing you? 18 Q. Why not? 
19 A. No. So she mentioned that she had been 19 A. I didn't see any reason to. 
20 evaluated before. 20 Q. Did you observe any pallor or discoloration to 
21 Q. But she didn't tell you where? 21 any of the skin on Janet's left ann? 
22 A. Right. And when she said that, I had already 22 A. No. 
23 reviewed her prior visits to St. Luke's. 23 Q. You've said that she appeared upset during the 
24 Q. SO you knew about that? 24 visit. Tell me what you mean by that. 
25 A. I knew about that. She didn't say anything 25 A. She was crying. She was asking for pain 
Page 29 Page 31 
1 about being seen at Saint AI's. 
2 Q. At any point during your obtaining this history 
3 and your initial encounter with Dennis and Janet, did 
4 either of them tell you that they were homeless? 
5 A. No. In fact, I inquired as to their appearing 
6 not to have had a shower for quite some time, 
7 specifically with that concern. Because we do have 
8 resources that we can offer homeless individuals through 
9 our social worker. And so when I see somebody in that 
1 0 sort of state, I inquire about that to see if there is 
11 anything we can offer them. 
12 When I asked them, or just brought up, it 
13 appears that you haven't had a shower for a while, 
14 assuming it's Mr. Nightengale, indicated - told me that 
15 they had been camping and that they were on their way 
16 home and would be able to clean up when they got there. 
1 7 That was his explanation. 
18 Q. Did Janet at any point during this encounter 
19 where you were obtaining your history, tell you that 
20 she'd been assaulted sometime previous? 
21 A. Yes. So she had referred to that time where 
22 she thought she was potentially or possibly thrown into a 
2 3 canal. So I took that as being the time that she may 
24 have been assaulted. 
25 Q. During this visit, did Dennis at any point tell 
Page 30 
1 medicine. During our discussions on the history when we 
2 were recounting the events that had led to her injury, 
3 she was upset, appeared upset about the assault itself. 
4 She, again, appeared upset when she was 
5 mentioning her prior visits, expressing frustration that 
6 everybody seemed to focus on her neck and shoulder. 
7 Nobody looked at her arm. She specifically mentioned 
8 that she was upset that nobody had done x-rays of her ann 
9 to that point. She seemed upset about that. 
10 Q. You indicated that she was crying. I mean, did 
11 you ever come to any conclusion as to why she was crying? 
12 Was it because she was upset or because she Was in pain 
13 orboth? 
14 A. Right. Those were the possibilities. I wasn't 
15 exactly sure how much of each one. 
16 Q. When you say that she was moderately 
1 7 disheveled, tell me what you mean by that. 
18 A. Disheveled is a term we use for how -- it 
19 refers to hygiene, neatness, unkempt might be another 
20 word to use for it. 
21 I tend to use mild, moderate, or severely 
22 disheveled. Someone severely disheveled would be naked 
23 or underpants only, looks like they were just pulled in 
2 4 off the street. 
25 Someone moderately would have maybe tattered 
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contacted my friend/counselor that at that time worked 
there and got a bed to go from Truman to recovery. 
Q. SO did you go straight from prison into Truman 
Recovery? 
A. Yes, by my own choice. 
Q. Okay. And how long were you in prison? 
A. 11 months. 
Q. And what were you in prison for? 
A. Assault 3. 
Q. Is Assault 3 a felony? 
A. Yes, it is. 
Q. Had you pled guilty to that crime? 
A. Yes, sir, I did. 
Q. SO prior to going to prison -- was the prison 
located in Newport? 
A. No, sir, it was not. 
Q. Where was the prison you were in? 
A. It was in Wilsonville, Oregon. 
Q. Prior to going to prison, where had you lived? 
A. I was living on the streets. 
Q. And in what city? 
A. In Newport, Oregon. 
Q. And for how long had you lived on the streets 
in Newport prior to your time in prison? 
A. I can't recall for sure exactly. Prior to 
Page 14 
that, I did have a residence in Newport of my own. 
Q. Okay. Prior to the time that you spent on the 
street? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. Okay. The in between going from the residence 
that you just mentioned to prison, was that a matter of 
months or years that you were on the streets? 
A. Months. 
Q. Months. 
Do you remember what the address was of the 
residence that you had in Newport? 
A. No. I believe the name of the street was 
Angle, but I don't recall exactly, no. 
Q. Would that be A-n-g-I-e? 
A. Yes, sir, I believe so. 
Q. And how long did you stay in that particular 
home? 
A. I believe that would have been probably maybe 
two years, give or take. 
Q. Okay. How about before that? 
A Before that r was living in a residential --
no, actually I was managing a residential treatment 
center for Truman Recovery. 
Q. And living there as well? 
A. Yes, sir. I'was the living manager. 
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Q. How long did you do that? 
A. I can't recall exactly. 
Q. Was it months, years? 
A. For several months. 
Q. Had you been in Truman Recovery prior to the 
time that you were there after getting out of prison? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Okay. And when had you previously been in 
Truman Recovery? 
A. I believe I went in there in the year of 1999. 
And graduated from the program and became an assistant 
counselor and residential manager. 
Q. Okay. So when you managed the residential 
treatment center for Truman Recovery, was that 
immediately after you had, yourself, completed the 
program there? 
A. Shortly after. 
Q. Was there a period of time in between those 
where you lived someplace else? 
A. Well, I completed the program, but stilt lived 
in the apartments, Truman Recovery. 
Q. Okay. And for how long did you live in those 
apartments? 
A. I can't say exactly. Maybe a couple or three 
years. 
Q. Between'99 and today, did you ever live 
anyplace other than Boise or Newport? 
A. No. 
Q. You mentioned Marysville, California. 
Did you live in Marysville at some point? 
A. Prior to Newport. 
Page 16 
Q. Okay. What originally brought you to Newport? 
A. I had a boyfriend. His father lived there, and 
we were going to stay with his father. 
Q. And so did you move to Newport from Marysville? 
A. Yes,Idid 
Q. And before Marysville, where did you live? 
A. Let me see. Sacramento. 
Q. And before Sacramento? 
A. Oh, God. I believe I had been back in 
Fayetteville, Arkansas, for a few months, ifmy memory 
serves me correctly. 
Q. Did you at some point in time live in San 
Diego? 
A. I did. 
Q. Do you remember where in the series oftime 
that occurred? 
A. That would be in -- around the mid '80s, 
somewhere in the mid '80s. 
Q. How about Ohio? 
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Q. (BY MR. SCANLAN) And would you travel with the 
carnival or just when it came to town you'd work with it? 
A. I never traveled, no. 
Q. SO it would only be when they came to town, you 
would work for them for a short period of time? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. Now, you indicated that you spent 11 months in 
prison as a result of a felony Assault 3 charge. 
A.' Yes, sir. 
Q. What was the circumstances of that? 
A. Circumstances was I beat up a person who I know 
to be a child molester from things that occurred in the 
residential vicinity of Truman Recovery when I was 
working there and living there. And he was sleeping in a 
part where children play. And little dummy thought she 
was going to take the law into her own hands, and I made 
a mistake. 
Q. Have you had any other felony charges? 
A. I believe so, yes. 
Q. Okay. And for what? 
A. I can't recall exactly -- what exactly charges 
that I do have. I'm sure that you have them on record. 
Am I not correct? 
Q. Do you remember any other felonies? 
A. I know that I've had a few. I can't tell you 
Page 46 
which ones - what they are exactly, no. 
Q. Have you ever served other time in prison? 
A. No, I have not. 
Q. Okay. What's the longest period of time that 
you've served in a jail? 
A. rm not quite sure. I believe I did a year 
once, but I'm not sure. 
Q. Okay. Do you remember what that was for? 
A. No, I do not. 
Q. Where was that? 
A. I would thirik Marysville, California. rm not 
quite sure again. 
Q. What sort of drug charges have you had? 
A. Possession, small amounts. 
Q. What kind of drugs? 
A. I believe they got me with heroin once and with 
meth once. Maybe more than once, I'm not sure. 
Q. Do you remember in what states those events 
occurred in? 
A. That would probably be in California. I think. 
I have a minor methamphetamine charge in Oregon. 
Q. And you indicated that you spent a night in 
jail within the last several months? 
A. Yes. And it was under the name Osburn. But I 
didn't tell them to do that, they did it on their own. I 
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tried to correct. 
Q. Do you remember what the charges were? 
A. Yeah, open container. 
Q. Anything else? 
A. There was, but it was dropped. 
Q. What was the other charge? 
A. I believe it was resisting arrest 
Q. What happened in that incident? 
A. I was drinking a beer, and it was in Ann 
Morrison park. And you're not supposed to take your can 
of beer off the grass on to the pavement And I had 
forgotten and was speaking to a friend. And I sat my 
beer on the top of his car, and the bicycle police came. 
And they saw it there and so they said, "Hey, 
is that your beer?" 
And I said, "Yeah. Yes, it is." 
And the one officer tried to grab the can of 
beer from me and spilled it upon hisself. He became a 
little angry and tried to overcharge me for that one. 
Q. Since July of2oo7, have you had any other 
run-ins with law enforcement? 
A. Anything severe? I don't believe so. 
Q. Anything at aU? 
A. Just the one thing that you just mentioned. 
Q. The time that you spent the night injail for 
the open container? 
A. Yeah. Yeah, that's all I have, to my 
knOWledge. 
Q. Do you drive? 
A. No. 
Page 
Q. When was the last time that you had a driver's 
license? 
A. I've never had a driver's license, yet I was 
capable of driving a vehicle. I just never obtained a 
license. 
Q. Have you ever had a driving under the influence 
charge? 
A. I believe I may have quite some time back. 
Q. Justone? 
A. I'm not quite sure about that. I believe 
that's all, but I wouldn't guarantee it 
Q. You said that the police were making things 
difficult for you in Newport. 
A. Correct. 
48 
Q. And that you were having trouble complying with 
your parole terms, which is what one of the things that 
made you come to Idaho? 
A. No, sir. That wasn't exactly it. Newport is a 
very small town. And it's ran by basically the tourists, 
people that own the tourist traps. And they have a 
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1 Q. Prior to coming to Idaho, had you previously 1 
2 been diagnosed with depression? 2 
3 A. Yes. 3 
4 Q. And had you always been previously diagnosed 4 
5 with hepatitis B and hepatitis C? 5 
6 A. Yes. 6 
7 Q. Do you know how you got hepatitis? 7 
8 A. From drinking. 8 
9 Q. Okay. Would that be both B and C? 9 
o A. That would probably be B. And C would probably \1 0 
1 be from the drugs, I asswne. \11 
2 Q. And at times, would you share needles with \12 
3 people? \13 
4 A. Yes. ~4 
5 Q. You also had previously been diagnosed with ~ 5 
6 bipolar disorder? P-6 
7 A. Yes. ~ 7 
8 Q. Do you get treated for that? \18 
9 A. I'm working with my regular doctor. Thafs why \19 
12 0 the recent change in my medications. There are ~ 0 
121 medications that do more than one thing at the same time. ~ 1 
12 2 And they can give me medications for my blood !2 2 
~ 3 pressure and to help me sleep that will also help me with ~ 3 
~ 4 my bipolar. ~ 4 
tiS Q. During the spring and surnmerof2007, were you ~5 
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1 taking any medication for your bipolar disorder? 1 
2 A. Prior to the injury? 2 
3 Q. Yes. 3 
4 A. No, I was not. At that time, I was controlling 4 
5 it through mind and will and doing pretty good, I think. 5 
6 I don't know. 6 
7 Q. You also have had a previous diagnosis of 7 
8 hypothyroidism? Are you aware of any hypothyroidism 8 
9 diagnosis? 9 
~ a A. If you tell me what that is, I'll tell you. 11 0 
~ 1 Q. Well, it's a condition that relates to your 1 
~2 ~d 2 
3 A. My thyroid is slightly low. Hyper sounds like p. 3 
4 it would be high, though. 4 
5 Q. And this is hypo, which would mean low thyroid. 5 
6 A. Okay. Because my thyroid is slightly low, yes. 116 
7 Q. Okay. And you've also had some kind of chronic 7 
~ 8 problems with bladder infections? 8 
9 A. Yeah. 9 
t2 0 Q. Any other conditions that you can think of !2 0 
t> 1 having prior to your arrival here in Idaho? b 1 
122 A. No. b2 
12 3 Q. Do you still smoke? b 3 
124 A. Yeah. b4 
125 Q. Howmuchdoyousmoke? ~5 
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A Around about a pack a day. 
Q. And back in the spring and summer of 2007, how 
much did you smoke? 
A Geez, God, I don't know. Probably around the 
same, I would assume. I don't know. 
Q. About a pack a day? 
A Yeah, I guess. 
(Deposition Exhibit No.3 was marked.) 
Q. (BY MR.. SCANLAN) You've been handed what's 
been marked as I believe it's Exhibit 3 to your 
deposition. Those are some records from Pacific Internal 
Medicine. 
A. Um-hmm. 
Q. Do you recall receiving services from anyone at 
Pacific Internal Medicine when you lived in Newport, 
Oregon? 
A. Yes. This Dr. Sayre, I saw him shortly, yes. 
Q. If you turn to the second page of that 
docwnent, there is a heading kind of near the top of the 
page that says "General." 
Do you see that? 
A. Hang on. General. Yeah. 
Q. And if you go down a little bit further in that 
paragraph, it says, "As far as her muscles and joints are 
concerned, she has pain, weakness, and numbness in the 
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arms, back, hands, hips, legs, neck, and shoulders." 
Do you see that? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. Is that something that you would have told Dr. 
Watkins? 
A. Is this from Dr. Watkins? 1 believe this is 
from Dr. Sayre, isn't it? 
Q. I believe that this is Dr. Watkins, if you look 
on the third page there at the bottom. 
A. I certainly don't recall. 
Q. Okay. Have you ever been involuntarily 
committed to a facility, either mental or drug and 
alcohol facility? 
A. No. 
Q. Have you ever had any treatment in a mental 
facility? 
A. I went to Lincoln County Mental Health at one 
time in Newport. 
THE REPORTER: What was the name? 
THE WI1NESS: Lincoln County Mental Health. 
Q. (BY MR. SCANLAN) And was that something you 
did voluntarily? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What sort of treatment did you receive there? 
A. They were treating me for bipolar. We had some 
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QUINN, MD'S AND IDAHO EMERGENCY 
PHYSICIANS, PA'S MOTIONS IN LIMINE 
COMES NOW the defendant, Kevin Timmel, MD, by and through his counsel of 
record, Steven K. Tolman of Tolman & Brizee, P.C., and hereby joins in, and adopts the 
arguments of, defendants Jason Quinn, MD's and Idaho Emergency Physicians, PA's 
motions in limine with respect to requiring plaintiff to provide notice to opposing counsel 
of any intent to use portions of depositions in opening, and precluding plaintiff or Dennis 
Nightengale from offering any testimony regarding statements made to them by non-
party medical providers that were not for the purpose of medical treatment or diagnosis. 
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Kevin E. Dinius 
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OR/Glr~AL 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
JANET BELL NIGHTENGALE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JASON QUINN, M.D.; IDAHO 
EMERGENCY PHYSICIANS, P.A.; AND 
KEVIN MATTHEW TIMMEL, M.D., 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 0722814 
JASON QUINN, M.D.'S 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION 
TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION IN 
LIMINE 
COMES NOW, defendant Jason Quinn, M.D. ("Dr. Quinn"), by and through his counsel 
of record, Hall, Farley, Oberrecht & Blanton, PLLC, and submits this Memorandum in 
Opposition to Plaintiff s Motion in Limine. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Plaintiff has filed a Motion in Limine seeking to preclude certain evidence from trial, 
including: that plaintiffs arterial occlusion was caused by IV drug abuse; plaintiffs drug and 
alcohol use after her amputation; plaintiffs medical records prior to June 1, 2007; plaintiffs 
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criminal history; Dr. Draper's opinion that Dr. Quinn's care and treatment of plaintiff complied 
with the applicable standard of care; any testimony from Dr. Shea as to the standard of care 
applicable to emergency medicine physicians; Myron Marx, M.D.'s opinions regarding what an 
ultrasound would and would not have shown on July 11, 2007; Dr. Henry's standard of care 
opinions; and comments on the scope or effect of this lawsuit on the healthcare system and/or 
defendants' medical practices. For the reasons discussed below, plaintiffs motion in limine 
should be denied, or at the least, tabled until trial. 
II. ARGUMENT 
A. IV Drug Abuse as a Potential Cause of Plaintiff's Arterial Occlusion is Relevant 
In an attempt to preclude defendants from offering any evidence or testimony regarding 
the IV drug abuse as a potential cause of plaintiff s arterial occlusion, plaintiff makes two 
arguments that both fail because the cause of plaintiff s arterial occlusion, or possible cause, is 
relevant to this case. 
First, plaintiff argues that the cause of the arterial occlusion is irrelevant because 
defendants are precluded from arguing comparative fault against plaintiff based on her pre July 
11, 2007 I.V. drug use. Dr. Quinn concedes plaintiffs actions that may have lead to causing her 
condition as of July 11, 2007 are not proper subjects of comparative fault, and has no intention of 
arguing the same at trial; however, the cause ofplaintiffs occlusion is relevant with regard to Dr. 
Quinn's medical decision making process and ultimate conclusions. Further, the probative value 
of such evidence is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. 
1. The Cause or Potential Causes of Plaintiff's Arterial Occlusion are 
Relevant 
a. Dr. Quinn considered plaintiff's prior drug use and its potential 
role in the plaintiff's presentation. 
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Dr. Quinn saw plaintiff on July 11, 2007. Mrs. Nightengale complained of pain in her 
left ann that had been present for a couple of months, and explained to Dr. Quinn the pain was 
not any different than it had been over the course of the prior couple of weeks. Plaintiff had 
multiple scars on her left ann believed to be from her admitted fonner heavy IV drug injection 
into that ann. See Affidavit of Counsel in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion in Limine ("Counsel 
Aff") Ex A (SARMC medical records from July 11, 2007). Plaintiff infonned Dr. Quinn she 
had not used IV drugs for a couple of years. Neither Dr. Quinn nor the nurse could locate a 
radial pulse. Jd. Plaintiffs capillary refill in her fingertips, however, was within normal limits as 
measured by the paramedics who transported her to the Emergency Department, the nurse who 
first saw plaintiff in the E.D., and Dr. Quinn. See Ex. B (Ada County Paramedics Records). Dr. 
Quinn also observed plaintiffs complaints of pain were inconsistent, plaintiff had full range of 
motion with her ann, her hand was nonnal color and she was able to use her ann regularly. See 
Counsel Aff. Ex. A. Dr. Quinn's Emergency Department record states: 
I do not feel she has an acute vascular emergency. I suspect the decreased 
pulses are likely related to chronic drug abuse in that arm and scar tissue. Given 
that she has nonnal capiIlary refill, I am not sure why her pulses are low. It may 
be related to prior drug use. At this point, I do not feel she has evidence of an 
acute arterial injury, she states the symptoms had been going on for many months 
and her exam is very inconsistent here ... At this time, I feel the patient can be 
safely discharged without further studies. 
Plaintiff had adequate blood flow to her hand as of Dr. Quinn's examination of her on 
July 11, 2007, as revealed by her nonnal capillary refill tests. (See 7111107 Record; Dr. Henry 
Depo., pp. 78-79, 11. 13-25). So long as a patient's hand is adequately vascularized, there is not 
an emergency situation and the problem does not need to be addressed in the Emergency 
Department. (Dr. Henry Depo), p. 58,11.6-17. 
Plaintiffs expert Richard Lally, M.D. has opined the standard of care reqUIres an 
emergency physician order vascular studies when faced with a patient with lack of a radial pulse 
000451 
JASON QUINN, M.D.'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION IN LIMINE - 3 
and arm pain, and that Dr. Quinn breached such standard. As stated above, in Dr. Quinn's 
Emergency Department Report, Dr. Quinn considered plaintiff s lack of radial pulse and 
indicated it may be due to her chronic drug use (that can damage arteries and veins and restrict 
blood flow)] or resulting scarring (which can make detection of pulses more difficult). The fact 
that Dr. Quinn specifically considered plaintiff s prior drug use in his treatment of plaintiff as 
well as his ultimate conclusion that plaintiff did not have an acute vascular emergency is clearly 
relevant. 
b. Plaintiff's prior drug use is a part of the history and provides an 
explanation for the manner in which plaintiff presented 
As seen throughout plaintiff s medical records, both pre and post amputation, her drug 
use is a part of her medical history and cannot be excluded without unfairly prejudicing Dr. 
Quinn and Dr. Timmel, who treated Mrs. Nightengale for her presenting conditions, which 
necessarily included discussion and consideration of her drug use history. 
c. Plaintiff provided other explanations for the cause of her problem 
that may have mislead the healthcare providers 
Throughout the course of June and July 2007, plaintiff provided varying explanations of 
the cause of her arm pain to the various medical providers who saw her, including: an injury ten 
years prior, caused by an alleged assault that occurred on June 1, 2007 and involved being struck 
by a rock and thrown into a canal, and a hangnail. See Counsel Aff., Ex. L (various medical 
records from June 1, 2007, July 16, 2007 and July 20, 2007 regarding causes of injury). 
Therefore, the cause of plaintiffs arterial occlusion, or at least plaintiffs comments regarding 
I Dr. Henry testified in his deposition that it is not uncommon for IV drug users to damage their arteries and that in 
his belie( plaintiffs IV drug use combined with other causes, resulted in a process whereby plaintiff had a chronic 
inflammation of her vessels resulting in long term chronic partial occlusion. See Counsel Aff. Ex C. (Dr. Henry 
Depo.), pp. 61-72) 000452 
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her own condition, including her thoughts of potential causes is also relevant in that it may have 
made diagnosis of her left arm pain more difficult. 
2. The Probative Value of the Prior IV Drug Use Would Not Lead to Unfair 
Prejudice 
Second, plaintiff argues that whatever probative value such evidence has is substantially 
outweighed by unfair prejudice plaintiff would incur if it was revealed to the jury she was an IV 
drug user. Plaintiffs prior IV drug use is relevant and has probative value, as it was an 
appropriate2 factor considered and relied upon by Dr. Quinn in his diagnosis of plaintiff and 
determination she was not experiencing an acute vascular event. 
Further, plaintiff would not incur unfair prejudice if the jury learns of her IV drug use as 
a result of testimony or evidence as to her IV drug abuse causing her occlusion, as such 
information is clearly relevant, and admissible on numerous issues, including the fact it resulted 
in significant scarring on her left foreann, was appropriately considered by Dr. Quinn in his 
medical decision making regarding his diagnosis of plaintiff on July 11, 2007 and affects her life 
expectancy. Ultimately, the fact of her drug use is part of the relevant medical records and her 
treatment and it must be shared with the jury. The fact that it may have been a factor in bringing 
about the medical problem in this case will not be unfairly prejudicial as the jury will already be 
aware of her prior drug use. 
B. Plaintiff's Drug or Alcohol Use After July 20, 2007 is Relevant 
Plaintiff asks the Court to exclude any mention of plaintiffs drug or alcohol use after the 
date of her amputation, arguing such information is irrelevant. This argument again fails, as 
2 Plaintiffs own expert Dr. Draper has opined that Dr. Quinn "documented a highly likely cause of decreased pulse 
in the left arm which could exist in the absence of signs of ischemia (history of heavy IV drug use with scar tissue 
obscuring a pulse.") See Counsel Aff. Ex. 0 (Dr. Draper September 18, 2007 Report,) p. 9). 000453 
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plaintiff s continued alcohol use continues to affect her physical condition, and because her 
continued alcohol and drug use is relevant to her life expectancy. 
In late July 2007, plaintiff broke her leg, and was confined to a wheel chair. Plaintiff was 
walking down a hill by Ann Morrison Park, fell and broke her leg. At the time of the fall, 
plaintiff was "intoxicated on alcohol as well as marijuana." See Counsel Aff. Ex. E (SLRMC 
records dated July 22, 2009). 
To the extent plaintiff intends to allege her fall was somehow related to her amputation, 
the fact she was drinking alcohol and smoking marijuana just prior to the fall is certainly 
relevant. 
Further, plaintiffs admitted continued use of marijuana is relevant to her credibility. 
Specifically, plaintiff testified she only uses marijuana for her chronic pain: 
Q: But I believe you were asked if you used marijuana in 2008. And you said 
yes. 
A: Yeah. 
Q: Have you used it in 2009? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Because I thought you said you were taking it because of the pain. 
A: Yes. 
Q: And for whatever other reason? 
A: No, not whatever other reason. 
See Counsel Aff. Ex. F. (Janet Nightengale Depo) p. 149, II. 3-12. 
Mr. Nightengale, however, testified his wife's last two uses of marIjUana were on a 
camping/fishing trip with him and New Year's Eve with one of her friends. See Counsel Aff. Ex. 
G. (Dennis Nightengale Depo), pp. 44-46, 11. 20-4. 
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Plaintiffs continued use of alcohol and drugs is relevant to the instant action as far as it 
relates to plaintiffs broken leg and her credibility. Further, such information is relevant to the 
extent it bears on her life expectancy. As such, plaintiffs motion should be denied. At the very 
least, the Court should defer ruling on this matter until trial. 
C. Plaintiff's Prior Medical Records Are Relevant and Should Be Admitted 
Plaintiff argues these records are irrelevant because they are in no way relevant to the 
condition with which plaintiff presented on July 11 or July 16, 2007. However, plaintiffs 
alleged damages are so broad as to include numerous items plaintiff suffered prior to defendants' 
involvement. 
To date, defendants are still unclear as to the extent of plaintiff's claimed damages. 
Plaintiff was asked in discovery to itemize her damages by description and amount. To date, the 
only response has been "Damages will include all those allowed by Idaho statutory and case law, 
including losses for pain and suffering, humiliation and disfigurement, as well as earnings loss 
yet to be completed. This response will be supplemented accordingly." See Counsel Aff. Ex. H 
(Plaintiff's Responses to Defendants Jason Quinn M.D., and Idaho Emergency Physicians, 
P.A. 's First Set ofInterrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents to Plaintiff.), p. 9. 
Plaintiffs disclosed Nancy Collins as an expert in this case. Her report states "[b]ecause [Mrs. 
Nightengale] cannot participate in many activities she used to enjoy she has gained weight and 
often feels fatigued." Ms. Collins' report also states that as a result of defendants' care plaintiff 
has been depressed. 
A review of plaintiff s previous medical records indicates plaintiff had complained of 
chronic fatigue and depression long before July 2007. See Counsel Aff. Ex. 1. As such, the 
previous medical records are relevant to establish preexisting conditions for which defendants 
are not liable. 
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Further, plaintiffs prior medical records are relevant for the purpose of establishing 
plaintiff does not have an average life expectancy. Plaintiffs experts Nancy Collins and 
Cornelius Hofman have offered reports related to life care plans and damages based upon the 
average woman's life expectancy. Plaintiff, however, is not an average female living in the 
United States. Rather, she has lived as a homeless person for a good portion of her life, and 
suffers from hepatitis B, hepatitis C, bipolar disorder, depression, and Post Traumatic Stress 
Disorder. Plaintiffs medical records further reveal that she has engaged in high risk behavior, 
such as sharing of needles and exchanging sex for drugs and/or money. See Counsel Aff. Ex. 1. 
All of this information is relevant with regard to plaintiffs life expectancy, and how it is shorter 
than that of an average female. 
Additionally, her past medical records demonstrate patterns of inconsistent stories 
relayed to health care providers and contradictory histories that are relevant to the histories 
provided in this case and her credibility. Additionally, to the extent she contradicts her prior 
records, they are relevant for impeachment purposes. 
The previous medical records of plaintiff are relevant for purposes of showing previously 
existing physical conditions as well as a less than average life expectancy. Additionally, they are 
relevant for purposes of demonstrating her lack of credibility and for impeachment purposes. 
D. Previous Crimes May Be Inquired Into on Cross-Examination of Plaintiff 
Dr. Quinn concedes that, at this point in time, evidence of plaintiff s known criminal 
convictions is not admissible; however, some of plaintiff s previous crimes may be inquired into 
on cross examination, as they concern her character for truthfulness and untruthfulness. 
In her deposition, plaintiff testified that she has "been known to shoplift from stores on 
occasion." See Counsel Aff. Ex. F (pp. 65-66, 11. 20-1). Further, plaintiff testified she has 
engaged in numerous acts of theft: 
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Q: Okay. Tell me about the times that you have been charged with theft. 
A: Let's see. I believe there was once in San Diego, would have been 
National City, actually, which is San Diego Country. 
Q: And what had you stolen there? 
A: Some groceries from a store. 
Q: Okay. Any others that you remember? 
A: Yeah. Actually, I believe there was twice down there. There was one in 
Chula Vista as well. There would be a couple of minor, petty thefts, I believe, in 
Marysville. 
ld, (pp. 54-55, II. 24-12). 
Idaho Rule of Evidence 608(b), states "[s]pecific instances of the conduct of a witness, 
for the purpose of attacking or supporting the credibility, of the witness, other than conviction of 
crime as provided in Rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in 
the discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on 
cross-examination of the witness .... " 
Idaho appellate courts have not specifically addressed whether specific instances of 
shoplifting are probative of a witnesses' untruthfulness. Idaho Courts have addressed the issue 
of whether crimes of burglary, larceny and robbery are relevant to credibility for Idaho Rule of 
Evidence 609 evaluations: "On the other hand robbery, larceny, and burglary, while not showing 
a propensity to falsify, do disclose a disregard for the rights of other which might reasonably be 
expected to express itself in giving false testimony whenever it would be to the advantage of the 
witness." State v. Thompson, 132 Idaho 628, 631, 977 P.2d 890, 893 (1999) (emphasis added); 
see also State v. Pierce, 107 Idaho 96, 103,685 P.2d 837,844 (1984) (holding that a conviction 
for robbery may bear on the issue of "whether [the witness] would hesitate to testify untruthfully 
if it seemed advantageous to do so.") (emphasis added). In the instant action, plaintiffs fomler 
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acts of theft and shoplifting are relevant to her truthfulness because she, as the plaintiff, has an 
opportunity to obtain an advantage in this case by being untruthful on the stand. 
Other courts have addressed the specific issue of whether shoplifting is probative of a 
witness's credibility. Although it appears foreign jurisdictions are not uniform, many have found 
that shoplifting or petit theft are probative of truthfulness. See People v. Segovia, 196 P.3d 1126, 
1132 (Colo.2008)(holding "shoplifting is a specific instance of conduct that is probative of 
truthfulness pursuant to CRE 608(b).") see also United States v. Smith, 80 F.3d 1188,1193 (7 th 
Cir.1996) (theft is probative of truthfulness); State v. Fields, 730 N.W.2d 777,783 (Minn.2007) 
(theft); Shumpert v. State, 935 So.2d 962, 971-72 (Miss.2006) (theft); State v. Hurlburt, 132 
N.H. 674, 569 A.2d 1306, 1307 (1990) (misappropriation); State v. Wyman, 96 N.M. 558, 632 
P.2d 1196, 1197-98 (Ct.App.l981) (theft). The Segovia court went on to explain "[i)t is illogical 
to conclude that an act which involves dishonesty is at the same time an act that is not probative 
of truthfulness. Moreover, common experience informs us that a person who takes the property 
of another for her own benefit is acting in an untruthful or dishonest way." Id. Idaho courts are 
likely to reach similar conclusions, particularly in light of the existing rulings regarding more 
serious theft crimes, such as robbery. 
As such, plaintiff's admissions of shoplifting and theft may be inquired into during cross-
examination for purposes of impeaching her credibility pursuant to Idaho Rule of Evidence 
608(b), and plaintiff's Motion in Limine should be denied. 
E. Dr. Quinn Should be Allowed to Call Dr. Draper in His Case in Chief, or Cross 
Examine Him as To Opinions He Holds Regarding Dr. Quinn's Care 
Dr. Quinn addressed this matter fully in his Memorandum in Support of Motions in 
Limine, and incorporates those arguments in this Opposition as if fully set forth herein. Dr. 
Quinn will not reargue those same points here, but will only address plaintiff's argument. 
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First, Dr. Quinn would like to address a misstatement in plaintiffs factual setup of her 
argument. Dr. Quinn did not object to plaintiffs original expert disclosure of Dr. Draper. 
Rather, Dr. Quinn objected only to Dr. Lally's disclosure. Further, Dr. Quinn did not request the 
prior supplementations of Dr. Draper be stricken. In fact, Dr. Quinn has objected to plaintiffs 
Fifth Expert Disclosure of Dr. Draper to the extent it intends to replace previously disclosed 
opinions of Dr. Draper. 
Second, plaintiff appears to argue the Court's July 13, 2009 Memorandum Decision 
struck or somehow allowed them to replace the prior expert disclosures. As stated in the 
Memorandum Decision, however, "the Court will order the following: Doctors Draper and Lally 
must submit supplemental reports .... " (p. 9). The Court's Memorandum Decision did not 
strike the previous disclosures, it simply required plaintiff to make a supplemental disclosure that 
complied with Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)( 4). 
Plaintiff appears to argue Dr. Draper has been retained as a testifying expert with regard 
to Dr. Timmel and as a non-testifying expert with regard to his opinions as to Dr. Quinn, and that 
Dr. Draper is, therefore, entitled to protection under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(4)(B). 
Dr. Quinn acknowledges that, typically a defendant may not call an expert witness who is 
retained by plaintiff, but not expected to testify, however, Dr. Quinn strongly disputes that Dr. 
Draper qualifies as a consulting witness when he is expected to testify at trial, and his opinions 
have already been disclosed. 
Dr. Draper has been disclosed as a standard of care expert with regard to emergency 
medicine providers practicing in Boise, Idaho in July 2007. As the Court is aware, both Dr. 
Quinn and Dr. Timmel are emergency medicine providers who, as of July 2007, were practicing 
in Boise, Idaho. Dr. Draper, as an emergency medicine expert, clearly has opinions he intends to 
offer regarding the standard of care applicable to Dr. Timmel. In the event Dr. Draper offers 
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such opinions, plaintiff has opened the door for any questioning with regard to standard of care 
issues for an emergency medicine physician practicing in Boise, including those as to Dr. 
Quinn's care and treatment of plaintiff. In other words, it is not possible for plaintiff to limit the 
scope of Dr. Draper's direct testimony as to only standard of care for Dr. Timmel, as Drs. Quinn 
and Timmel are subject to the same standard of care. 
Dr. Draper's opinion that Dr. Quinn's care and treatment of plaintiff complied with the 
applicable standard of care will help the jury resolve a disputed issue in this case and is therefore 
clearly relevant. Dr. Draper has been disclosed as having opinions as to both Dr. Quinn and Dr. 
Timme!, and only now, has plaintiff attempted to improperly limit the scope of Dr. Draper's 
opinions. It is anticipated plaintiff will argue defendants have done the same thing by selecting 
experts to testify only as to Dr. Quinn or Dr. Timme!. However, Dr. Quinn and Dr. Timmel have 
their own right to defend themselves in this lawsuit as they see fit, which includes, retention of 
their own experts. Defendants' experts were not asked to form opinions as to other providers, 
and have not done so. Dr. Draper was asked to opine as to both Dr. Quinn's and Dr. Timmel's 
care and treatment. Dr. Draper provided such opinions and plaintiff disclosed such opinions in 
this case. 
In the event Dr. Draper testifies, Dr. Quinn should be allowed to cross examine him 
regarding his standard of care opinions applicable to emergency medicine physicians practicing 
in Boise, Idaho in July 2007, which includes his opinions as to Dr. Quinn's care and treatment of 
plaintiff. 
F. Dr. Marx's Opinion as to What an Ultrasound Would Have Revealed on July 11, 
2007 is Proper and Admissible 
Myron Marx, M.D. is a board certified interventional radiologist. Dr. Quinn identified 
Dr. Marx's opinions in his original disclosure of expert witnesses. Plaintiff moves the Court to 
preclude Dr. Marx from offering two of his offered opinions in this case: (1) his opinion as to 0 
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causation of the injury and (2) his expert opinion as to what an ultrasound test would have shown 
on July 11,2007, had one been performed. 
As for Dr. Marx's causation opinions, plaintiff makes the same arguments addressed 
above in section A. 
Plaintiff then argues Dr. Marx's testimony regarding what an ultrasound would have 
shown on July 11, 2007, had one been done, is speculative and unsupported by the facts. 
Plaintiff's arguments are misplaced. 
Dr. Quinn's disclosure of Dr. Marx includes the following statements: 
Dr. Marx is anticipated to opine that, more probably than not, had an ultrasound 
study been performed on July 11,2007, at the time Mrs. Nightengale was seen by 
Dr. Quinn, it would have demonstrated sufficient blood flow in the arm and hand. 
(See Jason Quinn, M.D. and Idaho Emergency Physicians, P.A.'s Disclosure of 
Expert Witnesses) 
Dr. Marx is an interventional radiologist. A part of his job includes reading and 
interpreting ultrasounds such as the one he describes above. Based upon Dr. Marx's review of 
the record, including the fact plaintiff's hand was of normal color, she had normal use of her 
arm, full range of motion in her arm, IV drug scarring on her forearm, and normal capillary refill 
throughout her hand, Dr. Marx has opined that had an ultrasound have been performed on July 
11, 2007, it would have shown sufficient blood flow. Dr. Marx's opinion is not mere 
speculation. Rather, it is his expert opinion based upon his training, experience, and education 
coupled with his review of the records in this case. 
Interestingly, plaintiff's own expert, Richard Lally, M.D., also offers an opinion on what 
an ultrasound would have shown if it had been done on July 11, 2007: "In my opinion, further 
vascular studies would have detected the arterial occlusion." See Plaintiff's Fifth Supplemental 
Expert Disclosure, Dr. Lally Report p. 3). While Dr. Lally likely lacks the training and 
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experIence to reach such a conclusion, it appears plaintiff plans to seek to introduce such 
testimony. 
Dr. Marx's opinion as to what an ultrasound would have shown on July 11, 2007 is not 
inadmissible speculation, but is rather an opinion held to a reasonable degree of medical 
certainty based upon the facts of this case, his education, training and experience. In the event 
the Court is inclined to grant plaintiff's Motion in Limine on this ground, it must also preclude 
plaintiff's experts from offering similar opinions. 
G. Dr. Henry Has Adequately Familiarized Himself With the Local Standard of 
Care for Dr. Quinn 
Plaintiff argues Dr. Henry failed to identify how he had sufficient knowledge of the local 
standard of care applicable to Dr. Quinn, and is therefore not qualitled to offer standard of care 
opinions at trial. An actual review of Dr. Quinn's testimony, however, as opposed to plaintiff's 
summary, reveals Dr. Henry is adequately familiar with the standard of care and qualified to 
offer standard of care opinions in this case. 
Dr. Henry testified that he discussed the standard of care applicable to Dr. Quinn with Dr. 
Beardmore: 
Q: It's indicated in your disclosure that you discussed the applicable standard 
of care with an emergency room physician that was familiar with the 
standard of care applicable to Dr. Quinn in this case. Is that true? 
A: Yes. That is true. 
Q: Who did you speak with? 
A: I believe he's Dr. Beardmore or - that's his name, I believe. 
(See Counsel Aff. Ex. C), p. 24, 11. 10-18. 
Dr. Henry testified that Dr. Beardmore was an emergency medicine physician who 
practiced in the Boise area. 
Q: Do you know if Dr. Beardmore is an emergency physician? 
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A: Yes, he is. 
*** 
Q: Okay. Do you know where he practices? 
A: All I know is it's in the state of Idaho. Now I can't tell you exactly which 
hospital it's at. All I know is he is from the state of Idaho, and I believe 
he's somewhere in the Boise area, but I'm not-I can't tell you which 
hospital he works at. 
See Counsel Aff. Ex. C, p. 27, 11. 5-17. 
Dr. Henry testified about his discussion with Dr. Beardmore, including that it lasted 
approximately 45 minutes to an hour and involved: 
the flow of patients, how they would be triaged, how they would be seen, what 
would constitute an emergent intervention, what would constitute follow-up care, 
what would constitute a reasonable physical examination given a patient with a 
certain set of medical problems and a certain condition. What would, what would 
you do with the following kind of case? And so that's, that's how we establish 
what would be done where I am, what would be done where he is, and pretty 
much that's how that conversation went. And it went on for about I'd say forty-
five minutes to an hour or so. 
See Counsel Aff. Ex. C, pp. 27-28,11. 18-8. 
Further, there is nothing precluding Dr. Quinn from having Dr. Henry revisit a discussion 
with Dr. David Beardmore in the event his memory needs to be refreshed with regard to the fact 
that Dr. Beardmore is an emergency room physician who, as of July 11, 2007, was practicing at 
Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, in Boise, Idaho. 
Plaintiff argues that the fact Dr. Henry had formed his initial opinions in this case prior to 
speaking with a local physician somehow invalidates his expert opinions. As the Court is fully 
aware, the purpose of having the out of state expert confer with a local physician is to confirm 
the out of state witness is familiar with the local standard. This is typically done by establishing 
that the local standard of care is without any deviations (or identifying any that may exists) as 
compared to the standard familiar to the out of state expert. Therefore, the fact Dr. Henry 
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developed his opinions prior to confirming the standard of care applicable to Dr. Quinn was the 
same as the standard of care he is familiar with is of no consequence whatsoever. 
Finally, Dr. Henry has read Dr. Quinn's deposition in this matter. An out of state expert 
may acquaint him or herself with the applicable standard of care by reading depositions of local 
physicians. See Kozlowski v. Rush, 121 Idaho 825, 838-839, 828 P.2d 854,857-858 (1992). Dr. 
Quinn testified in his deposition that "[s]o in this case, no, I don't think the standard of care - I 
don't think the standard of care would have been any different anywhere else." See Counsel Aff. 
Ex. K (Dr. Quinn Depo), p., 76, 11. 4-9. 
As such, Dr. Henry is familiar with the standard of care applicable to Dr. Quinn through 
his discussions with Dr. Beardmore, as well as his review of Dr. QUinn's own deposition 
testimony indicating that the Boise standard of care is the same as the national standard of care 
with regard to his treatment of plaintiff. 
H. Various Issues 
Plaintiff identifies eight statements or topics she wants to preclude defendants from 
making. Dr. Quinn has no objection to the first seven; however, Dr. Quinn does oppose item (g) 
which would preclude Dr. Quinn from calling the instant action a medical malpractice case. Dr. 
Quinn primarily objects to this as it is inconsequential, but fears it may be difficult to avoid 
reference to this matter as a medical malpractice case throughout the course of trial. 
DATED this day of September, 2009. 
HALL,FARLEY,OBERRECHT 
& BLANTON, P.A. 
r Defendant Jason Quinn, M.D. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
JANET BELL NIGHTENGALE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JASON QUINN, M.D.; IDAHO 
EMERGENCY PHYSICIANS, P.A.; 
KEVIN MATTHEW TIMMEL, M.D.; AND 
EMERGENCY MEDICINE OF IDAHO, 
PA AND ITS AFFILIATES, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 0722814 
DEFENDANT KEVIN TIMMEl, M.Do'S 
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF MOTIONS IN LIMINE 
INTRODUCTION 
COMES NOW, defendant Kevin Timmel, MD (hereinafter referred to as "Dr. 
Timmel"), by and through his counsel of record, Tolman & Brizee, P.C., and submits his 
Reply Memorandum in Support of Motions in Limine. These motions are made and 
based upon the record herein, the Idaho Rules of Evidence, and the following law and 
argument. 
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ARGUMENT 
A. Plaintiff's Experts Should Be Precluded From Providing Opinions at 
Trial Not Previously Disclosed and Provided in Written Disclosures. 
Dr. Timmel previously filed a motion to exclude plaintiff's expert witnesses Dr. 
Draper and Dr. Lally, and a motion to strike plaintiff's second supplemental expert 
disclosure, based upon the fact the disclosures were untimely, deficient, and not in 
compliance with Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(4). The Court, in its Memorandum 
Decision, dated the 13th day of July, 2009, agreed with Dr. Timmel and concluded the 
disclosures were deficient. However, the Court allowed the plaintiff an opportunity to 
resubmit the reports of Drs. Draper and Lally, instructing plaintiff to comply with Idaho 
Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(4)(A){i). 
Plaintiff has resubmitted the expert disclosures for both of her expert witnesses, 
Dr. Draper and Dr. Lally. Moreover, Dr. Timmel argues the Court cannot permit or aI/ow 
Dr. Draper and Dr. Lally to provide any testimony or opinion(s) at trial regarding Dr. 
Timmel which have not been previously disclosed by written disclosure, pursuant to this 
Court's Scheduling Order, dated January 8, 2009, and Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 
26(b)(4)(A}(i). In other words, plaintiff's expert witnesses are limited to testifying 
regarding their respective opinions as provided in plaintiff's expert disclosures. 
The Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and Idaho case law support Dr. Timmel's 
position that plaintiff's expert witnesses can only testify regarding opinions and 
information provided in plaintiffs expert disclosures. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 26(e) 
provides, in relevant part: 
(1) A party is under a duty seasonably to supplement the response with 
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respect to any question directly addressed to ... (8) the identity of each 
person expected to be called as an expert witness at trial, the subject 
matter on which the person is expected to testify, and the substance of 
the persona's testimony. 
I.R.C.P. 26(e)(1}. 
"This rule unambiguously imposes a continuing duty to supplement responses to 
discovery with respect to the substance and subject matter of an expert's testimony 
where the initial responses have been rejected, modified, expanded upon, or otherwise 
altered in some manner." Radmer v. Ford Motor Company, 120 Idaho 86, 89, 813 P.2d 
897, 900 (1991) (citing Zolber v. Winters, 109 Idaho 824, 712 P.2d 525 (1986). In 
Radmer v. Ford Motor Company, the Idaho Supreme Court reviewed the Advisory 
Committee Notes for Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26, which is analogous to Idaho 
Rule of Civil Procedure 26, and both rules are designed to promote candor and fairness. 
Id. 
The federal Advisory Committee stated: 
"In cases of this character [involving expert testimony], a prohibition 
against discovery of information held by expert witnesses produces in 
acute form the very evils that discovery has been created to prevent. 
Effective cross-examination of an expert witness requires advance 
preparation . . . Similarly, effective rebuttal requires advance 
knowledge of the line of testimony of the other side. If the latter is 
foreclosed by a rule against discovery, the narrowing of issues and 
elimination of surprise which discovery normally produces are frustrated." 
Id. (quoting Advisory Committee Notes, Rule 26, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure., 28 
u.s.e.A.) (emphasis added); see also Clark v. Raty, 137 Idaho 343, 347,48 P.3d 672, 
676 (2002). 
The Idaho Supreme Court also noted the critical nature of complete and accurate 
responses regarding expert witnesses in the discovery process in preparation for trial, 
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noting: 
"It is fundamental that opportunity be had for full cross-examination, and 
this cannot be done properly in many cases without resort to pretrial 
discovery, particularly when expert witnesses are involved ... Before an 
attorney can even hope to deal on cross-examination with an 
unfavorable expert opinion he must have some idea of the bases of 
that opinion and the data relied upon. If the attorney is required to 
await examination at trial to get this information. he often will have 
too little time to recognize and expose vulnerable spots in the 
testimony." 
Id. (quoting Friedenthal, Discovery and Use of an Adverse Party's Expert Information, 14 
Stan.LRev. 455, 485 (1962) (emphasis added). 
The Radmer court held that if a party fails to satisfy the requirements of Idaho Rule 
of Civil Procedure 26, then typically the trial court excludes the proffered evidence. Id. 
(citing Cole co Industries, Inc. v. Berman, 567 F.2d 569 (3d Cir. 1977». Since trial courts 
have broad discretion in ruling on pre-trial discovery matters, "reversible error has been 
found in allowing testimony where Rule 26 has not been complied with." Id. (citing Smith v. 
Ford Motor Co., 626 F.2d 784 (10th Cir. 1980». Specifically, in Radmer, the Idaho 
Supreme Court concluded the trial court committed reversible error in aI/owing the 
testimony of an expert witness at trial after the Supreme Court determined that "[the 
plaintiffs] breached their obligation to supplement their discovery responses prior to trial, 
as required by rule 26, and as a result [the defendant] was unprepared to meet and 
effectively challenge [the plaintiffs'] new theory of liability and was prejudiced thereby." Id., 
120 Idaho at 91, 813 P.2d at 902. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held expert witnesses may only testify at trial 
regarding opinions, facts, and information which are properly disclosed. In Clark v. Raty, 
137 Idaho 343, 48 P.3d 672 (2002), the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's 
DEFENDANT KEVIN TIMMEL. M.D.'S REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTIONS IN LlMIN~ 
PAGE 4 OOu469 
exclusion of trial testimony provided by plaintiffs expert witness relating to information 
which plaintiff untimely disclosed. In Clark, the plaintiff identified treating physicians, 
including a Dr. Scoville, as potential witnesses. Id., 137 Idaho at 344, 48 P.3d at 673. 
However, plaintiff did not state any medical opinions to which Dr. Scoville was expected 
to testify nor offer any facts to support those opinions. Id. Two weeks prior to trial, the 
defendants filed a motion in limine requesting preclusion of expert testimony regarding 
any opinions that had not been disclosed in plaintiff's discovery responses. Id. 
One week prior to trial, at a hearing on defendant's motion in limine, the trial 
court determined plaintiff's expert witness disclosure relating to Dr. Scoville's testimony 
and expert opinion was deficient. but permitted plaintiff to cure Dr. Scoville's expert 
disclosure and set a deadline for the plaintiffs supplemental disclosure prior to trial. Id. 
The plaintiff supplemented the disclosure of Dr. Scoville's testimony and opinions prior 
to the trial setting. but two days after the court established deadline. Id. 
One day prior to the commencement of trial, the district court held that "because 
of [plaintiffs] untimely disclosure, he would not be allowed to present Dr. Scoville's 
opinion regarding the [information and opinions found in the updated supplemental 
disclosure]." Id., 137 Idaho at 345, 48 P.3d at 674. However, the trial court held 
plaintiffs expert witness, Dr. Scovil/e, would be allowed to testify about matters that had 
already been timely disclosed in accordance with the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. 
The trial court specifically stated, "to the extent that [the plaintiff has] made the 
disclosures as to Dr. Scoville appropriately, if any, then [the plaintiff] can use [Dr. 
Scovil/e]. If not, then I think [the plaintiff is] restricted to what [Dr. Scovil/e] can say in 
terms of facts." Id., 137 Idaho at 348, 48 P.3d at 677. The trial court specifically 
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prohibited the parties from eliciting evidence of "any of the new opinions of Dr. Scoville 
not previously disclosed." Id. (emphasis part of original). 
In affirming the trial court's decision to exclude the trial testimony of plaintiffs 
untimely-disclosed opinions of his expert witness, Dr. Scoville, the Idaho Supreme Court 
noted U[i]t is clear that the district court intended only to preclude opinions and 
supporting data that had not been disclosed in discovery responses .... [and] excluded 
only Dr. Scoville's untimely-disclosed opinions and underlying data, but expressly 
allowed Dr. Scoville's testimony as to any facts or opinions that had been disclosed in 
response to discovery." Id. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has also prohibited expert witnesses from providing 
opinions at trial in medical malpractice cases, where such opinions have not previously 
been disclosed and provided in written disclosures. In Clark v. Klein, 137 Idaho 154, 45 
P.3d 810 (2002), the Supreme Court held that a party's failure to timely supplement 
discovery responses, including disclosure of the identity of an expert witness and 
disclosure of the substance of the expert's testimony concerning an opinion 
regarding the applicable standard of care, warranted exclusion of the expert's testimony 
at trial. Clark v. Klein, 137 Idaho 154, 158-159, 45 P.3d 810, 814-815 (2002). The 
Supreme Court reasoned exclusion of the expert testimony was proper because the 
opposing party did not have an opportunity to prepare cross-examination or to offer 
rebuttal testimony. Id., 137 Idaho at 159,45 P.3d at 815. 
Presently, in the above-entitled case, plaintiff has timely supplemented her expert 
witness disclosures to Dr. Timmel and the Court. However, based upon the Idaho Rules 
of Civil Procedure and Idaho case law, plaintiffs expert witnesses are precluded from 
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providing opinions, facts, or information at trial which have not been previously 
disclosed and provided in plaintiffs written disclosures. To the extent plaintiff elicits 
"new", or previously undisclosed, opinions from her expert witnesses during trial 
testimony, such testimony is inadmissible and should be excluded. See Radmer v. Ford 
Motor Company, 120 Idaho 86, 813 P.2d 897 (1991); Clark v. Raty, 137 Idaho 343, 48 
P .3d 672 (2002). 
Therefore, the Court should exclude any trial testimony provided by plaintiffs 
expert witnesses which has not been previously disclosed and provided in plaintiffs 
written expert disclosures. 
B. Plaintiff, Her Counsel, and Her Expert Witnesses Cannot Mention or 
Refer to Letters Authored by Dr. Gross or Make Reference to Ms. 
Nightengale Bell's Care Being Referred to Risk Management. 
This Court has previously ruled that the two letters authored by Dr. Dominic 
Gross on October 2, 2007 fall under the peer review privilege, pursuant to Idaho Code § 
39-1392 et seq., and entered an order sealing the subject letters. See Memorandum 
Decision on Plaintiff's Motion RE: Deposition Questions of Dr. Gross and the Status of 
Letters Authored by Dr. Gross, January 15, 2009, p. 6. 
This Court's Memorandum Decision, dated January 15,2009, correctly analyzed 
the issues presented regarding the status of Dr. Gross' October 2, 2007 letters, 
correctly applied the peer review privilege, and correctly sealed the letters. As the Court 
succinctly stated, the applicable statutes "provide a broad privilege for peer review 
records." See Memorandum Decision on Plaintiffs Motion RE: Deposition Questions of 
Dr. Gross and the Status of Letters Authored by Dr. Gross, January 15, 2009, p. 4. This 
Court held: 
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''These letters constitute reports or memoranda that relate to peer review 
and are part of the peer review process. In fact, they are the very type of 
document needed to initiate the peer review process. This type of 
communication is precisely what the peer review privilege contemplates 
for the medical community. As an activity directly related to medical 
'quality assurance and improvement,' the authoring and mailing of the 
letters constitute a peer review activity. See section 39-1392(a)(11 )(b). In 
addition, the letters themselves fall squarely within the broad definition of 
peer review records as they constitute 'physical materials relating to peer 
review of any health care organization.' See section 39-1392(a)(12)." 
See Memorandum Decision on Plaintiff's Motion RE: Deposition Questions of Dr. Gross 
and the Status of Letters Authored by Dr. Gross, January 15, 2009, p. 4-5. 
This Court also noted the public policy and purpose supporting the protection of 
the letters by applying the peer review privilege. "If not privileged, the type of 
communication expressed in the letters would be 'inhibited and discouraged,' and the 
exchange of information that improves the standards and quality of medical practice in 
the State would be compromised." See Memorandum Decision on Plaintiff's Motion RE: 
Deposition Questions of Dr. Gross and the Status of Letters Authored by Dr. Gross, 
January 15, 2009, p. 5. Thus, this Court properly applied the peer review privilege and 
sealed the subject letters. 
Plaintiff requests the Court to reconsider its decision concerning the subject 
letters, and specifically the letter written by Dr. Gross to Dr. Foss, and argues that the 
statutory peer review privilege does not apply. For the reasons this Court already 
articulated in its Memorandum Decision, dated January 15, 2009, the plaintiff is wrong. 
The peer review privilege must be applied broadly. as mandated by Idaho statute. to 
both of Dr. Gross' letters. The Court's analysis and decision ordering the subject letters 
sealed is proper. 
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Moreover, plaintiff argues she should be able to use the letter from Dr. Gross to 
Dr. Foss for impeachment purposes. The Court should deny this request because the 
letters are privileged and properly sealed by order of this Court. Thus, the subject letters 
are not permitted to be used for any purpose during the trial. 
Therefore, plaintiff, her counsel, and her witnesses are precluded from 
identifying, mentioning and/or referencing said letters for any purpose at trial. 
Additionally, any mention or reference to the care of plaintiff being referred to or sent to 
risk management, whether the reference is in testimony or in the medical records 
themselves, should be precluded. 
Accordingly, Dr. Timmel respectfully requests the Court to preclude plaintiff from 
referencing, commenting, or mentioning the letters authored by Dr. Gross or referencing 
plaintiffs care being referred to risk management. 
C. Plaintiff Should Be Precluded from Eliciting Testimony and Opinions 
from Treating PhYSicians Regarding Standard of Care. 
In order to prove her case against Dr. Timmel, plaintiff must satisfy the 
requirements of Idaho Code §§ 6-1012 and 6-1013, and prove Dr. Timmel violated the 
applicable standard of health care practice in his treatment of plaintiff. Idaho Code 
Section 6-1012 requires the plaintiff to prove by direct expert testimony, in its case-in-
chief, that the defendant health care provider failed to meet the applicable standard of 
health care practice in the community in which the care was, or should have been, 
provided. I.C.§ 6-1012. See also Ramos v. Dixon, 144 Idaho at 35, 156 P.3d at 536; 
Edmunds v. Kraner, 142 Idaho at 876,136 P.3d at 347; Dulaney V, Sf. Alphonsus Reg'! 
Med. Gtr., 137 Idaho 160, 164, 45 P.3d 816, 820 (2002); Rhodehouse v. Stutts, 125 
Idaho 208, 868 P.2d 1224, 1227 (1994). The expert witness must testify that the 
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defendant health care provider did not meet the applicable standard of care to his or her 
specific field of health care and specialty. I.C. § 6-1012. Therefore, every defendant 
health care provider shall be judged in comparison with similarly trained and qualified 
health care providers in the same community, taking into account his or her experience, 
training, and field of medical specialization. I.C. § 6-1012. See Ramos v. Dixon, 144 
Idaho at 35, 156 P.3d at 536; Edmunds v. Kraner, 142 Idaho at 876, 136 P.3d at 347; 
Dulaney v. St. Afphonsus Reg'f Ctr., 137 Idaho 160, 164,45 P.3d 816, 820 (2002); KoHn 
v. St. Luke's Reg. Med. Ctr., 940 P.2d at 1150. 
Idaho Code Section 6-1012 must be read in conjunction with Idaho Code Section 
6-1013, which provides the foundational requirements for expert testimony in medical 
malpractice cases. The plaintiff must establish by one or more knowledgeable, 
competent expert witness the applicable standard of practice and the failure to 
adequately meet the community standard of care. I.C. § 6-1013. In addition, the plaintiff 
must lay a proper foundation for the expert testimony before the court will admit the 
expert testimony into evidence. I.C. § 6-1013. See a/so Weeks v. Eastern Idaho Health 
Services, 143 Idaho 834,153 P.3d 1180, 1183 (2007); Ramos v. Dixon, 144 Idaho 32, 
156 P.3d 533,536 (2007); Dulaney v. St. Alphonsus Reg'l Med. Ctr., 137 Idaho at 164, 
45 P.3d at 533; Evans v. Griswold, 129 Idaho 902, 905, 935 P.2d 165, 168 (1997); 
Watts v. Lynn, 125 Idaho 341, 345, 870 P.2d 1300,1304 (1994); Rhodehouse v. Stutts, 
868 P.2d at 1227-28. 
Idaho Code Section 6-1013 provides the requirements that the plaintiff must 
establish for laying a proper foundation for expert testimony, which are: (1) the opinion 
is actually held by the expert witness, (2) the opinion is held with a reasonable degree of 
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medical certainty, and (3) the expert possesses actual knowledge of the applicable 
community standard which was in place at the time of the alleged malpractice. I.C. § 6-
1013. Thus, the plaintiff's expert's testimony must show that he or she familiarized 
himself or herself with the local standard of care for a particular defendant, whether the 
defendant be an emergency physician, orthopedic surgeon, nurse, hospital, or other 
health care worker. I.C. § 6-1013. See also Ramos v. Dixon, 144 Idaho 32, 156 P.2d at 
536 (2007). As a foundation for expert testimony, a plaintiff must establish that his or 
her expert witness has actual knowledge of the local standard of care and skill ordinarily 
exercised by a similar provider in the same community. I.C. § 6-1013. 
If an expert witness is not from the locality where the alleged malpractice 
occurred, the expert can only demonstrate an adequate familiarity with the local 
standard of care by consulting with a health care provider who practices in the same 
community where the alleged malpractice occurred. Kolin v. St. Luke's Reg'l Med. Ctr., 
130 Idaho 323, 940 P.2d 1142, 1147-48 (1997); Watts v. Lynn, 870 P.2d at 1304; 
Rhodehouse v. Stutts, 125 Idaho 208, 868 P.2d 1224, 1228 (1994) (In order to show 
actual knowledge of the local standard of care under I.C. § 6-1013, the Court has held 
that a medical expert from out of the area must inquire of a local specialist as to the 
local community standard of care.); Strode v. Lenzi, 116 Idaho 214, 775 P.2d at 108 
(holding that before a board certified specialist from outside the state may testify as to 
the local standard of care, the specialist "must, at a minimum, inquire of a local 
specialist to determine whether the local community standard varies from the national 
standard for that board certified specialty."). 
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The term "community" refers to that geographical area ordinarily served by the 
licensed general hospital at or nearest to which such care was provided. I.C. § 6-1012. 
In addition, if plaintiff's standard of care experts do not have actual knowledge of the 
applicable standard of care, then plaintiff's expert witnesses must show that they have 
adequately familiarized themselves with that standard of care in order to testify at trial. 
Thus, plaintiff must elicit expert testimony to prove her case against Dr. Timme!. 
In the present, the Court established deadlines for the disclosure of expert witnesses 
and the manner in which the parties' disclosures must be made in this Court's 
Scheduling Order, dated January 8, 2009. The Court's Order stated: U[t]reating 
physicians for the purposes of this scheduling order are deemed to be an expert 
witness." See Scheduling Order, January 8, 2009, p. 3,,-r 7. 
Moreover, the Court ordered U[a]/I parties' disclosure as to experts shall be in 
compliance with Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i)." See Scheduling Order, January 8,2009, p. 3, 1f 7. 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(4)(A)(i) provides the requirements for the discovery 
disclosures required for expert witnesses, including treating physicians which the Court 
deems to be expert witnesses, and states each party must disclose the following: 
UA complete statement of all opinions to be expressed and the basis 
and reasons therefore; the data or other information considered by 
the witness in forming the opinions; any exhibits to be used as a 
summary of or support for the opinions; any qualifications of the 
witness, including a list of all publications authored by the witness 
within the preceding ten years; the compensation to be paid for the 
testimony; and a listing of any other cases in which the witness has 
testified as an expert at trial or by deposition within the preceding four 
years." 
J.R.C.P. 26(b)(4)(A)(i) (emphasis added). 
To date, plaintiff has submitted an original and six supplemental disclosures. 
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However, none of these disclosure documents provide a complete statement of all 
opinions to be expressed and the basis and reasons for such opinions for any of the 
treating physicians, including but not limited to, Dr. Gross, Dr. Gilbertson, Dr. Yeakley, 
Dr. Timmel, and/or Dr. Quinn. Plaintiffs expert disclosures are also deficient because 
plaintiff fails to provide the data or other information considered by the disclosed 
treating physicians (again, including but not limited to, Dr. Gross, Dr. Gilbertson, Dr. 
Yeakley, Dr. Timmel, and/or Dr. Quinn) in forming such opinions. Plaintiff also does not 
disclose any exhibits to be used as a summary of or support for said opinions of 
the plaintiffs disclosed list of treating physicians. 
In contrast, plaintiff merely provides a list of a/l experts, including treating 
physicians the Court deems as expert witnesses, in its Sixth Supplemental Expert 
Disclosure and neglects to provide a complete statement of each expert's opinion, the 
basis for said opinion, and exhibits to be used in support of each expert's opinion. 
Rather, plaintiff's disclosure only provides U[b]ecause these treating physicians are 
'deemed' experts by this Court, it is expected that they will render opinions relating to 
the medical care and treatment they provided to Plaintiff specifically, issues of 
proximate cause, and/or the standard of health care generally in Boise, Idaho in the 
summer of 2007." See Plaintiff's Sixth Supplemental Expert Disclosure, p. 2. 
However, as already noted, plaintiff fails to comply with Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 26(b)( 4 )(A){i) because plaintiff does not provide a complete statement of 
each treating physician's opinion, the basis for said opinion, and exhibits to be used in 
support of each expert's opinion. Since plaintiff failed to provide Dr. Timmel the required 
information for expert disclosures, pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 
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26(b)(4)(A)(i) and the Court's January 8, 2009 Scheduling Order, the Court should 
preclude plaintiff from calling as expert witnesses, or seeking opinions as to causation 
and standard of care, plaintiff's treating health care providers. This would include, but 
not be limited to, Dr. Gross, Dr. Gilbertson, and Dr. Yeakley. 
Furthermore, due to plaintiff's failure to comply with the expert disclosure 
requirements of Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(4)(A){i) regarding disclosure of the 
respective treating physicians' opinions, plaintiff cannot utilize or rely upon the testimony 
of these experts to satisfy the requirements of Idaho Code §§ 6-1012 and 6-1013 
regarding the applicable standard of care. See Clark v. Klein, 137 Idaho 154, 45 P.3d 
810 (2002) (Idaho Supreme Court excluded trial testimony of expert witness regarding 
standard of care which was not properly disclosed. pursuant to Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure, in discovery prior to trial). 
Therefore. the Court should preclude plaintiff from eliciting testimony and 
opinions from the treating physicians regarding the applicable standard of health care 
practice as it pertains to Dr. Timme!. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the preceding argument, Dr. Timmel respectfully requests the Court 
to grant his Motions in Limine in their entirety. 
DATED this Z~(~ay of September, 2009. 
TOLMAN & BRIZEE. P.C. 
By: :zs-~ 4 ~ 
Steven . Tolman 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
JANET BELL NIGHTENGALE, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
JASON QUINN, M.D.; IDAlIO 
EMERGENCY PHYSICIANS) P.A.; A...'lD 
KEVIN MATTHEW TIMMEL, M.D., 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 0722814 
DEFENDANT JASON QUINN, M.D.'S 
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTIONS IN LIMINE 
COME NOW, defendants Jason Quilm, M.D., and Idaho Emergency Physicians, P.A. 
(collectively "Dr. Quinn") by and through their counsel of record, Hall, Farley, Oberrecht & 
Blanton, P.A., and submit this Reply Memorandum in Support of Motions in Limine. 
I. ARGUMENT 
First, plaintiff did not object to Dr. Quinn's Motion in Limine as it related to item 3, 
precluding plaintiff or Dennis Nightengale from offering any testimony as to their alleged 
conversations with Dr. Dominic Gross or other medical providers as to criticisms of care 
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provided by Dr. Quinn or Dr. Timmel or as to causation. As such, Dr. Quinn requests the Court 
grant his Motion in Limine as to this issue. 
A. DR. QUINN SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO ELICIT TESTIMONY FROM DR. 
DRAPER THAT HIS CARE AND TREATMENT OF PLAINTIFF MET THE 
STANDARD OF CARE. 
Dr. Quinn's position on most of the issues raised by plaintiff regarding Dr. Draper in her 
Response to Dr. Quinn's Motions in Limine have previously been addressed in Dr. Quinn's 
earlier briefmg in support of his Motions in Limine. As a result, Dr. Quirm refers the Court to 
such discussion, and he will not reiterate all of his earlier arguments here. 
Contrary to Plaintiffs contention, the Court did not authorize her to "substitute" new 
expert disclosures for those previously made; rather, the Court required her to supplement her 
disclosures (i.e., provide additional infom1ation) to comply v/ith the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure and the Court's Scheduling Order. 
All of the testimonial topics sought by Dr. Quinn from Dr. Draper were previously 
disclosed through Plaintiffs disclosure of Dr. Draper's expert reports. He was never maintained 
as a consulting expert, but instead specifically disclosed as a retained expert testifying as to 
standard of care and causation issues, including opinions regarding Dr. Quinn. The idea that 
Plaintiff could now unilaterally limit the scope of Dr. Draper's examination, who has opinions 
that are not only favorable to Dr. Quinn, but are also inconsistent with the opinions of Plaintiffs 
other expert, is unreasonable and would be unfairly prejudicial to Dr. Quinn. Plaintiff must be 
prepared to accept the negative comments, along with the positive statements) of her selected 
experts. 
In addition, Dr. Quinn has appropriately identified and disclosed Dr. Draper's opinions, 
and he should be permiUed to elicit such testimony. There will be no surprise and Dr. Quinn has 
DEFENDANT JASON QUn., .. N, M.D.'S REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTIONS IN LIMINE _ 900482 
09/2t/2009 16:t8 FAX 20839 HALLFARLEY 
I{Z] 004/009 
fully complied with the applicable rules and requirements for identification of Dr. Draper's 
testimony. 
Dr. Draper's testimony also directly contradicts that of Plaintiffs other retained and 
disclosed expert, Dr. Lally, who is expected to offer opinions critical of Dr. Quinn. Such 
contradiction makes Dr. Draper's testimony further relevant to the credibility of Dr. Lally and 
should be allowed for that reason as well. While Dr. Quilm does not believe that "exceptional 
circumstances" are required under the facts of this case, the complete divergence of opinion of 
Dr. Draper and Dr. Lally (physicians who practice together at the same facility) certainly 
provides exceptional circumstances under which Dr. Quinn should be pemlitted to explore the 
contradiction between such witnesses 
For the reasons stated herein, and those detailed in Dr. Quinn's previous filings, Dr. 
Quinn should be pemlittcd to call Dr. Draper as a witness and/or exceed the scope of direct in 
order to elicit testimony on any of the topics detailed in his reports (incorporated into Plaintiffs 
original Expert Disclosure) and his deposition. 
B. PLAINTIFF'S CANNOT USE ANY DEPOSITION TRANSCRIPT FOR ANY 
PURPOSE 
Dr. Quinn's motion in limine as to requesting notice of plaintiff's intent to use portions of 
deposition transcripts in her opening is not overly broad or l.mfairly prejudicial. Plaintiff relies 
on Idallo Rule of Civil Procedure 32(a) for the proposition that "deposition testimony can be 
used for any purpose, including opening statements, under Idaho Rules." However) as the Court 
is aware, there are limitations for the use of deposition testimony as further set forth in IRCP 
32(a). Specifically, Wlless it is deposition testimony of a party, plaintiff must establish certain 
requirements prior to reading or displaying deposition testimony in an opening statement. 
Specifically, IRCP 32(a)(3) provides that a deposition may be used for any purpose "if the court 
finds: (A) that the witness is dead; or (B) that the witness is at a greater distance than 1 00 miles 
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from the place of trial or hearing, or is out of the state of Idaho ... or (C) that the ~itness is 
unable to attend or testify because of age, illness, infonnation or imprisonment; or (D) that the 
party otTering the deposition has been unable to procure the attendance of the Vvitness by 
subpoena; or (E) upon application and notice, that such exceptional circumstances exist as to 
make it desirable, in the interest of justice and with due regard to the importance of presenting 
the testimony of witnesses orally in open court .... " 
Dr. Quinn concedes that seven days notice may not be practical for the parties under the 
circumstances; however, providing notice to opposing counsel of an intent to use any portions of 
depositions in opening statements should be manageable if it was required to be given by the 
close of business on the Friday before trial commences (5:00 p.m. on October 3, 2009). 
C. COMMENTS IN DR. GROSS'S RECORDS REGARDING RISK 
MANAGEMENT SHOULD BE REDACTED AS THEY ARE IMPROPER 
EXPERT TESTIMONY, IRRELEVANT AND UNDULY PREJUDICIAL 
Plaintiff objects to any redaction of Dr. Gross's records arguing they are admissible as 
created, and that there is no legitimate basis to redact the statements about "Risk Management." 
PlaintitT argues "[t]he fact that Dr. Gross is now unwilling to testify with respect to his initial 
reactions is immaterial." 
Dr. Gross's History and Physical of plaintiff on July 20,2007 includes the sentence "Risk 
Management V\-ill have to see tlus patient based upon several visits to the emergency room where 
this was undiagnosed until the hand was dead." The preceding statement implies that Dr. 
Quinn's and Dr. Timmcl' s care and treatment of plaintiff was inappropriate. 
Dr. Gross clearly and unequivocally stated in his deposition that he is not qualified to 
offer any standard of care opinions as to either Dr. Quinn's or Dr. Timmel's care of plaintiff, as 
he himself is not an emergency medicine physician. See Affidavit of Counsel in Support of 
Motions in Limine Aff., Ex. G (portions of Dr. Gross's deposition transcript), pp. 72-73, 11. 22-
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19) Plaintiff has the burden of establishing the s1andard of care applicable to Drs. Quinn and 
Timme], and any breach thereof, through qualified expert testimony. Dr. Gross, by his own 
admission, is not qualit1ed to offer standard of care opinions against Drs. Quinn and Timme!. 
Theretore, even assuming Dr. Gross's comment in his medical record was an opinion he actually 
held, it is still an improper expert opinion, as Dr. Gross is not qualified to offer such opinion, and 
the statement should be redacted. 
Further, plaintiff is unable to overcome the hurdle that the statement is inadmissible 
hearsay. Specifically, although the statement is contained in a medical record, it was not made 
or offered by Dr. Gross for purposes of medical treatment or diagnosis, and therefore does not 
fall under any hearsay exception. 
PlaintitT argues there is no unfair prejudice if the record is 110t redacted. Drs. Quinn and 
TimmeI would be unfairly prejudiced if such statement was not redac1ed from the record, as it 
would in effect provide the jury with an inadmissible and unqualified expert opinion (in v\lIiting) 
that could easily be improperly interpreted by the jury as a critical opinion regarding the care 
rendered by the defendants. 
As such, Dr. Quinn respectfully requests the Court redact the above quoted statement 
from Dr. Gross' History and Physical of pl.aintiff dated July 20, 2007. 
D. PLAINTIFF SHOULD NOT BE ALLO\VED TO ELICIT EXPERT OPINION 
TESTMONY FROM TREATING PHYSICIANS REGARDING STANDARD 
OF CARE OPINIONS 
Plaintiff failed to disclose any opinions (or the reasons and basis thereof) of physicians 
who treated her in the period of time relevant to this action in her cxpen disclosures. However, 
on the eve of trial; plaintiff disclosed a number of treating physicians as experts and now "seeks 
the ability 10 question these witnesses within their disclosed areas of expertise." The Court's 
Scheduling order indicates thaI treating phYSicians are deemed experts. As such, in order to 
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elicit expert testimony from such providers, plaintiff needed to provide actual disclosures for 
these witnesses, which she has failed to do. 
Plaintiff states she "docs not expect any of the treating physicians to opine as to whether 
the standard of care was met with respect to any defendant in this case," however, she indicates 
she will seek opinions from these treaters within their expertise. Plaintiff saw numerous other 
emergency medicine physicians during the June and July 2007 time frame. As such, standard of 
care for emergency medicine physicians practicing in Boise, Idaho in July 2007 may be within 
their expertise. 
Again; plaintiff failed to identify any of these experts as standard of care or causation 
experts and has failed to provide any idea of what opinions these treaters actually hold. As such, 
plaintiff should not be allowed to attempt to elicit expert standard of care or causation testimony 
frOUl these treaters at trial. Plaintiff argues the treating physicians were not retained experts and 
therefore she "had no ability until depositions to fully elicit opinions that are held." First, a 
number of the named treating physicians have not been deposed. Second, plaintiff had and has 
access 10 these treaters that defendants do not. To the extent plaintiff desired to seek expert 
opinion testimony from such witness, she could have sought and indel1tified any such opinions in 
compliance with the court's scheduling order. On the other hand, defendants arc not permitted to 
unilaterally contact plaintiffs treating physicians and without notice from plaintiff, had no 
reason to believe expert opinion testimony would be provided by such individuals, which would 
have likely necessitated deposing anyone identified by plaintiff expected to testifY. 
Allowing plaintiff to elicit standard of care or causation opinion testimony from any of 
plaintiffs treating physicians would clearly be prejudicial to Dr. Quinn or Dr. Timme1, as it 
would in effect provide plruntiffwith additional experts. Further, any testimony as to standard of 
care or causation would also be cumulative testimony that would waste the Court and the jury's 
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time. Plaintiff has identified Dr. Draper and Dr. Lally as experts in this case as to both standard 
of care and causation. Finally, allowing plaintiff to elicit such testimony would allow plaintiff to 
"ambush" the defendants with undisclosed expert opinions that the defendants could neither plan 
tor or investigate through the discovery process or otherwise. Clearly, such result would be 
unfair and prejudicial, and it would run contrary to the intent of the rules and the scheduling 
order issued by the court. 
n. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated previously in Dr. Quinn's Memorandum in Support of Motions in 
Limjne as well as those set forth above, Dr. Quinn requests the Court grant his Motions in 
Limine. 
DA TED this 21- day of September, 2009. 
HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT 
& BLANTON, P.A. 
c an - Of the Firm 
r Defendant Jason Quinn, M.D. 
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INSTRUCTION NO.1 
These instructions explain your duties as jurors and define the law that applies to this 
case. It is your duty to determine the facts, to apply the law set forth in these instructions to those 
facts, and in this way to decide the case. Your decision should be based upon a rational and 
objective assessment of the evidence. It should not be based on sympathy or prejudice. 
It is my duty to instruct you on the points of law necessary to decide the case, and it is 
your duty to follow the law as I instruct. You must consider these instructions as a whole, not 
picking out one and disregarding others. The order in which these instructions are given or the 
manner in which they are numbered has no significance as to the importance of any of them. If 
you do not understand an instruction, you may send a note to me through the bailiff, and I will try 
to clarifY or explain the point further. 
In determining the facts, you may consider only the evidence admitted in this trial. This 
evidence consists of the testimony of the witnesses, the exhibits admitted into evidence, and any 
stipulated or admitted facts. While the arguments and remarks of the attorneys may help you 
understand the evidence and apply the instructions, what they say is not evidence. If an 
attorney's argument or remark has no basis in the evidence, you should disregard it. 
The production of evidence in court is governed by rule of law. At times during the trial, 
I sustained an objection to a question without permitting the witness to answer it, or to an offered 
exhibit without receiving it into evidence. My rulings are legal matters, and are solely my 
responsibility. You must not speculate as to the reason for any objection, which was made, or my 
ruling thereon, and in reaching your decision you may not consider such a question or exhibit or 
000491 
speculate as to what the answer or exhibit would have shown. Remember, a question is not 
evidence and should be considered only as it gives meaning to the answer. 
There were occasions where an objection was made after an answer was given or the 
remark was made, and in my ruling on the objection I instructed that the answer or remark be 
stricken, or directed that you disregard the answer or remark and dismiss it from your minds. In 
your deliberations, you must not consider such answer or remark, but must treat it as though you 
had never heard it. 
The law does not require you to believe all of the evidence admitted in the course of the 
trial. As the sole judges of the facts, you must determine what evidence you believe and what 
weight you attach to it. In so doing, you bring with you to this courtroom all of the experience 
and background of your lives. There is no magical formula for evaluating testimony. In your 
everyday affairs, you determine for yourselves whom you believe, what you believe and how 
much weight you attach to what you are told. The considerations you use in making the more 
important decisions in your everyday dealings are the same considerations you should apply in 
your deliberations in this case. 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
OTHER 
IDJI2d 1.00 
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INSTRUCTION NO.2 
There are certain things you must not do during this trial: 
1. You must not associate in any way with the parties, any of the attorneys or their 
employees, or any of the witnesses. 
2 You must not discuss the case with anyone, or permit anyone to discuss the case 
with you. If anyone attempts to discuss the case with you, or to influence your decision in the 
case, you must report it to me promptly. 
3. You must not discuss the case with other jurors until you retire to the jury room to 
deliberate at the close of the entire case. 
4. You must not make up your mind until you have heard all of the testimony and 
have received my instructions as to the law that applies to the case. 
5. You must not contact anyone in an attempt to discuss or gam a greater 
understanding of the case. 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
OTHER 
IDJI2d 1.03 (Modified by deleting number 6; 
specifically, if any juror requires medical 
attention, he or she should not be prohibited from 
seeking medical care or treatment at Saint 
Alphonsus Regional Medical Center or S1. Luke's 
Regional Medical Center) 
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INSTRUCTION NO.3 
During your deliberations, you will be entitled to have with you my instructions 
concerning the law that applies to this case, the exhibits that have been admitted into evidence 
and any notes taken by you in the course of the trial proceedings. 
If you take notes during the trial, be careful that your attention is not thereby diverted 
from the witness or his testimony; and you must keep your notes to yourself and not show them 
to other persons or jurors until the jury deliberations at the end of the trial. 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
OTHER 
IDJI2d 1.01 
000494 
INSTRUCTION NO.4 
In deciding this case, you may not delegate any of your decisions to another or decide any 
question by chance, such as by the Hip of a coin or drawing of straws. If money damages are to 
be awarded or percentages of fault are to be assigned, you may not agree in advance to average 
the sum of each individual juror's estimate as the method of determining the amount of the 
damage award or percentage of negligence. 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
OTHER 
IDJI2d l.09 
000495 
INSTRUCTION NO.5 
Whether a party has insurance is not relevant to any of the questions you are to decide. 
You must avoid any inference, speculation or discussion about insurance. 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
OTHER 
IDJI2d 1.04 
Lemkuhl v. Bolland, 114 Idaho 503, 757 P.2d 
1222 (et. App. 1998) 
000496 
INSTRUCTION NO.6 
Evidence may be either direct or circumstantial. Direct evidence is evidence that directly 
proves a fact. Circumstantial evidence is evidence that indirectly proves the fact, by proving one 
or more facts irom which the fact at issue may be inferred. 
The law makes no distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence as to the degree 
of proof required; each is accepted as a reasonable method of proof and each is respected for such 
convincing force as it may carry. 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
OTHER 
IDJI2d 1.24.2 
000497 
INSTRUCTION NO.7 
Any statement by me identifYing a claim of a party is not evidence in this case. I have 
advised you of the claims of the parties merely to acquaint you with the issues to be decided. 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
OTHER 
IDJI2d 1.05 
000498 
INSTRUCTION NO.8 
On July 11, 2007, plaintiff Janet Nightengale was seen at Saint Alphonsus 
Regional Medical Center's Emergency Department for neck, left shoulder and left arm 
pain. Defendant Jason Quinn, M.D. treated Mrs. Nightengale at Saint Alphonsus 
Regional Medical Center's Emergency Department on July 11,2007. Dr. Quinn 
discharged Mrs. Nightengale with instructions to follow up with the Terry Reilly Clinic 
within four days. 
On July 16, 2007, Mrs. Nightengale sought treatment at St. Luke's Regional 
Medical Center's Emergency Department. Defendant Jason Timmel, M.D., treated Mrs. 
Nightengale at S1. Luke's Regional Medical Center's Emergency Department on July 
16, 2007. Dr. Timmel discharged Mrs. Nightengale with instructions to follow up with a 
orthopedic physician within the week. 
On July 20, 2007, Mrs. Nightengale sought treatment at the Terry Reilly Clinic. 
Mrs. Nightengale was then sent to St.Luke's Emergency Department and ultimately 
Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, where a left above elbow amputation was 
performed. Mrs. Nightengale alleges her amputation was the result of negligent care 
and treatment provided to her by defendants Dr. Quinn and Dr. Timmel. 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED ________ _ 
OTHER 
IDJI2d 1.07 (Modified) 
000499 
INSTRUCTION NO.9 
Certain evidence was presented to you by deposition. A deposition is testimony taken 
under oath before the trial and preserved in writing and/or by video recording. This evidence is 
entitled to the same consideration you would have given had the witness testified from the 
witness stand. 
You will only receive this testimony in open court. Although there is a record of the 
testimony taken by deposition, this record will not be available to you during your deliberations. 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
OTHER 
IDJI2d 1.22 (Modified to past tense and to add 
preservation by video recording) 
000500 
INSTRUCTION NO.1 0 
In this case, certain evidence was admitted for a limited purpose. I called your attention 
to this when the evidence was admitted. I remind you that whenever evidence was admitted for a 
limited purpose, you must not consider such evidence for any purpose other than the limited 
purpose for which it was admitted. 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
OTHER 
IDJI2d 1.28 
000501 
INSTRUCTION NO. 11 
When I say that a party has the burden of proof on a proposition, or use the expression "if 
you find" or "if you decide," I mean you must be persuaded that the proposition is more probably 
true than not true. 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
OTHER 
IDJI2d 1.20.1 
000502 
INSTRUCTION NO. 12 
On the claim of medical negligence against Jason Quinn, M.D. alleging failure to meet 
the standard of care, the plaintiff has the burden of proof on each of the following propositions: 
1. That Dr. Quinn failed to meet the applicable standard of care as defined in these 
instructions; 
2. That the plaintiff was injured; 
3. That the acts of the Dr. Quinn which failed to meet the applicable standard of care 
"vere a proximate cause of the inj uries of the plaintiff; and 
4. The elements of damage and the amount thereof. 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of these propositions has 
been proved, your verdict should be for the plaintiff; however, if you find that anyone or more of 
these propositions has not been proved, then the plaintiff has not met the burden of proof 
required and your verdict should be for Dr. Quinn. 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
OTHER 
IDJI2d 2.10 (Modified) 
IDJI 270 (Modified) 
000503 
INSTRUCTION NO. 13 
On the claim of medical negligence against Kevin Timmel, M.D. alleging failure to meet 
the standard of care, the plaintiffs have the burden of proof on each of the following propositions: 
1. That Dr. Timmel failed to meet the applicable standard of care as defined in these 
instructions; 
2. That the plaintitf was injured; 
3. That the acts of Dr. Timmel which failed to meet the applicable standard of care 
were a proximate cause of the injuries of the plaintiff; and 
4. The elements of damage and the amount thereof. 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of these propositions has 
been proven, your verdict should be for the plaintiff; however, if you find that anyone or more of 
these propositions has not been proven, then the plaintiff has not met the burden of proof 
required and your verdict should be for Dr. Timme!. 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
OTHER 
IDJI2d 2.10.3 (Modified) 
IDJI 270 (Modified) 
000504 
INSTRUCTION NO. 14 
In detennining whether Dr. Quinn's and Dr. Timmel's conduct satisfied the applicable 
standard of practice as it has been stated to you, you are not permitted to set up arbitrarily a 
standard of your o\vn. You must detennine the applicable standard of practice required of Dr. 
Quinn and Dr. Timmel and any breach thereof only from the testimony of those persons, 
including Dr. Quinn and Dr. Timmel, who have testified as expert witnesses as to such standard 
in this case. 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
OTHER 
BAlI 214-B (modified) 
Idaho Code §§ 6-1012 and 6-1013 
Watts v. Lynn, 125 Idaho 341, 870 
P.2d 1300 (1994) 
Frank v. East Shoshone Hosp., 114 
Idaho 480, 757 P.2d 1199 (1988) 
000505 
INSTRUCTION NO. 15 
To prove that Dr. Quinn was "negligent," the plaintiff must prove, by direct expert 
testimony and by a preponderance of all of the competent evidence, that Dr. Quinn failed to meet 
the standard of health care practice in Boise, Idaho, as such standard existed on July 11, 2007, 
with respect to the class of health care provider to which Dr. Quinn belonged and in which he 
was functioning; here, a board certified emergency medicine physician. 
Doctors such as Dr. Quinn shall be judged in comparison with similarly trained and 
qualified doctors in the same community taking into account his training, experience and field of 
specialization. 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
OTHER 
Idaho Code § 6-1012 
Hilden v. Ball, 117 Idaho 314,787 P.2d 1122 
(1989) 
IDJI 2.10.1 (In concept) 
000506 
INSTRUCTION NO. 16 
To prove that Dr. Timmel was "negligent," the plaintiff must prove, by direct expert 
testimony and by a preponderance of all of the competent evidence, that Dr. Timmel failed to 
meet the standard of health care practice in Boise, Idaho, as such standard existed on July 16, 
2007, with respect to the class of health care provider to which Dr. Timmel belonged and in 
which he was functioning; here, a board certified emergency medicine physician. 
Doctors such as Dr. Timmel shall be judged in comparison with similarly trained and 
qualified doctors in the same community taking into account his training, experience and field of 
specialization. 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
OTHER 
000507 
INSTRUCTION NO. 17 
When I use the word "negligence" in these instructions, I mean the failure to use ordinary 
care in the management of one's property or person. The words "ordinary care" mean the care a 
reasonably careful person would use under circumstances similar to those shown by the evidence. 
Negligence may thus consist of the failure to do something which a reasonably careful person 
would do, or the doing of something a reasonably careful person would not do, under 
circumstances similar to those shown by the evidence. 
IDJI2d 2.20 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
OTHER 
000508 
INSTRUCTION NO. 18 
In detennining whether medical providers such as Dr. Quinn or Dr. Timmel have failed to 
meet the appropriate standards of health care required of each of them in treating a patient, their 
judgment must be considered in light of all the facts and circumstances with which each was 
confronted at the time. Medical providers such as Dr. Quinn and Dr. Timmel are not to be 
judged by after-acquired knowledge or by the results of their treatment; the test is not what 
hindsight may reveal should have been done in light of subsequently occurring conditions. 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
OTHER 
Bloom v. Bonner General Hospital, Inc., D.C. 
Idaho, 82-3081 (1985) 
Keaton v. Greenville Hospital System, 514 S.E. 
2d 570, 574-75 (1999) 
Boudoin v. Crawford and Marshall, Ltd., 709 S.2d 
798, 808 (5th Cir. 1998) 
Klisch v. Meritcare Medical Group, Inc., 134 F.3d 
1356, 1359-60 (8th Cir. 1998) 
000509 
INSTRUCTION NO. 19 
A plaintiff in a medical negligence action is required to prove a breach of the community 
standard of care. The mere fact that an undesirable or unfortunate result occurs following 
medical care rendered by a defendant does not, by itself, establish a breach of the standard of care 
by the defendant. 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
OTHER 
Idaho Code § 6-1013 
Pearson v. Parsons, 114 Idaho 334, 757 P.2d 197 
(1988) 
Swallow v. Emergency Medicine of Idaho, 138 
Idaho 589, 67 P.3d. 68 (2005) 
000510 
INSTRUCTION NO. 20 
You have heard from the expert witnesses who have testified in this case with differing 
vIews as to what would be the appropriate standards to be followed by a board certified 
emergency medicine physician providing medical care under the circumstances presented here. If 
you find from these opinions that two or more alternative courses of action would be recognized 
by the profession as proper and that Dr. Quinn chose one of those courses of action, then a 
verdict should be returned in favor of Dr. Quinn. 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
OTHER 
Jones v. Chidester, 610 A.2d 964, 969 (I 992) 
Fragale v. Brigham, 741 A.2d 788, 791 (1999) 
000511 
INSTRUCTION NO. 21 
You have heard from the expert witnesses who have testified in this case with differing 
VIews as to what would be the appropriate standards to be followed by a board certified 
emergency medicine physician providing medical care under the circumstances presented here. If 
you find from these opinions that two or more alternative courses of action would be recognized 
by the profession as proper and that Dr. Timmel chose one of those courses of action, then a 
verdict should be returned in favor of Dr. Timmel. 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
OTHER 
000512 
INSTRUCTION NO. 22 
If plaintiffs prove that Dr. Quinn failed to meet the applicable standard of care, plaintiff 
has the additional burden of proving through expert testimony that his failure to meet the 
applicable standard of care was, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, the proximate cause 
of plaintitT's injuries. 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
OTHER 
IDJI 271 (In part and modified) 
000513 
INSTRUCTION NO. 23 
If plaintiffs prove that Dr. Timmel failed to meet the applicable standard of care, plaintiff 
has the additional burden of proving through expert testimony that his failure to meet the 
applicable standard of care was, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, the proximate cause 
of plaintiff s injuries. 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
OTHER 
IDJI 271 (In part and modified) 
000514 
INSTRUCTION NO. 24 
When I use the expression "proximate cause," I mean a cause which, in natural or 
probable sequence, produced the complained injury, loss or damage, and but for that cause the 
damage would not have occurred. It need not be the only cause. It is sufficient if it is a 
substantial factor in bringing about the injury, loss or damage. It is not a proximate cause if the 
injury, loss or damage likely would have occurred anyway. 
There may be one or more proximate causes of an injury. When the negligent conduct of 
two or more persons or entities contribute concurrently as substantial factors in bringing about an 
injury, the conduct of each may be a proximate cause of the injury regardless of the extent to 
which each contributes to the injury. 
IDJI2d 2.30.1. 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
OTHER 
000515 
INSTRUCTION NO. 25 
In this case, the defendants have alleged that the plaintiff was negligent. On this defense, 
the defendants have the burden of proof on each of the following propositions: 
1. That the plaintiff was negligent. 
2. That the negligence of the plaintiff was a proximate cause of her 
own ll1Junes. 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of these propositions has 
been proven, you should answer Questions No.6 and No.7 on the verdict form "YES." If you 
find from your consideration of all the evidence that proposition No. 1 has not been proven, you 
should Answer Question No.6 "NO." If you find from your consideration of all the evidence 
that proposition No. 1 was proven but proposition No. 2 was not proven, you should answer 
Question No.6 "YES" and Question No.7 "NO." 
IDJI2d 1.41.4.2.(modified) 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
OTHER 
000516 
INSTRUCTION NO. 26 
In this case, the defendants have alleged that some other individual or entity, not a party 
to this lawsuit, was negligent. On this defense, the defendants have the burden of proof on each 
of the following propositions: 
1. Another individual or entity was negligent. 
2. The negligence of the other individual or entity was a proximate 
cause of the plaintiff's injuries. 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of these propositions has 
been proven, you should answer Questions No.8 and No.9 on the verdict form "YES." If you 
tind from your consideration of all the evidence that proposition No.1 has not been proven, you 
should Answer Question No.8 "NO." If you find from your consideration of all the evidence 
that proposition 1 was proven but proposition No.2 was not proven, you should answ'er Question 
No.8 "YES" and Question No.9 "NO." 
IDJI2d 1.41.4.3.(modified) 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
OTHER 
000517 
INSTRUCTION NO. 27 
By giving you instructions on the subject of damages, I do not express any opinion as to 
whether the plaintiff is entitled to damages. 
IDJI2d 9.00 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
OTHER 
000518 
INSTRUCTION NO. 28 
If the jury decides the plaintiff is entitled to recover from the defendants, the jury must 
determine the amount of money that will reasonably and fairly compensate the plaintitI for any 
damages proved to be proximately caused by the defendants' negligence. 
The elements of damage the jury may consider are: 
A. Non-economic damages 
1. The nature of the injuries; 
2. The physical and mental pain and suffering, past and future; 
3. The impairment of abilities to perform usual activities; 
4. The disfigurement caused by the injuries; 
5. The aggravation caused to any preexisting condition. 
B. Economic damages 
1. The reasonable value of necessary medical care received 
and expenses incurred as a result of the injury and the 
present cash value of medical care and expenses reasonably 
certain and necessary to be required in the future; 
2. The reasonable value of necessary services provided by 
another in doing things for the plaintiff: which, except for 
the injury, the plaintiff would ordinarily have performed 
and the present cash value of such services reasonably 
certain to be required in the future; 
Whether the plaintiff has proved any of these elements is for the jury to decide. 
IDJI2d 9.01.(modified) 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
OTHER 
000519 
INSTRUCTION NO. 29 
You are instructed that if you find plaintiff is entitled to damages, then you must only 
award such damages that have been proved by plaintiff with reasonable certainty. 
You are not permitted to award speculative damages, which means compensation for 
future loss or harm which, although possible, is conjectural or not reasonably certain to occur in 
the future. 
BAJI 1460 (7th ed. )(Modified) 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
OTHER 
Rindlisbaker v. Wilson, 95 Idaho 752, 519 P.2d 
421 (1974) 
McLean v. City of Spirit Lake, 91 Idaho 779, 430 
P.2d 670 (1967) 
McGuire v. Post Falls Lumber & Mfg. Co., 23 
Idaho 608,131 P. 654 (1913) 
000520 
INSTRUCTION NO. 30 
When I use the phrase "present cash value" as to any damage that may accrue in the 
future, I mean that sum of money determined and paid now which, when invested at a reasonable 
rate of interest, would be sufficient to pay the future damages at the time and in the amount the 
future damages will be incurred. 
IDJI2d 9.13 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
OTHER 
000521 
INSTRUCTION NO. 31 
Under a standard table of mortality, the life expectancy of a female age _ is _ years. 
This figure is not conclusive. It is an actuarial estimate of the average probable remaining length 
of life based upon statistical samples of death rates and ages at death in this country. This data 
may be considered in connection with all other evidence relating to the probable life expectancy, 
including the subject's occupation, health, habits, and other activities. 
IDJI2d 9.15. 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
OTHER 
000522 
INSTRUCTION NO. 32 
Your award, if any, for plaintiff's injuries will not be subject to any income taxes, and 
you should not consider such taxes in fixing the amount of your award. 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
OTHER 
000523 
INSTRUCTION NO. 33 
A person who has been damaged must exercise ordinary care to minimize the damage and 
prevent further damage. Any loss that results from a failure to exercise such care cannot be 
recovered. 
IDJI2d 9.14 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
OTHER 000524 
INSTRUCTION NO. 34 
A person who has a preexisting condition or disability is entitled to recover damages for 
the aggravation of such preexisting condition, if any, that is proximately caused by the 
occurrence. The person is not entitled to recover damages for the preexisting condition or 
disability itself. 
If you find that before the occurrence causing the injuries in this case that Janet 
Nightengale had a preexisting bodily condition or disability, and further find that because of the 
new occurrence in this case the preexisting condition or disability was aggravated, then you 
should consider the aggravation of the condition or disability in fixing the damages in this case. 
You should not consider any condition or disability that existed prior to the occurrence, or any 
aggravation of such condition that was not caused or contributed to by reason of this occurrence. 
You are to apportion, if possible, between the condition or disability prior to this 
occurrence and the condition or disability caused by this occurrence, and assess liability 
accordingly. If no apportionment can reasonably be made by you, then the defendants are liable 
for the entire damage. 
IDJI2d 9.02 (Modified) 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
OTHER 
000525 
INSTRUCTION NO. 35 
If it becomes necessary during your deliberations to communicate with me, you may send 
a note signed by one or more of you to the bailiff. You should not try to communicate with me 
by any means other than such a note. 
During your deliberations, you are not to reveal to anyone how the jury stands on any of 
the questions before you, numerically or otherwise, unless requested to do so by me. 
IDJI2d 1.11. 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
OTHER 
000526 
INSTRUCTION NO. 36 
Members of the Jury: In order to return a verdict, it is necessary that at least three-fourths 
of the jury agree. Your verdict must represent the considered judgment of each juror agreeing to 
it. 
It is your duty, as jurors, to consult with one another and to deliberate with a view to 
reaching an agreement, if you can do so without violence to individual judgment. Each of you 
must decide the case for yourself, but do so only after an impartial consideration of the evidence 
with your fellow jurors. In the course of your deliberations, do not hesitate to reexamine your 
own views and change your opinion if convinced it is erroneous. But do not surrender your 
honest conviction as to the weight or effect of evidence solely because of the opinion of your 
fellow jurors, or for the mere purpose of returning a verdict. 
You are not partisans. You are judges - judges of the facts. Your sole interest is to 
ascertain the truth from the evidence in the case. 
IDJI2d 1.13.1. 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
OTHER 
000527 
INSTRUCTION NO. 37 
In this case, you will return a Special Verdict consisting of a series of questions. In 
answering a question, you must be persuaded, considering all of the evidence in this case, that 
your choice of answer is more probably true than not true. Because the explanation on the form 
which you will have is part of my instructions to you, I will read the verdict form to you and 
explain it. It states: 
We, the Jury, answer the special interrogatories as follows: 
Question No.1: Did defendant Jason Quinn, M.D., negligently fail to meet the 
applicable standard of health care practice in his treatment and care of Mrs. Nightengale? 
Answer to Question No.1: Yes L-J NoL-J 
If you answered "No" to Question No.1, then do not answer Question No.2 and proceed 
directly to Question No.3. 
If you answered "Yes" to Question No.1, then answer Question No.2. 
Question No.2: Was Dr. Quinn's negligence a proximate cause of Mrs. Nightengale's 
injuries? 
Answer to Question No.2: Yes[~ No L-J 
Please answer Question No.3. 
Question No.3: Did defendant Kevin Timmel negligently fail to meet the applicable 
standard of health care practice in his treatment and care of Mrs. Nightengale? 
Answer to Question No.3: Yes[~ NoL-J 
If your answers to Questions No. and 3 were "No" you are finished. Please sign the 
000528 
1 
verdict form and tell the bailiff that you are finished. If you answered "Yes" to Question No.3, 
then answer Question No.4. 
Question No.4: Was Dr. Timmel's negligence a proximate cause of Mrs. Nightengale's 
injuries? 
Answer to Question No.4: Yes [.-J No [.-J 
If your answers to Questions No.2 and 4 were "No" you are finished. Please sign the 
verdict form and tell the bailiff that you are finished. Otherwise, please answer Question No.5. 
Question No.5: Was Janet Nightengale negligent? 
Answer to Question No.5: Yes [.-J No [.-J 
If your answer to Question No. 5 was "No" do not answer Question No. 6 and move 
directly to Question No.7. If your answer to Question No.5 was "Yes" please answer Question 
No.6. 
Question No. 6:Was Janet Nightengale's negligence a proximate cause of her injuries? 
Answer to Question No.6: YesL-.J No L-.J 
Please answer Question No.7. 
Question No.7: Was a third party negligent? 
If your answer to Question No. 7 was "No" do not answer Question No. 8 and move 
directly to Question No.9. If your answer to Question No.7 was "Yes" please answer Question 
No.8. 
Question No.8: Was the third party's negligence a proximate cause of Mrs. 
Nightengale's injuries? 
Instruction for Question No.9: You will reach this question if you have found that 
2 
000529 
either defendant Dr. Quinn or defendant Dr. Timmel was negligent, which negligence caused 
injury to plaintiff In this question, you are to apportion the fault between the negligent parties in 
terms of a percentage. As to each party or entity to which you answered "Yes" on Questions 
Nos. 2, 4, 6, and 8 determine the percentage of fault for that party or entity, and enter the 
percentage on the appropriate line. If you answered "No" to any of the above questions, insert a 
"0" or "Zero" as to that party or entity. Your total percentages must equal 100%. 
Question No.9: What is the percentage of fault (if any) you assign to each of the 
following: 
Answer to Question No.9: 
To the Defendant, Jason Quinn, M.D .. 
To the Defendant, Kevin Timmel, M.D. 
To the plaintiff Janet Nightengale 
To third party 
Total must equal 
Please answer Question No. 10. 
% 
% 
% 
% 
100% 
Question No. 10: What is the total amount of economic damages, if any, sustained by 
Janet Nightengale as a result of the negligence of the parties listed above in response to Question 
No. 9'7 
Answer to Question No. 10: $_---
Question No. 11: What is the total amount of non-economic damages, if any, sustained 
by Janet Nightengale as a result of the negligence of the parties listed above in response to 
Question No.9? 
000530 
3 
Answer to Question No. 11: 
IDJI2d 1.41.4.3 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED ___ _ 
OTHER 
$_---
000531 
4 
INSTRUCTION NO. 38 
I have given you the rules of law that apply to this case. I have instructed you regarding 
matters that you may consider in weighing the evidence to determine the facts. In a few minutes 
counsel will present their closing arguments to you and then you will retire to the jury room for 
your deliberations. 
Each of you has an equally important voice in the jury deliberations. Therefore, the 
attitude and conduct of jurors at the beginning of the deliberations are important. At the outset of 
deliberations, it is rarely productive for a juror to make an emphatic expression of opinion on the 
case or to state how he or she intends to vote. When one does that at the beginning, one's sense 
of pride may be aroused and there may be reluctance to change that position, even if shown that it 
is wrong. Remember that you are not partisans or advocates, but you are judges. For you, as for 
me, there can be no triumph except in the ascertainment and declaration of the truth. 
Consult with one another. Consider each other's views. Deliberate with the objective of 
reaching an agreement, if you can do so without disturbing your individual judgment. Each of 
you must decide this case for yourself; but you should do so only after a discussion and 
consideration of the case with your fellow jurors. 
IDJI2d 1.13 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
OTHER 
000532 
INSTRUCTION NO. 39 
On retiring to the jury room, select one of your number as a foreman, who will preside 
over your deliberations. 
An appropriate form of verdict will be submitted to you with any instructions. Follow the 
directions on the verdict form, and answer all of the questions required of you by the instructions 
on the verdict form. 
A verdict may be reached by three-fourths of your number, or nine of you. As soon as 
nine or more of you shall have agreed upon each of the required questions in the verdict, you 
should fill it out as instructed, and have it signed. It is not necessary that the same nine agree on 
each question. If your verdict is unanimous, your foreman alone will sign it; but if nine or more, 
but less than the entire jury, agree, then those so agreeing will sign the verdict. 
As soon as you have completed and signed the verdicts, you will notify the bailiff, who 
will then return you into open court. 
IDJI2d 1.15.2 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
OTHER 
000533 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
JANET BELL NIGHTENGALE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JASON QUINN, M.D.; IDAHO 
EMERGENCY PHYSICIANS, P.A.; AND 
KEVIN MATTHEW TIMMEL, M.D., 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 0722814 
SPECIAL VERDICT FORM 
We, the Jury, answer the special interrogatories as follows: 
Question No.1: Did defendant Jason Quinn, M.D., negligently fail to meet the 
applicable standard of health care practice in his treatment and care of Mrs. Nightengale? 
Answer to Question No.1: YesLJ No LJ 
If you answered "No" to Question No.1, then do not answer Question No.2 and proceed 
directly to Question No.3. 
If you answered "Yes" to Question No.1, then answer Question No.2. 
Question No.2: Was Dr. Quinn's negligence a proximate cause of Mrs. Nightengale's 
injuries? 
Answer to Question No.2: YesLJ No LJ 
Please answer Question No.3. 
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SPECIAL VERDICT FORM- 1 
Question No.3: Did defendant Kevin Timmel negligently fail to meet the applicable 
standard of health care practice in his treatment and care of Mrs. Nightengale? 
Answer to Question No.3: YesL] NoL] 
If your answers to Questions No. 1 and 3 were "No" you are finished. Please sign the 
verdict form and tell the bailiff that you are finished. If you answered "Yes" to Question No.3, 
then answer Question No.4. 
Question No.4: Was Dr. Timmel's negligence a proximate cause of Mrs. Nightengale's 
injuries? 
Answer to Question No.4: YesL] NoL] 
If your answers to Questions No. 2 and 4 were "No" you are finished. Please sign the 
verdict form and tell the bailiff that you are finished. Otherwise, please answer Question No.5. 
Question No.5: Was Janet Nightengale negligent? 
Answer to Question No.5: YesL] NoL] 
If your answer to Question No.5 was "No" do not answer Question No.6 and move 
directly to Question No.7. If your answer to Question No.5 was "Yes" please answer Question 
No.6. 
Question No. 6:Was Janet Nightengale's negligence a proximate cause of her injuries? 
Answer to Question No.6: YesL] NoL] 
Please answer Question No.7. 
Question No.7: Was a third party negligent? 
If your answer to Question No. 7 was "No" do not answer Question No. 8 and move 
directly to Question No.9. If your answer to Question No.7 was "Yes" please answer Question 
No.8. 
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Question No.8: Was the third party's negligence a proximate cause of Mrs. 
Nightengale's injuries? 
Instruction for Question No.9: You will reach this question if you have found that 
either defendant Dr. Quinn or defendant Dr. Timmel was negligent, which negligence caused 
injury to plaintiff. In this question, you are to apportion the fault between the negligent parties in 
I! ~ 
terms of a percentage. As to each party or entity to which you answered "Yes" on Questions 
Nos. 2, 4, 6, and 8 determine the percentage of fault for that party or entity, and enter the 
percentage on the appropriate line. If you answered "No" to any of the above questions, insert a 
"0" or "Zero" as to that party or entity. Your total percentages must equal 100%. 
Question No.9: What is the percentage of fault (if any) you assign to each of the 
following: 
Answer to Question No.9: 
To the Defendant, Jason Quinn, M.D .. % 
To the Defendant, Kevin Timmel, M.D. % 
To the plaintiff Janet Nightengale % 
To third party % 
Total must equal 100% 
Please answer Question No. 10. 
Question No. 10: What is the total amount of economic damages, if any, sustained by 
Janet Nightengale as a result of the negligence of the parties listed above in response to Question 
No.9? 
Answer to Question No. 10: $_---
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Question No. 11: What is the total amount of non-economic damages, if any, sustained 
by Janet Nightengale as a result of the negligence of the parties listed above in response to 
Question No.9? 
Answer to Question No. 11: $_---
Please sign the verdict form and notify the bailiff that you have finished your deliberations. 
Dated: _________ ,2009 
Presiding Juror 
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SPECIAL VERDICT FORM- 4 
Steven K. Tolman (ISB #1769) 
TOLMAN & BRIZEE, P.C. 
132 3rd Avenue East 
P.O. Box 1276 
Twin Falls, Idaho 83303-1276 
Telephone: (208) 733-5566 
Attorney for Defendant Kevin Timmel, MD 
J. 
Clerk: 
PATRICIA A DWONCH 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
JANET BELL NIGHTENGALE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JASON QUINN, M.D.; IDAHO 
EMERGENCY PHYSICIANS, P.A.; 
KEVIN MATTHEW TIMMEL, M.D.; AND 
EMERGENCY MEDICINE OF IDAHO, 
PA AND ITS AFFILIATES, 
Defendants. 
[JORIGINAl 
Case No. ev oe 0722814 
DEFENDANT KEVIN TIMMEL, MOtS 
PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
COMES NOW the Defendant Kevin Timmel, M.D., by and through his counsel of 
record, Tolman & Brizee, p.e., and submits the following proposed jury instructions 
numbered 1 through 38, inclusively, as well as the Special Verdict Form. These proposed 
instructions include the standard Idaho Pattern Jury Instructions as well as Requested or 
modified Jury Instructions. 
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DEFENDANT KEVIN TIMMEL, MD'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS, PAGE 1 
Defendant reserves the right to amend, supplement or withdraw any of these 
instructions. 
J,fr~ DATED this _<7\_ day of September, 2009. 
TOLMAN & BRIZEE, P.C. 
;7 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
" tt.-, 
I hereby certify that on this~D (fay of September, 2009, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing DEFENDANT KEVIN TIMMEL, MD'S PROPOSED JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS to be forwarded with all required charges prepared, by the method(s) 
indicated below, to the following: 
Kevin E. Dinius 
MORROW DINIUS 
5680 E. Franklin Rd., Suite 130 
Nampa, 10 83687-7901 
Kevin J. Scanlan 
HALL FARLEY OBERRECHT & BLANTON 
702 W Idaho, Suite 700 
P.O. Box 1271 
Boise, 10 83701 
E¥ 
o 
o 
First Class Mail 
Hand Delivered 
Facsimile 
Overnight Mail 
all First Class Mail 
~ Hand Delivered 
o Facsimile 
o Overnight Mail 
DEFENDANT KEVIN TIMMEL, MD'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS, PAGE 2 
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DEFENDANT'S INSTRUCTION NO. 1 
THE VOIR DIRE 
You have been summoned as prospective jurors in the lawsuit now before us. 
The first thing we do in a trial is to select 12 jurors, and, perhaps one or two alternate 
jurors from among you ladies and gentlemen. 
I am the judge in charge of the courtroom and this trial. The deputy clerk of court 
marks the trial exhibits and administers oaths to you jurors and the witnesses. The 
bailiff will assist me in maintaining courtroom order and will arrange for your meals after 
this case has been submitted to you for decision. The court reporter will keep a 
verbatim account of all matters of record during the trial. 
To assist both you and the attorneys with this process of selection of a jury, I will 
introduce you to the parties and attorneys and tell you in brief what this lawsuit is about. 
The parties who bring a lawsuit are called the "plaintiffs." In this suit, the plaintiff 
is Janet Bell Nightengale. The plaintiff is represented by lawyer Kevin Dinius. The 
parties against whom a lawsuit is brought are called the "defendants." The defendants 
in this suit are Jason Quinn, M.D. and Kevin Timmel, M.D. Jason Quinn, M.D. is 
represented by Kevin J. Scanlan. Kevin Timmel, M.D. is represented by Steven K. 
Tolman. This is a civil case involving a claim for medical malpractice. 
A trial starts with a selection of a fair, impartial jury. To that end, the court and 
the lawyers will ask each of you questions to discover whether you have any information 
concerning the case or any opinions or attitudes which any of the lawyers believe might 
cause you to favor or disfavor some part of the evidence or one side or the other. The 
questions may probe deeply into your attitudes, beliefs and experiences, but they are 
not intended to embarrass you. 
If you do not hear or understand a question, you should say so. If you do 
understand the question, you should answer it freely. 
The clerk of the court will now swear you for the jury examination. 
IDJI 1-1 (modified) 
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Given 
-------Refused 
-------Modified, ______ _ 
Covered ______ _ 
Other ______ _ 
DATED This day of September, 2009 
District Judge 
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JURY INSTRUCTIONS WITH CITES, PAGE 2 
DEFENDANT'S INSTRUCTION NO. _2_ 
These instructions explain your duties as jurors and define the law that applies to 
this case. It is your duty to determine the facts, to apply the law set forth in these 
instructions to those facts, and in this way to decide the case. Your decision should be 
based upon a rational and objective assessment of the evidence. It should not be based 
on sympathy or prejudice. 
It is my duty to instruct you on the points of law necessary to decide the case, 
and it is your duty to follow the law as I instruct. You must consider these instructions as 
a whole, not picking out one and disregarding others. The order in which these 
instructions are given or the manner in which they are numbered has no significance as 
to the importance of any of them. If you do not understand an instruction, you may send 
a note to me through the bailiff, and I will try to clarify or explain the point further. 
In determining the facts, you may consider only the evidence admitted in this 
trial. This evidence consists of the testimony of the witnesses, the exhibits admitted into 
evidence, and any stipulated or admitted facts. While the arguments and remarks of the 
attorneys may help you understand the evidence and apply the instructions, what they 
say is not evidence. If an attorney's argument or remark has no basis in the evidence, 
you should disregard it. 
The production of evidence in court is governed by rule of law. At times during 
the trial, I sustained an objection to a question without permitting the witness to answer 
it, or to an offered exhibit without receiving it into evidence. My rulings are legal matters, 
and are solely my responsibility. You must not speculate as to the reason for any 
objection, which was made, or my ruling thereon, and in reaching your decision you 
may not consider such a question or exhibit or speculate as to what the answer or 
exhibit would have shown. Remember, a question is not evidence and should be 
considered only as it gives meaning to the answer. 
There were occasions where an objection was made after an answer was given 
or the remark was made, and in my ruling on the objection I instructed that the answer 
or remark be stricken, or directed that you disregard the answer or remark and dismiss 
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, 
r 
it from your minds. In your deliberations, you must not consider such answer or remark, 
but must treat it as though you had never heard it. 
The law does not require you to believe all of the evidence admitted in the course 
of the trial. As the sole judges of the facts, you must determine what evidence you 
believe and what weight you attach to it. In so doing, you bring with you to this 
courtroom all of the experience and background of your lives. There is no magical 
formula for evaluating testimony. In your everyday affairs, you determine for yourselves 
whom you believe, what you believe and how much weight you attach to what you are 
told. The considerations you use in making the more important decisions in your 
everyday dealings are the same considerations you should apply in your deliberations in 
this case. 
IDJI2d 1.00 
Given 
---------------Refused 
--------Modified _______ _ 
Covered 
---------Other ________ _ 
DATED This day of September, 2009 
District Judge 
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DEFENDANT'S INSTRUCTION NO. 3 
---
During your deliberations, you will be entitled to have with you my instructions 
concerning the law that applies to this case, the exhibits that have been admitted into 
evidence and any notes taken by you in the course of the trial proceedings. 
If you take notes during the trial, be careful that your attention is not thereby 
diverted from the witness or his testimony; and you must keep your notes to yourself 
and not show them to other persons or jurors until the jury deliberations at the end of 
the trial. 
IDJI2d 1.01 
Given 
--------
Refused 
-------
Modified 
-------
Covered 
-------Other 
--------
DATED This ___ day of September, 2009 
District Judge 
000544 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS WITH CITES, PAGE 5 
, 
, 
DEFENDANT'S INSTRUCTION NO. 4 
There are certain things you must not do during this trial: 
1. You must not associate in any way with the parties, any of the attorneys or 
their employees, or any of the witnesses. 
2. You must not discuss the case with anyone, or permit anyone to discuss 
the case with you. If anyone attempts to discuss the case with you, or to influence your 
decision in the case, you must report it to me prompt/yo 
3. You must not discuss the case with other jurors until you retire to the jury 
room to deliberate at the close of the entire case. 
4. You must not make up your mind until you have heard all of the testimony 
and have received my instructions as to the law that applies to the case. 
5. You must not contact anyone in an attempt to discuss or gain a greater 
understanding of the case. 
6. You must not go to the place where any alleged event occurred. 
IDJI2d 1.03 
Given 
-------------
Refused 
---------
Modified 
-------Covered 
--------Other 
----------DATED This ____ day of September, 2009 
District Judge 
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JURY INSTRUCTIONS WITH CITES, PAGE 6 
DEFENDANT'S INSTRUCTION NO. _5_ 
Members of the jury, I remind you that you are not to discuss this case among 
yourselves or with anyone else, nor to form any opinion as to the merits of the case, 
until after I finally submit the case to you. 
IDJI2d 1.03.1 
Given 
--------
Refused 
-------
Modified 
"-------
Covered 
-------
Other 
--------DATED This ___ day of September, 2009 
District Judge 
000546 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS WITH CITES, PAGE 7 
DEFENDANT'S INSTRUCTION NO. _6_ 
Whether a party has insurance is not relevant to any of the questions you are to 
decide. You must avoid any inference, speculation or discussion about insurance. 
IDJI2d 1.04 
Given 
--------Refused ______ _ 
Modified 
-------Covered 
-------Other _______ _ 
DATED This day of September, 2009 
District Judge 
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DEFENDANT'S INSTRUCTION NO. 7 
Any statement by me identifying a claim of a party is not evidence in this case. I 
have advised you of the claims of the parties merely to acquaint you with the issues to 
be decided. 
IDJI2d 1.05 
Given 
--------
Refused 
-------
Modified 
-------Covered 
-------Other _______ _ 
DATED This day of September, 2009 
District Judge 
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DEFENDANT'S INSTRUCTION NO. _8_ 
The following facts are not in dispute: 
1. Janet Bell Nightengale presented to the emergency room at St Luke's 
Regional Medical Center on June 1,2007, where she was seen by 
Stephanie Bodes, M.D. 
2. Janet Bell Nightengale presented to the emergency department of S1. Luke's 
Regional Medical Center, on June 18, 2007, where she was seen 
by Marlin Jack Trainer, D.O. 
3. Janet Bell Nightengale presented to the emergency department of Saint 
Alphonsus Regional Medical Center on July 11,2007, and she was 
seen by Jason Quinn, M.D. 
4. Janet Bell Nightengale presented to the emergency department of St. 
Luke's Regional Medical Center, Ltd., on July 16, 2007, and she 
was seen by Kevin Timmel, MD. 
5. Janet Bell Nightengale presented to the Terry O'Reilly Clinic on July 20, 
2007. Thereafter, and on that same day, plaintiff went to S1. Luke's 
Regional Medical Center emergency department, where she was 
seen by Rourke Yeakley, M.D. 
6. Janet Bell Nightengale was transferred to Saint Alphonsus Regional 
Medical Center on July 20, 2007. She was diagnosed with limb 
ischemia, at which time she was determined to have an arterial 
occlusion of the left arm which resulted in an above the elbow 
amputation. 
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IDJI2d 1.07 (modified) 
Given ______ _ 
Refused ______ _ 
Mod ifi ed ______ _ 
Covered 
-------Other _____ --''---
DATED This ___ day of September, 2009 
District Judge 
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DEFENDANT'S INSTRUCTION NO. _9_ 
Certain evidence is about to be presented to you by deposition. A deposition is 
testimony taken under oath before the trial and preserved in writing. This evidence is 
entitled to the same consideration you would give had the witness testified from the 
witness stand. 
You will only receive this testimony in open court. Although there is a record of 
the testimony you are about to hear, this record will not be available to you during your 
deliberations. 
IDJI2d 1.22 
Given 
--------
Refused 
-------Modified 
-------Covered 
-------Other _______ _ 
DATED This ___ day of September, 2009 
District Judge 
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JURY INSTRUCTIONS WITH CITES, PAGE 12 
DEFENDANT'S INSTRUCTION NO. 10 
- --
Evidence may be either direct or circumstantial. The law makes no distinction 
between direct and circumstantial evidence. Each is accepted as a reasonable method of 
proof and each is respected for such convincing force as it may carry. 
IDJI2d 1.24.1 
Given 
--------
Refused 
-------Modified 
-------
Covered 
-------Other _______ _ 
DATED This ___ day of September, 2009 
District Judge 
000552 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS WITH CITES, PAGE 13 
DEFENDANT'S INSTRUCTION NO. 11 
A witness who has special knowledge in a particular matter may give his opinion on 
that matter. In determining the weight to be given such opinion, you should consider the 
qualifications and credibility of the witness and the reasons given for his opinion. You are 
not bound by such opinion. Give it the weight, if any, to which you deem it entitled. 
IDJI 124 
Given 
--------
Refused 
-------
Modified 
-------
Covered 
-------Other _______ _ 
DATED This ___ day of September, 2009 
District Judge 
000553 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS WITH CITES, PAGE 14 
DEFENDANT'S INSTRUCTION NO. 12 
- --
When I say that a party has the burden of proof on a proposition, or use the 
expression "if you find," or "if you decide," I mean you must be persuaded, that the 
proposition is more probably true than not true. 
IDJI2d 1.20.1 
Given 
--------
Refused 
-------Mod ifi ed ______ _ 
Covered 
-------Other _______ _ 
DATED This ___ day of September, 2009 
District Judge 
000554 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS WITH CITES, PAGE 15 
DEFENDANT'S INSTRUCTION NO. _13_ 
On the claim of medical malpractice against Dr. Timmel for failure to meet the 
applicable standard of health care practice, the plaintiff has the burden of proof on each 
of the following propositions: 
1. That Dr. Timmel failed to meet the applicable standard of health care 
practice as defined in these instructions; 
2. That the plaintiff was damaged; 
3. That the acts of Dr. Timmel which failed to meet the applicable standard of 
health care practice were a proximate cause of the damages of the plaintiff; and 
4. The elements of damage and the amount thereof. 
You will be asked the following questions on the jury verdict form: 
Did defendant Kevin Timmel, M.D. breach the applicable standard of health care 
practice in his care and treatment of Janet Bell Nightengale? 
If so, did any breach of the standard of health care practice on the part of defendant 
Kevin Timmel, M.D. proximately cause Janet Bell Nightengale's damages? 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that the respective proposition 
has been proved, you should answer the respective question or questions "Yes." 
However, if you find that any of the propositions have not been proved, then the plaintiff 
has not met the burden of proof required and you should answer the respective question 
or questions "No." 
IDJI2d 2.10.3 (modified); IDJI2d 1.41.1 (modified) 
Given 
--------Refused 
-------Modified ______ _ 
Covered 
-------
Other 
--------
DATED This ___ day of September, 2009 
District Judge 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS WITH CITES, PAGE 16 
000555 
DEFENDANT'S INSTRUCTION NO. 14 
The plaintiff in this medical malpractice case has the burden of affirmatively proving 
by direct expert testimony, and by a preponderance of all competent evidence, that at the 
time and place of the incident in question, Dr. Timmel negligently failed to meet the 
applicable standard of health care practice of the community in which such care allegedly 
was or should have been provided, as such standard then existed at the time and place of 
the alleged negligence of defendant and as such standard then and there existed with 
respect to the class of health care providers that Dr. Timmel then and there belonged to 
and in which capacity he was functioning. 
Dr. Timmel shall be judged in comparison with similarly trained and qualified 
providers of the same class in the same community, taking into account training, 
experience and fields of medical specialization. 
Idaho Code § 6-1012 
Given 
--------Refused 
-------Modified 
-------
Covered 
-------Other _______ _ 
DATED This day of September, 2009 
District Judge 
000556 
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DEFENDANTS' INSTRUCTION NO. _15_ 
When I use the expression "proximate cause," I mean a cause which, in natural or 
probable sequence, produced the injury, the loss or the damage complained of. It need 
not be the only cause. It is sufficient if it is a substantial factor in bringing about the injury, 
loss or damage. It is not a proximate cause if the injury, loss or damage likely would have 
occurred anyway. 
There may be one or more proximate causes of an injury. 
Plaintiff must prove proximate cause by expert testimony, by a preponderance of 
the evidence, and to a reasonable degree of medical certainty. 
IDJI2d 2.30.2 (modified) 
Swallow v. Emergency Medicine of Idaho, P.A., 138 Idaho 589,67 P.3d 68 (2003) 
Hilden v. Ball, 117 Idaho 314, 787 P.2d 1122 (1989) 
Evans v. Twin Falls County, 118 Idaho 210,796 P.2d 87 (1990) 
Flowerdew v. Warner, 90 Idaho 164,409 P.2d 110 (1965) 
Maxwell v. Women's Clinic, P.A., 102 Idaho 53,625 P.2d 407 (1981) 
Hall v. Bacon, 93 Idaho 1,453 P.2d 816 (1969) 
Schofield v. Idaho Falls Latter Day Saints Hospital, 90 Idaho 186,409 P.2d 107 (1965) 
Given 
--------
Refused 
-------
Modified 
-------Covered ______ _ 
Other 
--------
DATED This ___ day of September, 2009 
District Judge 
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JURY INSTRUCTIONS WITH CITES, PAGE 18 
DEFENDANTS' INSTRUCTION NO. 16 
When I use the word "negligence in these instructions, I mean the failure to use 
ordinary care in the management of one's property or person. The words "ordinary 
care" mean the care a reasonably careful person would use under circumstances 
similar to those show by the evidence. Negligence may thus consist of the failure to do 
something which a reasonably careful person would do, or the doing of something a 
reasonably careful person would not do, under circumstances similar to those show by 
the evidence. The law does not say how a reasonably careful person would act under 
those circumstances. That is for you to decide. 
IDJI 2.20 - Definition of negligence 
Given 
----------------Refused 
--------
Modified 
-------
Covered 
---------Other _______ _ 
DATED This day of September, 2009 
District Judge 
000558 
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DEFENDANT'S INSTRUCTION NO. _17_ 
As used in these instructions, the term "community" refers to that geographical area 
ordinarily served by the licensed general hospital at or nearest to which the care was or 
allegedly should have been provided. 
Idaho Code § 6-1012 
Grimes v. Green, 113 Idaho 519,746 P.2d 978 (1987) 
Dekker v. M.v.R.M.C., 115 Idaho 332,766 P.2d 1213 (1988) 
Given 
--------Refused ______ _ 
Modified 
._------
Covered 
-------
Other 
--------
DATED This ___ day of September, 2009 
District Judge 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS WITH CITES, PAGE 20 
000559 
DEFENDANT'S INSTRUCTION NO. 18 
- --
In determining whether Dr. Timmel's care of Janet Bell Nightengale satisfied or 
breached the applicable standard of care of health care practice as it has been stated to 
you, you are not permitted to arbitrarily set a standard of your own. The only way you may 
properly learn the applicable standard of care is through evidence presented in this trial by 
health care providers, including physicians, called as expert witnesses. The expert 
witness's testimony can only be considered by the jury if (a) the expert opinion is actually 
held by the expert witness; (b) that the expert's opinion can be testified to with reasonable 
medical certainty, and (c) that the expert witness possesses professional knowledge and 
expertise coupled with actual knowledge of the applicable community standard to which 
his or her expert opinion testimony is addressed. 
Idaho Code § 6-1013 
BAJI 214-B (modified) 
Given 
--------
Refused 
-------
Modified 
-------Covered 
-------Other 
=---:=--------
DATED This ___ day of September, 2009 
District Judge 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS WITH CITES, PAGE 21 
000560 
DEFENDANT'S INSTRUCTION NO. _19_ 
If the plaintiff proves through expert testimony that Dr. Timmel breached the 
applicable standard of health care practice, plaintiff has the additional burden of proving 
through expert testimony Dr. Timmel's breach of the applicable standard of health care 
practice was, with a reasonable degree of medical certainty, the proximate cause of Janet 
Bell Nightengale damages. 
If you find Dr. Timmel breached the applicable standard of health care practice, but 
that this was not the proximate cause of Janet Bell Nightengale's damages, then your 
verdict must be for Dr. Timmel. 
Conrad v. St. Clair, 100 Idaho 401, 599 P.2d 292 (1979) 
Swallow v. Emergency Medicine of Idaho. P.A., 138 Idaho 589,67 P.3d 68 (2003) 
Sheridan v. St. Luke's Regional Medical Center, 135 Idaho 775,25 P.3d 88 (2001) 
Doe v. Garcia, 126 Idaho 1036, 895 P.2d 1229 (Ct. App. 1995) 
Given 
--------
Refused 
-------
Modified 
._------
Covered 
-------Other _______ _ 
DATED This day of September, 2009 
District Judge 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS WITH CITES, PAGE 22 
000561 
DEFENDANT'S INSTRUCTION NO. 20 
- --
When I use the expression "proximate cause," I mean a cause which, in natural or 
probable sequence, produced the complained injury, loss or damage, and but for that 
cause the damage would not have occurred. It need not be the only cause. It is sufficient 
if it is a substantial factor in bringing about the injury, loss or damage. It is not a proximate 
cause if the injury, loss or damage likely would have occurred anyway. 
IDJI 2.30.1 - Proximate cause "but for" test 
Given 
--------Refused ______ _ 
Mod ifi ed ______ _ 
Covered 
-------
Other_--------
DATED This day of September, 2009 
District Judge 
000562 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS WITH CITES, PAGE 23 
DEFENDANT'S INSTRUCTION NO. 21 
further instruct you that medical practitioners, such as Dr. Timmel are not 
insurers of the correctness of their treatment. The mere fact that an undesirable or 
unfortunate result occurred following medical care rendered by Dr. Timmel does not, of 
itself, establish a breach of the applicable standard of health care practice on the part of 
Dr. Timmel. 
Willis v. Western Hospital Ass'n, 67 Idaho 435,182 P.2d 950 (1947) 
Given 
--------Refused ______ _ 
Modified 
-------Covered 
-------
Other 
--------DATED This ___ day of September, 2009 
District Judge 
000563 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS WITH CITES, PAGE 24 
DEFENDANT'S INSTRUCTION NO. 22 
Dr. Timmel may not be held liable for the breach of the applicable standard of 
health care practice, if any, by any other health care provider involved in the care of 
Janet Bell Nightengale. 
IDJI2d 2.40 (modified) 
Given 
--------Refused 
-------
Modified 
-------Covered 
-------
Other 
=-:--------DATED This ___ day of September, 2009 
District Judge 
000564 
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DEFENDANT'S INSTRUCTION NO. _23_ 
In this case, the Defendant has alleged that Janet Bell Nightengale was negligent 
in not following medical advice regarding her care and treatment. On this defense, the 
Defendant has the burden of proof of each of the following propositions: 
1. Janet Bell Nightengale was negligent, and 
2. The negligence of Janet Bell Nightengale was a proximate cause of her own 
injuries. 
IDJI 1.41.4.2 - Companion instruction - defendant's burden (modified) 
Given 
--------
Refused 
-------
Modified 
-------Covered 
-------Other 
--------
DATED This ___ day of September, 2009 
District Judge 
000565 
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DEFENDANT'S INSTRUCTION NO. 24 
By giving you instructions on the subject of damages, I do not express any opinion 
as to whether the plaintiff is entitled to damages. 
IDJI2d 9.00 
Given 
--------Refused ______ _ 
Mod ifi ed ______ _ 
Covered 
-------Other _______ _ 
DATED This day of September, 2009 
District Judge 
000566 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS WITH CITES, PAGE 27 
DEFENDANT'S INSTRUCTION NO. 25 
If the jury decides the plaintiff is entitled to recover from the defendant, the jury 
must determine the amount of money that will reasonably and fairly compensate the 
plaintiff for any damages proved to be proximately caused by defendant's negligence. 
The elements of damage the jury may consider are: 
A. Non-economic damages 
1. The nature of the injuries; 
2. The physical and mental pain and suffering, past and future; 
3. The impairment of abilities to perform usual activities; 
4. The disfigurement caused by the injuries; 
B. Economic damages 
1. The reasonable value of necessary medical care received and expenses 
incurred as a result of the injury and the present cash value of medical care and expenses 
reasonably certain and necessary to be required in the future; 
2. The reasonable value of necessary services provided by another in doing 
things for the plaintiff, which, except for the injury, the plaintiff would ordinarily have 
performed and the present cash value of such services reasonably certain to be required 
in the future. 
Whether the plaintiff has proved any of these elements is for the jury to decide. 
IDJI 9.01 - Damage instruction for injuries to plaintiff - general case (modified) 
Given _______ _ 
Refused 
-------
Modified 
-------
Covered 
-------Other _______ _ 
DATED This day of September, 2009 
District Judge 
000567 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS WITH CITES, PAGE 28 
DEFENDANT'S INSTRUCTION NO. _26_ 
You are instructed that if you find the plaintiff is entitled to damages that you may 
award only such damages as have been proved by plaintiff with reasonable certainty. 
Mclean v. City of Spirit lake, 91 Idaho 779, 430 P.2d 670 (1967) 
Rindlisbaker v. Wilson, 95 Idaho 752, 519 P.2d 421 (1974) 
Hake v. Delane, 117 Idaho 1058, 793 P.2d 1230 (1990) 
Given 
-------Refused ______ _ 
Modified 
-------Covered 
-------Other ______ _ 
DATED This day of September, 2009 
District Judge 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS WITH CITES, PAGE 29 
000568 
DEFENDANT'S INSTRUCTION NO. _27_ 
A person asserting a claim of damages has the burden of proving not only a right to 
damages, but also the amount of damages. Idaho law does not permit arriving at an 
alleged amount of damages by guessing or conjecture. 
Beare v. Stowes' Builders Supply, 104 Idaho 317,658 P.2d 988 (Ct. App. 1983) 
Given 
--------
Refused 
-------Modified ______ _ 
Covered 
-------Other _______ _ 
DATED This day of September, 2009 
District Judge 
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JURY INSTRUCTIONS WITH CITES, PAGE 30 
DEFENDANT'S INSTRUCTION NO. 28 
- --
The amount of damages claimed either by the written pleadings or in the argument 
of counsel must not be considered by you as evidence of reasonable compensation. 
Idaho Code § 10-111 
Given 
--------
Refused 
-------
Modified 
-------Covered ______ _ 
Other 
~=--------
DATED This ___ day of September, 2009 
District Judge 
000570 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS WITH CITES, PAGE 31 
DEFENDANT'S INSTRUCTION NO. 29 
A person who has been damaged must exercise ordinary care to minimize the 
damage and prevent further damage. Any loss that results from a failure to exercise 
such care cannot be recovered. 
IDJI2d 9.14 
Given 
--------
Refused 
-------
Modified 
-------
Covered 
-------Other _______ _ 
DATED This day of September, 2009 
District Judge 
000571 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS WITH CITES, PAGE 32 
DEFENDANT'S INSTRUCTION NO. _30_ 
In fixing the amount of money which will reasonably and fairly compensate the 
plaintiff, you are to consider that a person who is injured must exercise ordinary care to 
minimize the damage and to prevent further damage. Any loss which results from a 
failure of the plaintiff Janet Bell Nightengale to exercise such ordinary care cannot be 
recovered by plaintiff. 
IDJI2d 9.14 (modified) 
Turpen v. Granieri, 133 Idaho 244, 247,985 P.2d 669, 671 (1999) 
Given 
--------
Refused 
-------
Modified 
-------Covered 
-------Other _______ _ 
DATED This day of September, 2009 
District Judge 
000572 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS WITH CITES, PAGE 33 
DEFENDANT'S INSTRUCTION NO. 31 
- --
When I use the phrase "present cash value" as to any damage that may accrue in 
the future, I mean that sum of money determined and paid now which, when invested at a 
reasonable rate of interest, would be sufficient to pay the future damages at the time and 
in the amount the future damages will be incurred. 
IDJI2d 9.13 
Given 
--------Refused 
-------Modified 
-------Covered 
-------Other _______ _ 
DATED This day of September, 2009 
District Judge 
000573 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS WITH CITES, PAGE 34 
DEFENDANT'S INSTRUCTION NO. 32 
In deciding this case, you may not delegate any of your decisions to another or 
decide any question by chance, such as by the flip of a coin or drawing of straws. If 
money damages are to be awarded or percentages of fault are to be assigned, you may 
not agree in advance to average the sum of each individual juror's estimate as the 
method of determining the amount of the damage award or percentage of negligence. 
IDJI2d 1.09 
Given 
--------
Refused 
-------Modified ______ _ 
Covered 
-------Other 
--------
DATED This ___ day of September, 2009 
District Judge 
000574 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS WITH CITES, PAGE 35 
, , 
DEFENDANT'S INSTRUCTION NO. 33 
- --
If it becomes necessary during your deliberations to communicate with me, you 
may send a note signed by one or more of you to the bailiff. You should not try to 
communicate with me by any other means than such a note. 
During your deliberation, you are not to reveal to anyone how the jury stands on 
any of the questions before you, numerically or otherwise, unless requested to do so by 
me. 
IDJI2d 1.11 
Given 
--------Refused 
-------Modified ______ _ 
Covered 
-------Other 
--------
DATED This ___ day of September, 2009 
District Judge 
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JURY INSTRUCTIONS WITH CITES, PAGE 36 
DEFENDANT'S INSTRUCTION NO. _34_ 
I have given you the rules of law that apply to this case. I have instructed you 
regarding matters that you may consider in weighing the evidence to determine the 
facts. In a few minutes counsel will present their closing arguments to you and then you 
will retire to the jury room for your deliberations. 
Each of you has an equally important voice in the jury deliberations. Therefore, 
the attitude and conduct of jurors at the beginning of the deliberations are important. At 
the outset of deliberations, it is rarely productive for a juror to make an emphatic 
expression of opinion on the case or to state how he or she intends to vote. When one 
does that at the beginning, one's sense of pride may be aroused and there may be 
reluctance to change that position, even if shown that it is wrong. Remember that you 
are not partisans or advocates, but you are judges. For you, as for me, there can be no 
triumph except in the ascertainment and declaration of the truth. 
Consult with one another. Consider each other's views. Deliberate with the 
objective of reaching an agreement, if you can do so without disturbing your individual 
judgment. Each of you must decide this case for yourself; but you should do so only 
after a discussion and consideration of the case with your fellow jurors. 
IDJI2d 1.13 
Given 
----------------
Refused 
-------
Modified 
--------Covered 
-------Other 
----------------
DATED This ___ day of September, 2009 
District Judge 
000576 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS WITH CITES, PAGE 37 
DEFENDANTS INSTRUCTION NO. 35 
Members of the Jury: In order to return a verdict, it is necessary that at least three-
fourths of the jury agree. Your verdict must represent the considered judgment of each 
juror agreeing to it. 
It is your duty, as jurors, to consult with one another and to deliberate with a view to 
reaching an agreement, if you can do so without violence to individual judgment. Each of 
you must decide the case for yourself, but do so only after an impartial consideration of the 
evidence with your fellow jurors. In the course of your deliberations, do not hesitate to 
reexamine your own views and change your opinion if convinced it is erroneous. But do 
not surrender your honest conviction as to the weight or effect of evidence solely because 
of the opinion of your fellow jurors, or for the mere purpose of returning a verdict. 
You are not partisans. You are judges--judges of the facts. Your sole interest is to 
ascertain the truth from the evidence in the case. 
IDJI2d 1.13.1 
Given 
--------------
Refused 
---------
Modified 
----------
Covered 
----------Other 
---------------
DATED This ___ day of September, 2009 
District Judge 
000577 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS WITH CITES, PAGE 38 
DEFENDANT'S INSTRUCTION NO. 36 
- --
On retiring to the jury room, select one of your number as a foreman, who will 
preside over your deliberations. 
An appropriate form of verdict will be submitted to you with any instructions. 
Follow the directions on the verdict form, and answer all of the questions required of you 
by the instructions on the verdict form. 
A verdict may be reached by three-fourths of your number, or nine of you. As 
soon as nine or more of you shall have agreed upon each of the required questions in 
the verdict, you should fill it out as instructed, and have it signed. It is not necessary that 
the same nine agree on each question. If your verdict is unanimous, your foreman alone 
will sign it; but if nine or more, but less than the entire jury, agree, then those so 
agreeing will sign the verdict. 
As soon as you have completed and signed the verdicts, you will notify the bailiff, 
who will then return you into open court. 
IDJI2d 1.15.2 
Given 
------------Refused 
--------
Modified 
--------Covered 
-------Other _______ _ 
DATED This day of September, 2009 
District Judge 
000578 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS WITH CITES, PAGE 39 
DEFENDANT'S INSTRUCTION NO. _37_ 
You have now completed your duties as jurors in this case and are discharged 
with the sincere thanks of this Court. You may now discuss this case with the attorneys 
or with anyone else. For your guidance, I instruct you that whether you talk to the 
attorneys, or to anyone else, is entirely your own decision. It is proper for you to 
discuss this case, if you want to, but you are not required to do so, and you may choose 
not to discuss the case with anyone at all. If you choose to talk to someone about this 
case, you may tell them as much or as little as you like about your deliberations or the 
facts that influenced your decisions. If anyone persists in discussing the case over 
your objection, or becomes critical of your service, either before or after any discussion 
has begun, you may report it to me. 
IDJI2d 1.17 
Given 
---------------
Refused 
----------
Modified 
---------Covered 
-------Other _______ _ 
DATED This day of September, 2009 
District Judge 
000579 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS WITH CITES, PAGE 40 
DEFENDANT'S INSTRUCTION NO. _38_ 
In this case, you will be given a special verdict form to use in returning your verdict. 
This form consists of a series of questions that you are to answer. I will read the verdict 
form to you now. 
We, the Jury, answer the special interrogatories as follows: 
Question No.1: Was the plaintiff, Janet Bell Nightengale, negligent in her participation 
and follow through in her own health care? 
Answer to Question NO.1: Yes L-.-1 No L-.-1 
If the answer to Question No.1 is Yes, go to Question No.2. If the answer to Question 
No.1 is No, skip Question No.2 and go to Question No.3. 
Question No.2: Was plaintiff, Janet Bell Nightengale's, negligence a proximate cause of 
her damages? 
Answer to Question No.2: Yes L-.-1 No L-.-1 
If the answer to Question No.2 is Yes, go to Question No.3. If the answer to Question 
No.2 is No, go to Question NO.3. 
Question No.3: Did Defendant Jason Quinn, M.D., breach the standard of care in his 
treatment of the plaintiff, Janet Bell Nightengale? 
Answer to Question NO.3: Yes L-.-1 No L-.-1 
If the answer to Question NO.3 is Yes, go to Question NO.4. If the answer to Question 
No.3 is No, skip Question No.4 and go to Question No.5. 
Question No.4: Was Defendant Jason Quinn, M.D.'s, breach of the standard of care in 
his treatment of the plaintiff, Janet Bell Nightengale, a proximate cause of plaintiffs 
damages? 
Answer to Question NO.4: Yes L-.-1 No L-.-1 
If the answer to Question NO.4 is Yes, go to Question No.5. If the answer to Question 
No.4 is No, go to Question No.5. 
000580 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS WITH CITES, PAGE 41 
Question No.5: Did Defendant Kevin Timmel, M.D., breach the standard of care in his 
treatment of the plaintiff, Janet Bell Nightengale? 
Answer to Question No.5: Yes l-.J No l-.J 
If the answer to Question No.5 is Yes, go to Question No.6. If the answer to Question 
No.5 is No, skip Question No.6 and go to the Instruction for Question No.7. 
Question No.6: Was Defendant Kevin Timmel, M.D.'s, breach of the standard of care 
in his treatment of the plaintiff, Janet Bell Nightengale, a proximate cause of plaintiffs 
damages? 
Answer to Question No.6: Yes l-.J No l-.J 
If the answer to Question No.6 is Yes, go to the Instruction for Question No.7. If the 
answer to Question No.6 is No, go to the Instruction for Question No.7. 
Instruction for Question No.7: You will answer this question only if you have found that 
the actions of one or both of the Defendants (Jason Quinn, M.D., and/or Kevin Timmel, 
M.D.), were the proximate cause of any damages to the Plaintiff. In this question, you 
are to apportion the fault between any parties for whom you found proximate cause. As 
to each party or entity to which you answered "Yes" to the proximate cause questions 
(Question Nos. 2, 4, and 6), you must determine the percentage of fault for that party or 
entity, and enter the percentage on the appropriate line. If you answered "No" to the 
proximate cause question for a party, insert a "0" or "Zero" as to that party or entity. 
Question No.7: What is the percentage of fault (if any) you assign to each of the 
following: 
To the Plaintiff, Janet Bell Nightengale 
To the Defendant, Jason Quinn, M.D. 
To the Defendant, Kevin Timmel, M.D. 
Total must equal 100% 
% 
--
% 
--
% 
--
If the percentage of fault you assigned to the Plaintiff, Janet Bell Nightengale, is equal to 
or greater than the percentage of fault you assigned to one or both of the Defendants 
000581 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS WITH CITES, PAGE 42 
(Jason Quinn, M.D., and/or Kevin Timmel, MD.), you are done. Sign the verdict and 
advise the Bailiff. If the percentage of fault assigned to the Plaintiff is less than the 
percentage of fault you assigned to the Defendants, answer Question NO.8. 
Answer to Question No.8: We assess Plaintiffs damages as follows: 
1. Economic damages, as defined in the Instructions: 
$------------------------------
2. Non-economic damages, as defined in the Instructions: 
$-------------------------------------
Sign the verdict and advise the Bailiff. 
There will be a place to insert the date and a signature line for the jury foreperson and 
each member of the jury who joins in the verdict to sign. 
IDJI 1.43.1 - Example verdict on special interrogatories 
IDJI 1.43.1 - Instruction on special verdict form 
Given 
------------
Refused 
------------Mod ifi ed, ________ _ 
Covered 
--------Other 
--------------
DATED This ___ day of September, 2009 
District Judge 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS WITH CITES, PAGE 43 
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Steven K. Tolman (ISB #1769) 
Nicole L. Cannon (ISB #5502) 
TOLMAN & BRIZEE, P.C. 
132 3rd Avenue East 
P.O. Box 1276 
Twin Falls, Idaho 83303-1276 
Telephone: (208) 733-5566 
Attorney for Defendant Kevin Timmel, MD 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
JANET BELL NIGHTENGALE, 
Plaintiff, Case No. CV OC 0722814 
vs. DEFENDANT KEVIN TIMMEL, M.D. 'S 
PROPOSED SPECIAL VERDICT FORM 
JASON QUINN, M.D.; IDAHO 
EMERGENCY PHYSICIANS, P.A.; 
KEVIN MATTHEW TIMMEL, M.D.; AND 
EMERGENCY MEDICINE OF IDAHO, 
PA AND ITS AFFILIATES, 
Defendants. 
We, the Jury, answer the special interrogatories as follows: 
Question NO.1: Was the plaintiff, Janet Bell Nightengale, negligent in her participation 
and follow through in her own health care? 
Answer to Question No.1: Yes ~ No ~ 
If the answer to Question No.1 is Yes, go to Question No.2. If the answer to Question 
No.1 is No, skip Question No.2 and go to Question NO.3. 
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DEFENDANT KEVIN TIMMEL, MD.'S PROPOSED SPECIAL VERDICT FORM, PAGE 1 
Question NO.2: Was plaintiff, Janet Bell Nightengale's, negligence a proximate cause of 
her damages? 
Answer to Question No.2: Yes L.-J No L.-J 
If the answer to Question No.2 is Yes, go to Question No.3. If the answer to Question 
No.2 is No, go to Question No.3. 
Question NO.3: Did Defendant Jason Quinn, M.D., breach the standard of care in his 
treatment of the plaintiff, Janet Bell Nightengale? 
Answer to Question No.3: Yes L.-J No L.-J 
If the answer to Question No.3 is Yes, go to Question No.4. If the answer to Question 
NO.3 is No, skip Question NO.4 and go to Question NO.5. 
Question NO.4: Was Defendant Jason Quinn, M.D.'s, breach of the standard of care in 
his treatment of the plaintiff, Janet Bell Nightengale, a proximate cause of plaintiff's 
damages? 
Answer to Question No.4: Yes L.-J No L.-J 
If the answer to Question No.4 is Yes, go to Question No.5. If the answer to Question 
NO.4 is No, go to Question No.5. 
Question NO.5: Did Defendant Kevin Timmel, M.D., breach the standard of care in his 
treatment of the plaintiff, Janet Bell Nightengale? 
Answer to Question No.5: Yes L.-J No L.-J 
If the answer to Question No.5 is Yes, go to Question No.6. If the answer to Question 
NO.5 is No, skip Question No.6 and go to the Instruction for Question No.7. 
Question NO.6: Was Defendant Kevin Timmel, M.D.'s, breach of the standard of care 
in his treatment of the plaintiff, Janet Bell Nightengale, a proximate cause of plaintiff's 
damages? 
Answer to Question No.6: Yes L.-J No L.-J 
If the answer to Question No.6 is Yes, go to the Instruction for Question NO.7. If the 
answer to Question No.6 is No, go to the Instruction for Question No.7. 
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DEFENDANT KEVIN TIMMEL, M.D.'S PROPOSED SPECIAL VERDICT FORM, PAGE 2 
Instruction for Question No.7: You will answer this question only if you have found that 
the actions of one or both of the Defendants (Jason Quinn, M.D., and/or Kevin Timmel, 
M.D.), were the proximate cause of any damages to the Plaintiff. In this question, you 
are to apportion the fault between any parties for whom you found proximate cause. As 
to each party or entity to which you answered "Yes" to the proximate cause questions 
(Question Nos. 2, 4, and 6), you must determine the percentage of fault for that party or 
entity, and enter the percentage on the appropriate line. If you answered "No" to the 
proximate cause question for a party, insert a "0" or "Zero" as to that party or entity. 
Question No.7: What is the percentage of fault (if any) you assign to each of the 
following: 
To the Plaintiff, Janet Bell Nightengale 
To the Defendant, Jason Quinn, M.D. 
To the Defendant, Kevin Timmel, MD. 
Total must equal 100% 
% 
--
% 
--
% 
--
If the percentage of fault you assigned to the Plaintiff, Janet Bell Nightengale, is equal to 
or greater than the percentage of fault you assigned to one or both of the Defendants 
(Jason Quinn, M.D., and/or Kevin Timmel, MD.), you are done. Sign the verdict and 
advise the Bailiff. If the percentage of fault assigned to the Plaintiff is less than the 
percentage of fault you assigned to the Defendants, answer Question NO.8. 
Answer to Question No.8: We assess Plaintiff's damages as follows: 
1. Economic damages, as defined in the Instructions: 
$-----------------------------------
2. Non-economic damages, as defined in the Instructions: 
$-----------------------------------
Sign the verdict and advise the Bailiff. 
DEFENDANT KEVIN TIMMEL, M.D.'S PROPOSED SPECIAL VERDICT FORM, PAGE 3 
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DATED This ____ day of _______ , 2009. 
Foreperson Juror 
Juror Juror 
Juror Juror 
Juror Juror 
Juror Juror 
Juror Juror 
000586 
DEFENDANT KEVIN TIMMEL, M.D.'S PROPOSED SPECIAL VERDICT FORM, PAGE 4 
INSTRUCTION NO. __ 
THE VOIR DIRE 
You have been summoned as prospective jurors in the lawsuit now before us. 
The first thing we do in a trial is to select 12 jurors, and, perhaps one or two alternate 
jurors from among you ladies and gentlemen. 
I am the judge in charge of the courtroom and this trial. The deputy clerk of court 
marks the trial exhibits and administers oaths to you jurors and the witnesses. The 
bailiff will assist me in maintaining courtroom order and will arrange for your meals after 
this case has been submitted to you for decision. The court reporter will keep a 
verbatim account of all matters of record during the trial. 
To assist both you and the attorneys with this process of selection of a jury, I will 
introduce you to the parties and attorneys and tell you in brief what this lawsuit is about. 
The parties who bring a lawsuit are called the "plaintiffs." In this suit, the plaintiff 
is Janet Bell Nightengale. The plaintiff is represented by lawyer Kevin Dinius. The 
parties against whom a lawsuit is brought are called the "defendants." The defendants 
in this suit are Jason Quinn, M.D. and Kevin Timmel, M.D. Jason Quinn, M.D. is 
represented by Kevin J. Scanlan. Kevin Timmel, M.D. is represented by Steven K. 
Tolman. This is a civil case involving a claim for medical malpractice. 
A trial starts with a selection of a fair, impartial jury. To that end, the court and 
the lawyers will ask each of you questions to discover whether you have any information 
concerning the case or any opinions or attitudes which any of the lawyers believe might 
cause you to favor or disfavor some part of the evidence or one side or the other. The 
questions may probe deeply into your attitudes, beliefs and experiences, but they are 
not intended to embarrass you. 
If you do not hear or understand a question, you should say so. If you do 
understand the question, you should answer it freely. 
The clerk of the court will now swear you for the jury examination. 
000587 
INSTRUCTION NO. __ 
These instructions explain your duties as jurors and define the law that applies to 
this case. It is your duty to determine the facts, to apply the law set forth in these 
instructions to those facts, and in this way to decide the case. Your decision should be 
based upon a rational and objective assessment of the evidence. It should not be based 
on sympathy or prejudice. 
It is my duty to instruct you on the points of law necessary to decide the case, 
and it is your duty to follow the law as I instruct. You must consider these instructions as 
a whole, not picking out one and disregarding others. The order in which these 
instructions are given or the manner in which they are numbered has no significance as 
to the importance of any of them. If you do not understand an instruction, you may send 
a note to me through the bailiff, and I will try to clarify or explain the pOint further. 
In determining the facts, you may consider only the evidence admitted in this 
trial. This evidence consists of the testimony of the witnesses, the exhibits admitted into 
evidence, and any stipulated or admitted facts. While the arguments and remarks of the 
attorneys may help you understand the evidence and apply the instructions, what they 
say is not evidence. If an attorney's argument or remark has no basis in the evidence, 
you should disregard it. 
The production of evidence in court is governed by rule of law. At times during 
the trial, I sustained an objection to a question without permitting the witness to answer 
it, or to an offered exhibit without receiving it into evidence. My rulings are legal matters, 
and are solely my responsibility. You must not speculate as to the reason for any 
objection, which was made, or my ruling thereon, and in reaching your decision you 
may not consider such a question or exhibit or speculate as to what the answer or 
exhibit would have shown. Remember, a question is not evidence and should be 
considered only as it gives meaning to the answer. 
There were occasions where an objection was made after an answer was given 
or the remark was made, and in my ruling on the objection I instructed that the answer 
or remark be stricken, or directed that you disregard the answer or remark and dismiss 
000588 
it from your minds. In your deliberations, you must not consider such answer or remark, 
but must treat it as though you had never heard it. 
The law does not require you to believe all of the evidence admitted in the course 
of the trial. As the sole judges of the facts, you must determine what evidence you 
believe and what weight you attach to it. In so doing, you bring with you to this 
courtroom all of the experience and background of your lives. There is no magical 
formula for evaluating testimony. In your everyday affairs, you determine for yourselves 
whom you believe, what you believe and how much weight you attach to what you are 
told. The considerations you use in making the more important decisions in your 
everyday dealings are the same considerations you should apply in your deliberations in 
this case. 
000589 
INSTRUCTION NO. __ 
During your deliberations, you will be entitled to have with you my instructions 
concerning the law that applies to this case, the exhibits that have been admitted into 
evidence and any notes taken by you in the course of the trial proceedings. 
If you take notes during the trial, be careful that your attention is not thereby 
diverted from the witness or his testimony; and you must keep your notes to yourself 
and not show them to other persons or jurors until the jury deliberations at the end of 
the trial. 
000590 
INSTRUCTION NO. __ 
There are certain things you must not do during this trial: 
1. You must not associate in any way with the parties, any of the attorneys or 
their employees, or any of the witnesses. 
2. You must not discuss the case with anyone, or permit anyone to discuss 
the case with you. If anyone attempts to discuss the case with you, or to influence your 
decision in the case, you must report it to me promptly. 
3. You must not discuss the case with other jurors until you retire to the jury 
room to deliberate at the close of the entire case. 
4. You must not make up your mind until you have heard all of the testimony 
and have received my instructions as to the law that applies to the case. 
5. You must not contact anyone in an attempt to discuss or gain a greater 
understanding of the case. 
6. You must not go to the place where any alleged event occurred. 
000591 
INSTRUCTION NO. __ 
Members of the jury, I remind you that you are not to discuss this case among 
yourselves or with anyone else, nor to form any opinion as to the merits of the case, 
until after I finally submit the case to you. 
000592 
INSTRUCTION NO. __ 
Whether a party has insurance is not relevant to any of the questions you are to 
decide. You must avoid any inference, speculation or discussion about insurance. 
000593 
INSTRUCTION NO. __ 
Any statement by me identifying a claim of a party is not evidence in this case. J 
have advised you of the claims of the parties merely to acquaint you with the issues to 
be decided. 
000594 
INSTRUCTION NO. __ 
The following facts are not in dispute: 
1. Janet Bell Nightengale presented to the emergency room at St Luke's 
Regional Medical Center on June 1, 2007, where she was seen by 
Stephanie Bodes, M.D. 
2. Janet Ben Nightengale presented to the emergency department of St. Luke's 
Regional Medical Center, on June 18,2007, where she was seen 
by Marlin Jack Trainer, D.O. 
3. Janet Bell Nightengale presented to the emergency department of Saint 
Alphonsus Regional Medical Center on July 11, 2007, and she was 
seen by Jason Quinn, M.D. 
4. Janet Bell Nightengale presented to the emergency department of St. 
Luke's Regional Medical Center, Ltd., on July 16, 2007, and she 
was seen by Kevin Timmel, M.D. 
5. Janet Bell Nightengale presented to the Terry O'Reilly Clinic on July 20, 
2007. Thereafter, and on that same day, plaintiff went to St. Luke's 
Regional Medical Center emergency department, where she was 
seen by Rourke Yeakley, M.D. 
6. Janet Bell Nightengale was transferred to Saint Alphonsus Regional 
Medical Center on July 20, 2007. She was diagnosed with limb 
ischemia, at which time she was determined to have an arterial 
occlusion of the left arm which resulted in an above the elbow 
amputation. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. __ 
Certain evidence is about to be presented to you by deposition. A deposition is 
testimony taken under oath before the trial and preserved in writing. This evidence is 
entitled to the same consideration you would give had the witness testified from the 
witness stand. 
You will only receive this testimony in open court. Although there is a record of 
the testimony you are about to hear, this record will not be available to you during your 
deliberations. 
000596 
INSTRUCTION NO. __ 
Evidence may be either direct or circumstantial. The law makes no distinction 
between direct and circumstantial evidence. Each is accepted as a reasonable method of 
proof and each is respected for such convincing force as it may carry. 
000597 
INSTRUCTION NO. __ 
A witness who has special knowledge in a particular matter may give his opinion on 
that matter. In determining the weight to be given such opinion, you should consider the 
qualifications and credibility of the witness and the reasons given for his opinion. You are 
not bound by such opinion. Give it the weight, if any, to which you deem it entitled. 
000598 
INSTRUCTION NO. __ 
When I say that a party has the burden of proof on a proposition, or use the 
expression "if you find," or "if you decide," I mean you must be persuaded, that the 
proposition is more probably true than not true. 
000599 
INSTRUCTION NO. __ 
On the claim of medical malpractice against Dr. Timmel for failure to meet the 
applicable standard of health care practice, the plaintiff has the burden of proof on each 
of the following propositions: 
1. That Dr. Timmel failed to meet the applicable standard of health care 
practice as defined in these instructions; 
2. That the plaintiff was damaged; 
3. That the acts of Dr. Timmel which failed to meet the applicable standard of 
health care practice were a proximate cause of the damages of the plaintiff; and 
4. The elements of damage and the amount thereof. 
You will be asked the following questions on the jury verdict form: 
Did defendant Kevin Timmel, M.D. breach the applicable standard of health care 
practice in his care and treatment of Janet Bell Nightengale? 
If so, did any breach of the standard of health care practice on the part of defendant 
Kevin Timmel, M.D. proximately cause Janet Bell Nightengale's damages? 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that the respective proposition 
has been proved, you should answer the respective question or questions "Yes." 
However, if you find that any of the propositions have not been proved, then the plaintiff 
has not met the burden of proof required and you should answer the respective question 
or questions "No." 
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